A New Zealand investigative journalist and author says the US spy system hosted by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) appears to be a controversial intelligence system used in global capture-kill operations.

Writing a commentary for RNZ News today, Nicky Hager, author of Secret Power, a 1996 book on New Zealand’s role in global spy networks, said the controversial and unidentified foreign intelligence operation cited in a report by New Zealand’s Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) last week appeared to be an “intelligence system with a ghostly codename”.

“The IGIS report said the GCSB decision to host a foreign system from 2012-2020 was ‘improper’ and that the GCSB ‘could not be sure the tasking of the capability was always in accordance with… New Zealand law’,” he wrote.

“The Inspector-General said: ‘I have found some of the GCSB’s explanations about how the capability operated and was tasked to be incongruous with information in GCSB records at the time’,” Hager wrote.

But the Inspector-General could not reveal details of the system to the public because they were “highly classified”.

“The name and function of the foreign spy spying equipment, the identity of the ‘foreign partner agency’ and the location of the ‘GCSB facility’ where foreign equipment was hosted all remained secret,” Hager wrote.

Hager argued that the mystery spy equipment appeared strongly to be a top secret US surveillance system that had been installed at the GCSB’s Waihopai base at the same time as the equipment in the IGIS investigation was installed at a “GCSB facility”.

25 years of investigations
Hager has worked as an investigative journalist for the past 25 years, and has been a New Zealand member of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists for 20 of those years.

In 2018, he was part of a reference group established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

Hager wrote that the top secret NSA spy equipment had the ghostly codename “APPARITION” and fitted with all the details presented in the IGIS report.

“APPARITION was owned by and controlled by the US National Security Agency — the world’s largest intelligence gathering agency and head of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance that includes the GCSB,” he wrote.

According to Hager, the NSA internal report, written after the launch of the APPARITION system in 2008, said that it “builds on the success of the GHOSTHUNTER prototype . . .  a tool that enabled a significant number of capture-kill operations against terrorists”.

“Capture-kill operations involve lethal attacks on targeted people using drones, bombs and special forces raids,” wrote Hager.

“Human rights organisations have documented numerous deaths of civilians during capture-kill operations — many of them ‘algorithmically targeted’ by electronic surveillance systems such as APPARITION.

‘Extra-judicial killings’
“They are also criticised as being ‘extra-judicial killings’.”

For decades, protesters had been calling for the GCSB’s iconic radomes at Waihopai Valley spy base in rural Marlborough to be dismantled, saying that when that intelligence was shared with Five Eyes partners — the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia — it made New Zealand complicit in the military campaigns of those countries, among other criticisms.

However, Anti-Bases Campaign (ABC) organiser Murray Horton said at the time of news of the domes’ redundancy in 2021 was nothing to celebrate, since the base itself would continue to operate at the site, “albeit without its most conspicuous physical features that stick out like dogs’ balls”.

The out-of-date domes were removed in 2022.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Whistleblower Owen Wilkes was a tireless and formidable researcher for the Pacific, peace and disarmament. Before the internet, he combed publicly available sources on weapons systems and defence strategy.

In 1968, he revealed the secretive military function of a proposed satellite tracking station in the South Island, and while working in Sweden he was charged with espionage and deported after photographing intriguing but publicly visible installations.

In a new book about his life, Peacemonger, edited by May Bass and Mark Derby, Nicky Hager writes about Wilkes’ research techniques:

Owen Wilkes was an outstanding researcher, a role model of how someone can make a difference in the world by good research. But how did he actually do it? Owen managed to study complex subjects such as Cold War communications systems, secret intelligence facilities and foreign military activities in the Pacific.

There are many important and useful lessons we can learn from how he did this work. The world needs more public interest researchers, on militarism and other subjects. Owen’s self-taught research techniques are like a masterclass in how it is done.

Lots of information isn’t secret, just hard to find
Owen worked for many years, sitting at his large desk at the Peace Movement office in Wellington, researching the military communications systems set up to launch and fight nuclear war. How was this possible?

We are a bit conditioned currently to imagine the only option would be leaked documents from a whistleblower. The first secret of Owen’s success is that he had learned that large amounts of information on these subjects can be found and pieced together from obscure but publicly available sources.

The heart of his research method was long hours spent poring over US government records and military industry magazines, gathering the precious crumbs of detail like someone panning for gold.

Behind the large desk were shelves and shelves of open-topped file boxes, each with a cryptic title. These boxes were full of photocopied documents and handwritten notes from his researching. This may all sound very pre-internet; indeed it was largely pre-digital.

