As you know, there’s a tiny group of Dame Jacinda Ardern haters in New Zealand who are easily triggered by facts and the ongoing success of the former prime minister on the world stage.

The tiny eeny weeny group is made to look bigger online by an automated army of fake profile bots who all say the same five or six things and all leave a space before a comma.

This automation is imported into New Zealand so many of the profiles are in other countries and simply are not real humans.

Naturally this illusion of “flooding the zone” programmatically on social media causes the non-critical minded to assume they are a majority when they have no such real evidence to support that delusion.

Yet here’s some context and food for thought.

None of the haters have run a public hospital, been a director-general of health during a pandemic, been an epidemiologist or even a GP and many struggle to spell their own name properly let alone read anything accurately.

None of them have read all the Health Advice offered to the government during the covid-19 pandemic. They don’t know it at all.

Know a lot more
Yet they typically feel they do know a lot more than any of those people when it comes to a global pandemic unfolding in real time.

None of the haters can recite all 39 recommendations from the first Royal Commission of Inquiry into Covid-19, less than three of them have read the entire first report, none have any memory of National voting for the wage subsidy and business support payments when they accuse the Labour government of destroying the economy.

Most cannot off the top of their heads tell us how the Reserve Bank is independent of government when it raises the OCR and many think Jacinda did this but look you may be challenged to a boxing match if you try to learn them.

The exact macro economic state of our economy in terms of GDP growth, the size of the economy, unemployment and declining inflation forecasts escape their memory when Jacinda resigned, not that they care when they say she destroyed the economy.

They make these claims without facts and figures and they pass on the opinions of others that they listened to and swallowed.

It’s only a tiny group, the rest are bots.

The bots think making horse jokes about Jacinda is amusing, creative and unique and it’s their only joke now for three years — every single day they marvel at their own humour. In ten years they will still be repeating that one insult they call their own.

Bots on Nuremberg
The bots have also been programmed to say things about Nuremberg, being put into jail, bullets, and other violent suggestions which speaks to a kind of mental illness.

The sources of these sorts of sentiments were imported and fanned by groups set up to whip up resentment and few realise how they have been manipulated and captured by this programme.

The pillars of truth to the haters rest on being ignorant about how a democracy necessarily temporarily looks like a dictatorship in a public health emergency in order to save lives.

We agreed these matters as a democracy, it was not Jacinda taking over. We agreed to special adaptations of democracy and freedom to save lives temporarily.

The population of the earth has not all died from covid vaccines yet.

There is always some harm with vaccines, but it is overstated by Jacinda haters and misunderstood by those ranting about Medsafe, that is simply not the actual number of vaccine deaths and harm that has been verified — rather it is what was reported somewhat subject to conjecture.

The tinfoil hats and company threatened Jacinda’s life on the lawn outside Parliament and burnt down a playground and trees and then stamp their feet that she did not face a lynch mob.

No doors kicked in
Nobody’s door was kicked in by police during covid 19.

Nobody was forced to take a jab. No they chose to leave their jobs because they had a choice provided to them. The science was what the Government acted upon, not the need to control anyone.

Mandates were temporary and went on a few weeks too long.

Some people endured the hardship of not being present when their loved ones died and that was very unfortunate but again it was about medical advice.

Then Director-General of Health Sir Ashly Bloomfield said the government acted on about 90 percent of the Public Health advice it was given. Jacinda haters never mention that fact.

Jacinda haters say she ran away, but to be fair she endured 50 times more abuse than any other politician, and her daughter was threatened by randoms in a café, plus Jacinda was mentally exhausted after covid and all the other events that most prime ministers never have to endure, and she thought somebody else could give it more energy.

We were in good hands with Chris Hipkins so there was no abandoning as haters can’t make up their minds if they want her here or gone — but they do know they want to hate.

Lost a few bucks
The tiny group of haters include some people who lost a few bucks, a business, an opportunity and people who wanted to travel when there was a global pandemic happening.