But what Owen was doing would today be called “open source” research and his work is far superior to that carried out by many people with Google and other digital tools at their fingertips. Probably his favourite source of all was a publicly available US defence magazine called Aviation Week and Space Technology. The magazine (now online) is written for military staff and arms manufacturers, keeping them informed about developments in weapons, aircraft and “C3I” systems, which stands for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence systems: one of Owen’s main areas of speciality.

The magazine also covered Owen’s speciality of “space based” military systems, such as military communication and surveillance satellites. In Owen’s files, which can be viewed at the National Library in Wellington, Aviation Week and Space Technology appears often. In a file box called USA Space Systems is a clipping from 1983 about the US Air Force awarding a contract for a ballistic missile early warning system (nuclear war-fighting equipment). The article revealed that the early warning system would be based at air force bases in Alaska, Greenland and Fylingdales, England — three clues about US foreign military activities.

By reading and storing away details from numerous such articles, spanning many years, Owen built up a more and more detailed understanding of military and intelligence systems.

The other endlessly useful source Owen used was US Congress and Senate hearings and reports about the US military budget. This is where each year the US military spells out its military construction plans, new weapons, technology programmes and the rest; often with figures broken down to the level of individual countries and military bases.

Senior military officials appear at hearings to explain the threats and strategies that justify the spending. As with the military magazines, Owen systematically mined these reports year after year for interesting detail.

He was especially keen on the US Congress’ Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations. His files on US antisatellite weapons, for instance, contain a document from this subcommittee about new Anti-Satellite System Facilities (project number 11610) based at Langley Air Force base, Virginia. It had been approved by the president in the renewed Cold War of the mid-1980s to target Soviet satellites. Details like this were pieces in a 1000-piece jigsaw puzzle.

When he was based at the Peace Movement Aotearoa office in Wellington, from 1983 until about 1992, Owen spent long hours at the US Embassy library studying the Military Construction Appropriations and other US government documents. Each year the library received copies of the documents as microfiche (microphotos of each page on a film). Owen was a familiar visitor, hunched over the microfiche reader making notes and printing out interesting pages.

Many times this gave the first clue of construction somewhere in the world, pointing to that country hosting some new US military, nuclear or intelligence activity. The annual US military appropriation information is available to a researcher today. In fact it is now more easily accessed since it is online. But, if anything, Owen’s pre-digital techniques make it clearer how this research is done well. It’s a good reminder that the best sources of information are most often not in the first 10 or 20 hits of a Google search, the point where many people stop looking.

Experience and persistence
An important ingredient in all these methods is persistence. The methods usually work best if, like Owen, a researcher sticks at them over time. Sticking at a subject means you start to recognise names and places in an otherwise boring document, appreciate the significance of some fragment of information and understand the big picture into which each piece of information fits.

Someone who reads deeply and studies a subject over a number of years can in effect become, like Owen, an expert. They may, like him, have no formal university qualifications. But they can know more about their subject than nearly anyone else, which is a good definition of an expert. They recognise the names and places and appreciate the significance of new evidence.

A textbook example of this was when Owen returned to New Zealand in the early 1980s and went to see a recently discovered secret military site near the beach settlement of Tangimoana in the Manawatu.

Owen, who had spent years studying secret bases around the world, was the New Zealander most likely to know what he was looking at. There, on one side of the base, was a large circle of antenna poles: a CDAA circularly-disposed antenna array. It instantly told him the Tangimoana facility was a signals intelligence base. It had the same equipment and was part of the same networks as the bases he had studied in Norway and Sweden.

Ensuring his research was noticed
The purpose of Owen’s work was to make a difference to the issues he researched. A final and vital part of the work was getting attention for the findings of his research. Owen often spoke in the news and he wrote about the issues he was studying. Research, writing and speaking up are essential ingredients in political change. The part of this he probably enjoyed most was travelling and speaking in public to interested groups.

During the 1980s, he had major speaking tours to countries including Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Canada (and often around New Zealand). During these trips he would present information about military and intelligence activities in those countries. A 1985 trip to Canada, which he shared with prominent Palau leader Roman Bedor, was typical. He was in Canada for seven weeks, speaking in most parts of the country and numerous times on radio and television.

One of the things he emphasised was that Canadians, as residents of a Pacific country, should be thinking about what was going on in the Pacific. One of Owen’s recurrent themes was the importance of being aware of the Pacific.

The final ingredient of a good researcher is caring about the subjects they are working on. This can be heard clearly in everything Owen wrote about the Pacific. He described the Pacific being used for submarine-based nuclear weapons and facilities used to prepare for nuclear war. He talked about the big powers using the Pacific as the “backside of the globe”, epitomised by tiny Johnston Atoll west of Hawai’i where the US military does “anything too unpopular, too dangerous and too secret to do elsewhere”.