Bad things happen in pandemics and every country experienced increased levels of debt, wage subsidies, job losses, tragic problems with a loss of income, school absenteeism, increased crime, and other effects like inflation and a cost of living crisis.

Haters just blame Jacinda because they don’t get that international context and the second Royal Commission of Inquiry was a political stunt, not about being more prepared for future pandemics but more about feeding the haters.

All the information it needed was provided by Jacinda, Grant Robertson and Chris Hipkins but right wing media whipped up the show trial despite appearances before a demented mob of haters being thought a necessary theatre for the right wing.

A right wing who signed up to covid lockdowns and emergency laws and then later manipulated short term memories for political gain.

You will never convince a hater not to hate with facts and context and persuasion, even now they are thinking how to rebut these matters rather than being open minded.

Pandemics suck and we did pretty well in the last one but there were consequences for some — for whom I have sympathy, sorry for your loss, I also know people who died . . .  I also know people who lost money, I also know people who could not be there at a funeral . . .  but I am not a hater.

Valuing wanting to learn
Instead, I value how science wants to learn and know what mistakes were made and to adapt for the next pandemic. I value how we were once a team of five million acting together with great kotahitanga.

I value Jacinda saying let there be a place for kindness in the world, despite the way doing the best for the common good may seem unkind to some at times.

The effects of the pandemic in country by country reports show the same patterns everywhere — lockdowns, inflation, cost of living increases, crime increase, education impacts, groceries cost more, petrol prices are too high, supply chains disrupted.

When a hater simplistically blames Jacinda for “destroying the economy and running away” it is literally an admission of their ignorance.

It’s like putting your hand up and screaming, ‘look at me, I am dumb’.

The vast majority get it and want Jacinda back if she wants to come back and live in peace — but if not . . .  that is fine too.

Sad, ignorant minority
A small sad and ignorant minority will never let it go and every day they hate and hate and hate because they are full of hate and that is who they really are, unable to move on and process matters, blamers, simple, under informed and grossly self pitying.

I get the fact your body is your temple and you want medical sovereignty, I also get medical science and immunity.

It’s been nearly three years now, is it time to be a little less hysterical and to actually put away the violent abuse and lame blaming? Will you carry on sulking like a child for another three years?

It’s okay to disagree with me, but before you do, and I know you will, without taking onboard anything I write, just remember what Jacinda said.

In a global pandemic with people’s lives at stake, she would rather be accused of doing too much than doing too little.

Gerard Otto is a digital creator, satirist and independent commentator on politics and the media through his G News column and video reports. This article is republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

An increasing proportion of New Zealand’s immigrants are foreign citizens. In the 2010s – especially the later 2010s – a critical driver of immigration had been returning New Zealand citizens. As the headlines have indicated, that process of sourcing immigrants from the New Zealand diaspora has long finished.

Where have New Zealand’s post-covid immigrants come from? The following table shows immigration from the 31 countries which Statistics New Zealand follows. The estimates for the years-ended-August have just been released.

We note that not all intended migrations to New Zealand are successful. Most immigrants arrive on non-residence visas, and then have to apply for permanent residence or other long-stay visas. Unsuccessful immigrations arise both from failures to secure the desired permission, or from immigrants themselves having second thoughts. There are two possible outcomes of unsuccessful immigration: return migration, or onward migration.

Onward migration may take place following immigrants’ success in gaining New Zealand passports. But that is not unsuccessful immigration, and it’s not shown here. The data below looks at the 12-month period ending August 2023, and deducts the migrant departures for each nationality in the following 12 months (ending August 2024). For comparison, the table also shows 12-month period ending August 2024, deducting the migrant departures for each nationality in the 12 months ending August 2025.

These data are estimates for successful immigration (as defined above) by migrants’ nationalities:

It turns out that Philippines is the 2023 ‘winner’. Philippines consistently has few return or onward migrants. We note that the Philippines’ number dropped more in 2024 compared to India, probably reflecting the larger numbers of Indian migrants who arrived as tertiary students.

Two other stand-out immigrant countries – relative to their source populations – are Sri Lanka and Nepal.

The dominant groups of countries are our Pacific neighbours (Oceania); and South and East Asia. In this context we should note that a substantial majority of immigrants from Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are ethnic ‘Austronesians’, the same broad ethnic group as our indigenous Māori and most of our Oceanian immigrants. Immigrants from Philippines are a particularly good fit, because of their similar Christian culture and because they are ethnic cousins of indigenous Aotearoans.

That’s not to say that any other national group is a bad fit. Most of our immigrants seek to integrate sufficiently to become Kiwis, without being under pressure to assimilate into Euro-Kiwi norms. Interestingly, of the six top immigrant-source countries, New Zealand only has direct flights with two: China and Fiji.

We note that the richer Asian nations feature well down the list. And we note the disproportionately low representation of nationalities with mainly Muslim populations. Indonesia, with 2½ times the population of Philippines has only 2½ percent of the Philippines’ successful immigration. Indonesia, our near-invisible near-neighbour, is the fourth most populous country in the world, and may well have more people than the United States by 2050.

With slightly more immigrants than from Indonesia is Pakistan, the world’s fifth most populous country, and a country with strong sporting links to New Zealand. But Pakistan is way below India in the above table. A surprising omission from the table is Bangladesh, the world’s eighth most populous country, with more residents than Russia (the world’s number nine). Bangladesh does have a significant community in New Zealand, including my GP doctor. I suspect that Bangladeshis feature strongly in the ‘other Asia’ category, along with Cambodians who continue to operate small bakeries in Aotearoa New Zealand. Another country of importance missing from the list is Singapore, whose airline does bring many if not most of our South Asian immigrants.

Other countries not mentioned so far in the world’s top-ten by population are Brazil, Nigeria, and Mexico. Of these only Brazil features in the table above, although Nigeria may well have a significant presence in ‘other’, and Mexico has had some high-profile immigrants to Aotearoa New Zealand. Brazilian immigration, which appears to be dropping off, may return once China Eastern commences flights from Auckland to Buenos Aires.

We see the richer countries in Europe and the Americas (traditional sources of immigration), and Australia, feature in the bottom half of the ‘Top-31′; much more so for 2024 than for 2023. We note that the negative numbers in 2024 mean that more people with those countries’ passports departed in 2025 than arrived in 2024.

Ukraine doesn’t feature, though it might be a major part of ‘other Europe’. Czechia, which I am surprised Stats NZ have included, may be taken as a proxy for Eastern Europe. Also, ‘other Africa’ has held up while South African successful immigration has halved.

The data all reinforces the fact that New Zealand is a demographic turnover country, with the momentum of immigration coming from much poorer non-Muslim countries, and with a significant outflow of richer-country migrants.

For some up-to-date perspective, the table below shows estimated immigration for the featured countries in the year to August 2025. It shows an increase in migrant arrivals from some richer countries, such as United States, Australia, Japan, Germany and France; however, it is likely that similar numbers of these nationalities will leave New Zealand in the next 12 months as arrived in the previous 12 months. Many from France will actually be from New Caledonia; from Oceania rather than from Europe.

Finally, total arrivals of foreigner immigrants were 201,950 in the year to August 2023; 142,661 in the year to August 2024; and 112,591 in the year to August 2025; much lower than immediately post-covid, but still high. Total departures of foreigner immigrants were 35,972 in the year to August 2023; 46,099 in the year to August 2024; and 54,092 in the year to August 2025.

So, in the last year, foreigner migrant departures from New Zealand had reached almost half of foreigner migrant arrivals. This suggests that, for many, immigration to New Zealand is a fraught and often unsuccessful experience.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Post-pandemic economics and the rise of national populism – Wherever we look today, whether it be through a political, economic, or security lens, we can see the consequences of post-pandemic economic instability.

And politically, the rise of national populism is in evidence, as is an apparent anti-incumbent mood among voters.

In this podcast, Paul G Buchanan and Selwyn Manning assess the global Zeitgeist and what impact post-pandemic economics is having on geopolitics and geo-economics.

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The Fiji government has announced its “rebuilding our future together” Budget with a spend of FJ$4.3 billion (NZ$3.2 billion) to address the high cost of living and pay for the hefty bill racked up by the former FijiFirst administration and the global pandemic, coupled with multiple tropical cyclones and the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Professor Biman Prasad said the focus of the budget was navigate the country from its economic crisis to provide a better standard of living for its people.

Professor Prasad said the deficit was higher than he wanted and nearly 25 percent of the budget would go to servicing debt.

“We have too much government debt for the size of our economy and that remains one of our biggest challenges. We must continue to carefully manage our revenue spending.”

He said the budget “stabilises revenue and debt level and puts the country on a sustainable path”.

Financial summary
Total government expenditure for the 2023/2024 Budget is $4.3 billion with a projected revenue of $3.7 billion — a deficit of $639 million. Fiji starts July with a debt-to-GDP ratio of almost 88.8 pecent.

Here’s a list of the major spending and projects:

Tax policies
Increases

• Value Added Tax increases to 15 percent on most food, with the intension to pump an estimated $446m into the economy.
• 5 percent increase to the excise tax on alcohol and tobacco.
• The excise on carbonated/ sugar-sweetened beverages will be increased from 35 cents per litre to 40 cents per litre.
• A domestic excise of 40c per kilogram or per litre, and import excise of 15 percent, will be introduced on carbonated drinks, ice cream, sweet biscuits, snacks, and sugar confectionery.
• Motor vehicle import excise duty will increase on all new and used passenger vehicles by an additional 5 percent.
• The corporate tax rate will increase from the current 20 percent to 25 percent.
• New companies eligible for reduced corporate tax for listing on the South Pacific Stock Exchange will have their tax rate increased from the current 10 percent to 15 percent. This will be for new companies and only for a period of seven years. These corporate tax rate increases will add about $73.5m in revenue.
• Departure Tax will increase from the current $100 to $125 effective from August 1 and will further increase by an additional $15 to $140 effective from January 1, 2024. This will add a total of $30m towards overall tax revenues.

Reductions

• 21 basic food items continue to attract zero VAT with the inclusion of prescribed medicine to the list.
• Reduction in fiscal duty from 32 percent to 15 percent on canned mackerel (except canned tuna), corned mutton, corned beef and beef products, canned tomatoes, prawns and duck meat.
• Fiscal duty on sheep/lamb meats will be reduced to zero. For beef meat the duty is being reduced from 32 percent to 15 percent.
• Reduction in import excise on chicken portions such as wings, drumsticks, feet, thighs, etc from 15 percent to 0 percent.
• Concession on smartphones will be removed and replaced with a fiscal duty of 5 percent.

Education

• Education gets the highest allocation in this budget – $845m.
• Biman Prasad announced all Tertiary Scholarship and Loans Service debt — $650m owed by more than 50,000 students — is written off. But it comes with the caveat that these students will have to save a bond. The bond savings will be years of study multiplied by 1.5, and those who choose not to save the bond will have to pay the equivalent cost amount.
• The rebranded Fijian scholarship scheme will have a total budget of $148.2m.
• The salaries budget for the Ministry of Education increased to $322.6m, to cover existing teachers and 179 new teaching and non-teaching positions.
• There is $8.9m for salary upgrades for teachers completing qualifications for higher pay.
• $5.7m for the rural and maritime teaching allowance budget.
• Free education and transport assistance to ECE, primary and secondary school students, with a total funding allocation of more than $100m.
• There is also money for back to school support, and maintenance and upgrading of schools.
• Investment in the technical colleges, working together with existing service providers, including the newly established Pacific Polytech.
• A revamp the apprenticeship scheme in the next few months and also review the NTPC Levy and how best to support and fund skill upgrades in the workforce.
• Tertiary institutions get $103.3m, the grant for the University of the South Pacific is restored, and they have allocated extra money towards clearing the USP outstanding grants.
• There is also an extra $500,000 for Sangam Institute of Technology to accommodate additional nursing students, “in light of the current shortage”.

Health and disability

• Health Ministry is allocated a budget of $453.8m, a significant increase of $58.7m from the previous budget.
• Salaries and wages budget for the Health Ministry has increased to $126.4m.
• This will cater for 250 intern nurses to move up to become registered nurses; 237 new intern nurses; 46 nursing assistants; 50 nursing aides; 40 midwives; 94 medical laboratory scientists; and additional support staff in various hospitals and non-medical officers for the Fiji Pharmaceutical & Biomedical Services to strengthen capacity and improve procurement efficiency.
• Nursing assistant and nurse aide positions have been created to support the nurses’ focus on their core role, where these aides and assistants will take over the non-clinical responsibilities like making the bed, getting the consumables etc. The government is also providing $11.6m for the upgrade of nurses’ salaries and overtime.
• $63m has been allocated for public health programmes, Emergency Radiology and Laboratory Services, procurement of drugs, consumables, medicines, and purchase of bio-medical equipment and accessories.
• $2.5m is allocated for the Kidney Dialysis Treatment Subsidy. The allocation has been increased by $1m from this year’s level to cater for the increase in the dialysis subsidy from the current $150 per session to $180.
• $16.4m is allocated for the upgrade and maintenance of urban hospitals and institutional quarters, permanent walkway for the maternity hospital at CWM, purchase, installation and replacement of ICT equipment, and a major interior upgrade of Labasa hospital.
• From August 1, only patients with a combined household income of $30,000 or less per annum can qualify for the free services at private practitioners.

Tourism

• Tourism Fiji is allocated an operating grant of $7m and to support new marketing strategies an increased Marketing Grant of $30m is provided in the new financial year.

Infrastructure, roads and water

• $200m has been allocated for the maintenance of hospitals, health centres, schools, public buildings, government quarters, roads and bridges and water infrastructure.
• The water sector will have an increased budget of $250.8m. This is a major increase of almost $60m compared to the current budget.
• $51.2m has been allocated for the completion of the Viria water project. The total cost of the project is approximately $400m.
• Government is working with the Asian Development Bank for a major institutional revamp of the Water Authority, including governance, investment planning, asset management, infrastructure replacement and upgrade, review of water tariffs, investment in people and improving customer service management. This will cost over $500m to replace the 40-year-old pipe system which is leaking underground.
• An increased allocation of $100.6m is allocated for road maintenance.
• Fiji Roads Authority is allocated a budget of $387.6m which comprises $14.7m for operations and $372.9m for capital expenditure.
• In the last eight years, a total of around $3.1b was spent by the road authority without any strategic plan, without much priority and without proper costing.
• $82.2m for the Transport Infrastructure Investment Sector Project financed through Asian Development Bank and World Bank loans of US$100m and US$50m, respectively.
• Public Works, Meteorological Service and Transport Ministry is allocated a sum of $98.3m.
• Government has also re-established the Public Works Department (PWD) to improve the state of rural roads around the country with an initial setup cost of $5m.

Social welfare and pension

• Ministry of Women, Children and Social Protection funding allocation has increased from $147.7m to $200.2m.
• More than 90,000 thousand people on social welfare will directly benefit from increased monthly allowances of 15 and 25 percent.
• $100,000 is allocated to cater for the establishment of a new Department of Children.
• $19.9m has been allocated for the Child Protection Allowance. This is an increase of $6.2m.
• The Family Assistance Scheme is allocated a budget of $45.6m. This is an increase of $11.5m from the current financial year. A total of 26,000 households are expected to be assisted in this financial year.
• $43million is allocated to cater for disability allowance, bus fare subsidy for elderly and disabled, electricity subsidy to households below $30,000 income and insurance for social welfare recipients. Over 100,000 people are expected to benefit from this.
• Those aged 70 years and above, and on the social pension system, will receive a 25 percent increase in allowances. This means the monthly allowance will increase from $100 a month to $125 a month effective August 2023. Those between the age of 65 to 69 years will have their monthly allowances increased from $100 to $115.
• The social pension scheme is allocated a large budget of $78.2m, an increase of $23.2m to cater for the needs of 54,200 senior citizens.
• Effective from August 2023, the 1,500 FNPF pensioners who had their pension rates reduced by the military regime will be able to access the Government social pension allowance of $125 if they are above the age of 70 or $115 if they are between 60 to 69 years.

Civil service and cutbacks

• Review of the current minimum wage rate to be done in the next financial year.
• The government is working together with the workers’ representatives to review the overall pay and benefits of the civil servants.
• In the next six to nine months, government will review the civil service remuneration and pending the review, the salary structure of the civil service will be readjusted to be commensurate with the work the civil servants are doing for the nation.
• Government ministers have taken a 20 percent pay cut; they are significantly cutting down ministerial travel allowances put in place by the previous government.
• Travel allowance of the Prime Minister, the current 250 percent per diem loading, will be reduced to 100 percent.
• Ministers will have their top-up reduced from 200 percent to 50 percent.
• For assistant ministers the top-up will be reduced from the current 100 percent to 25 percent.
• Apart from these major reductions, Government will remove “all the exorbitant incidental allowances that are currently provided”.

Culture and arts

• Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, Culture, Heritage and Arts has been allocated a budget of $38.6m, a major increase of $23.2m from this year’s allocation
• To strengthen iTaukei administration and provincial councils, a grant of $10.8m is allocated to fund the 14 provincial councils, including $4.3m to fund the salaries and wages of 182 provincial council officers and other operational expenses of around $6.1 million.
• The Turaga-ni-Koro monthly allowance will be increased from $100 to $150 per month for all 1,181 Turaga-ni-Koro for which a total sum of $2.1 million is allocated.
• The Mata-ni-Tikina quarterly allowance will be increased by $150 per quarter, which is equivalent to an increase of $50 per month for the 262 Mata-ni-Tikina.
• $4m is allocated for iTaukei Land Development to help landowners with the development of their land for commercial purposes.
• To recognise and support the Turaga-ni-Yavusa in decision-making and Vanua administration, a monthly allowance of $100 has been allocated for 648 Turaga-ni-Yavusa under the Vanua Leadership Allowance with a sum of around $800,000.

Agriculture and Sugar

• Ministry of Agriculture and Waterways is allocated a budget of $95.2 million in this budget which is an increase of $37.3 million.
• For the first time, the government will be providing weedicide and fertilizer subsidy for non-sugar crops which includes rice, ginger, dalo, and cassava, with a funding of $1m to boost production of these crops.
• The Ministry of Multi-Ethnic Affairs and Sugar Industry is allocated a sum of $51.7m in the new financial year, of which $49.7m is for the sugar unit.
• With the aim to increase cane production from current production of 1.6m tonnes to 1.9m tonnes by 2024 season, a sum of $11m is allocated for the Sugar Development and Farmers Assistance Program, New Farmers and Lease Premium Assistance, Weedicide Subsidy, Farm Incentive Program and Cage Bins.

Fisheries, land and SME

• Ministry of Fisheries and Forestry is allocated a budget of $41.6m. This will support the expansion of aquaculture, shrimp farming, seaweed Development Programme, Multi-Species Hatchery, construction of ice plants and the supply of tilapia fingerlings and prawn frys to farmers in the Western Division.
• Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources is allocated a budget of $30.1m to enable the Ministry to continue effectively and efficiently administer and regulate the land and mineral resource sector
• Ministry of Trade, Co-operatives and Small Medium Enterprises and Communications is allocated a budget of $116.5m in the next financial year, an increase of $25.3m from this year’s allocation.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The above chart draws on the historical ‘births, deaths, and marriages’ dataset published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It’s a major resource for genealogical research.

The database for 13 June 2023 showed the deaths of all people whose deaths were registered in New Zealand on or before 13 June 1973. And, for 14 June 1973 to 13 June 2023, the deaths of people born on or before 13 June 1943. You need to enter a family name – and ‘wildcard’ spellings are not allowed – so I have used the name Smith as a sample of New Zealanders. (This dataset is useful in that you can get death numbers for individual dates, and it’s the date of death, not the date of registration. It would be good if you could use wildcards, as you can in most genealogical databases.)

The Smith sample used for the data for the above chart is biassed in several respects, but these biases are pertinent in the context of an evaluation of the demographic impact of the Covid19 pandemic in New Zealand.

The first and most obvious bias is that the data only includes older people; further the definition of ‘older’ changes for each year plotted, albeit in an orderly way. This in itself means that there will be more women counted, because the older population is more female. The second bias is that married women, including widows, will show up whether either their birth name or their final married name is ‘Smith’. So this survey is principally, though not only, of grandmothers (and great-grandmothers, and their sisters and female cousins).

The name Smith is a Pakeha name, common in Scotland as well as England, so will bias the data in favour of people (including many Māori) with English and Scottish ancestors. There will be bias against Māori though, because Māori life expectancy is still well below that for Pakeha. The octogenarian population underrepresents Māori. These factors will also bias the data in favour of the South Island relative to the North Island. Overall, this is very much a survey of the end-of-life circumstances of older Pakeha women in Aotearoa New Zealand.

The 2022 number includes people aged 79 and above who died in the 12-week period from 19 June to 10 September. The 2021 number includes people aged 78 and above who died in the 12-week period from 19 June to 10 September of that year. And so on. Thus the 1973 number includes people aged 30 or older when they died. Overall, the earlier the year the more younger person deaths; yet the overwhelming majority of deaths each year is of people who would have been regarded, when they died, as ‘elderly’.

The chart shows a discontinuity in the late 1990s, which I cannot explain for sure; a discontinuity that shows more Smith deaths in the early 2000s, when in fact I had expected fewer deaths. (Anti-vaxxers might interpret the discontinuity as being due to the introduction of the influenza vaccine. I think this is very unlikely to be the reason, and we would need numbers of people who actually received that vaccination each year. My suspicion is that significant numbers of people received influenza vaccinations only from the late-2000s.) My best guess is that in the early 2000s the most frequent ages of recorded deaths were the early 80s – from 80 to 82 years old. This corresponds to births in the 1920 to 1922 post World War 1 mini baby boom.

An important reason for this century’s trendline sloping downwards is the shortfall in births from 1932 to 1938, a result of the Great Depression. A person dying aged 89 (the most frequent age of death) in 2022 would have been born in 1932 or 1933, the peak years of the Depression. The deficit of births in the early 1930s would however have been offset to some extent by the immigration of ten-pound-poms in the 1950s and 1960s.

The peaks in the chart in most cases represent years of high levels of death from pneumonia and other conditions arising from winter respiratory infections, the most prominent being influenza though ‘common colds’ may also be significant triggers of mortality amongst people over 85 years old. (One year, 2013, appears to be a ‘rogue sample’ in which Smiths died, by chance, in greater numbers than would have been expected from overall deaths; a bad year for the Smith clan.)

The chart shows the impact of the deadly 2017 influenza ‘pandemic’, and it shows the substantial upturn in deaths in the winters of 2021 and 2022. The high 2022 number is known to be the mortality peak of Covid19 in New Zealand, a peak accentuated because most older people in New Zealand were required to wait too long for their second booster vaccination despite well-publicised forecasts of a winter peak. The high number in the chart for 2021 is more of a mystery, because neither Covid19 nor influenza were present in New Zealand that winter. The elevated number of deaths that year will be partly a reflection of the numbers of frail elderly who would have died in 2020 had that been a normal year; and partly older people with weakened immunity to common colds (arising from the lockdown and border quarantines).

The above chart shows the mortality experience in the last 50 years of, especially, older New Zealand women of Anglo-Scottish ancestry. Deaths have been falling in recent years due to both low birth numbers in the 1930s and to substantial health improvements enjoyed by New Zealanders born between 1918 and 1943. The trend from the late 2020s will be different, as post-1945 baby boomers start to appear in these kinds of data; and, possibly, as health improvements decline and quite possibly reverse in the face of increased inequality, which exists – especially around housing – among the older age cohorts as well as among families with young children. We protect older people by including them, not ignoring them.

Granny Smith had a good life. Long live Granny Smith.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Over Easter I relistened to Jim Mora’s RNZ interview (17 May 2020) of Johan Giesecke, “world leading epidemiologist” and Professor Emeritus at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, Sweden. In the period April to June 2020, Sweden gained notoriety for its divergent public health policies with respect to the management of the Covid19 pandemic. People – including me – widely pointed to Swedish authorities then as being more concerned about retaining a pretence of their economic normality rather than caring about people’s lives.

Swedish exceptionalism became a thing, again; this time seemingly for all the wrong reasons. Hitherto ‘progressive’ New Zealanders had regarded Sweden as an exceptional policy exemplar; now it seemed to be an outlier of classical liberalism.

Here are two summary measures of pandemic and post-pandemic mortality; comparing Sweden with Finland, Germany, New Zealand and Japan:

We note that all these countries have rising populations of older people, so some increase in deaths was to be expected in all of them. Sweden had covid vaccination rates comparable with these other four representatives of ‘the rest of the civilised world’, so differences in vaccination uptake cannot explain its mortality difference.

It’s worth relistening to this Giesecke interview, now with the perspective of hindsight. The context is that, in the contest (as it was then framed) of Sweden versus the rest of the civilised world (with the World Health Organisation settling on the counter-Swedish majority view), Sweden has come out a clear winner. The scandal is the failure of ‘the rest of the civilised world’ to acknowledge the statistical reality.

(Note that I use ‘civilised world’ with mock irony. In New Zealand at least, few politicians or high-profile commentators believed that there could be anything New Zealand authorities could learn from the experiences of West Europe, South America, or Africa; instead, the policy elite contemptuously assumed such countries to be ‘basket cases’. See the use of this phrase in 1980s: Days of greed and glamour, NZ Herald, while noting that we are still waiting for a balanced history of the ‘Muldoon Years’ referred to.)

Highlights from the 2020 Interview, and the interview itself can be heard here, and read in synopsis form: Johan Giesecke: Why lockdowns are the wrong approach, Radio New Zealand, 17 May 2020.

Relating to points not covered in RNZ’s synopsis, Giesecke draws a direct comparison with Finland, which was pursuing a public health policy very close to New Zealand’s. His concern – shared by Finland’s state epidemiologist – was that the authorities’ actions were creating a significantly vulnerable population in Finland.

Giesecke, from that May 2020 perspective, mentions that if a good vaccine would come quite soon then New Zealand’s outcome might be better than Sweden’s. The irony is that, while a good vaccine did indeed come quickly, New Zealand’s authorities were slow to embrace the vaccine as the answer; having already decided that New Zealand had eliminated the virus as per the China policy. Then, after New Zealand’s people were vaccinated, the government doubled down on the lockdowns, not at all trusting the vaccine to work as a substitute for lockdowns. (Indeed, New Zealand only abandoned its border-quarantine policy in 2022 because that policy failed on its own terms. Had the border policy been implemented without error, New Zealand presumably would have followed a set of draconian restrictions through 2022, with a timeline similar to that of China. New Zealand’s border mishaps proved to be a blessing in disguise.)

In mid-2020, Johan Giesecke’s main expectation was that the mortality experience of all countries in the OECD (essentially the rich western plus the rich eastern countries) would all be about the same; and that Sweden’s major benefit would be in its substantially lesser disruption to normal life.

Where Giesecke was wrong was that the OECD ‘WHO countries’ (a label for the ‘civilised world other than Sweden’) ended up with substantially higher increases in deaths than did Sweden; he was wrong in a way that favoured Sweden rather more than he had expected.

The pandemic has nevertheless had an adverse impact on Sweden’s mortality. Sweden did experience the West European surge in deaths from respiratory illnesses late last year. Its people no more live in a bubble than do New Zealand’s. Overall though, Sweden got the win-win outcome: fewer deaths, and less social and economic dislocation. (David prevailed over Goliath.)