He talked about things that were getting better: French nuclear testing on the way out; chemical weapons being destroyed. But also the region being used as a site for great power rivalry; and, under multiple pressures, the small Pacific countries being at risk of becoming “more repressive, less democratic”. He cared, and that was at the heart of being a public-interest researcher for decades.

Many of the problems he described are still occurring today. More research, more good research, on these issues and many others is crying out to be done.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The former Minister of Defence has admitted he “completely forgot” about a report which stated civilian casualties were possible during Operation Burnham.

The Burnham Inquiry, led by Sir Terence Arnold and Sir Geoffrey Palmer, has found a child was killed during the operation in Afghanistan and at least seven men also died – three of whom have been identified as insurgents.

The two-year investigation found New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) officials did not plot to cover-up the casualties from the operation in August 2010, as claimed in the book Hit and Run by investigative journalists Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson.

READ MORE: An inquiry into the Hit and Run book claims essential

It did, however, find the Defence Force never corrected claims made to the public and ministers by its personnel that allegations of civilian casualties were “unfounded”, despite knowing it was possible.

The Burnham Inquiry stated NZDF officials misled former Defence Minister Dr Wayne Mapp for more than a year over the possibility of civilian casualties.

But Dr Mapp continued to tell the public claims of civilian casualties were not true after receiving a briefing which said they were in September 2011, it said.

Dr Mapp told RNZ he likely forgot about the briefing because of the death of New Zealand soldier Leon Smith, which happened about the same time.

‘I had actually forgotten’
“I would never do an official information reply untruthfully, knowingly untruthfully. The reality is I actually had forgotten about the briefing,” Dr Mapp said.

Dr Mapp had a sketchy memory of receiving the briefing from retired SAS commander Colonel Jim Blackwell, he said.

“I should’ve at that time spoken to the Chief of Defence Force and to the Prime Minister’s office and I didn’t do that, so I never allowed the opportunity for a proper consideration of that briefing and so that was a failing on my part,” Dr Mapp said.

Dr Mapp has asked himself how he forgot about such crucial information “a huge amount of times” since, he said.

He would never intentionally issue misleading statements, he added.

The RNZ Checkpoint programme.

Dr Mapp told Checkpoint for years he forgot about the 2011 briefing he received from Colonel Blackwell, and it was only during the circumstances of the 2019 inquiry that it came back to him.

“I should have contacted the Chief of Defence Force General … and I should have contacted the Prime Minister’s Office,” when he remembered, he said.

“That was a major failing on my part.”

He checked his diary
He said when he checked his diary – which he had under his house – he realised he did get a briefing.

“Somehow it surfaced back into my memory that I could remember Colonel Blackwell sitting opposite me.

“None of us can ever remember when we forgot, by definition. I can only surmise it was the death of Corporal Leon Smith which occurred about two weeks after the [September 2011] briefing which somehow had the effect of removing it from my memory. That was a very traumatic thing.

Dr Mapp said it was unsatisfactory and he did fail the Defence Force.

“And I failed in fact my fellow colleagues and I guess ultimately I failed New Zealand, by not taking that briefing up immediately and then allowing a proper process to take place,” he told Checkpoint.

“I let New Zealanders down by not following the proper process and so in that sense I do apologise for that. I like to have thought of myself as someone who actually was across things, and in this instance I clearly failed.

“I’ve always been of the view that New Zealand as a nation owes compensation to the victims. I have always felt that we haven’t done enough as a nation to find out. Well now we have the report, we have more information. And I think is now incumbent upon the government now having got the report to do more for the villagers.”

Co-author Stephenson criticises ‘downplay’
One of the authors of Hit and Run is concerned inexcusable failures of the Defence Force are being downplayed.

Jon Stephenson said he felt vindicated by the findings of the Burnham Inquiry Report, but is worried its severity is not being fully conveyed.

“I’m concerned that they are being downplayed by the Defence Force, not only initially and throughout the inquiry, but even now it seems like the Attorney General is not really prepared to accept the extent to which the inquiry has condemned some of the actions of the Defence Force,” he said.

Stephenson had “serious doubts” about whether the Defence Force could change because of their record and their performance throughout the inquiry, he said.

Ardern promises quick implementation
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said the government would implement the recommended changes in the Burnham Inquiry report as quickly as possible and would proceed with them if re-elected.

“There are significant lessons to be learnt from the inquiry’s findings,” she said.

“There are findings here which we will be making sure we follow up on to give that extra layer of confidence in our Defence Force,” she said.

It was right to investigate the claims made in Hit and Run and the country would have a stronger system as a result, she added.

This article is republished by the Pacific Media Centre under a partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz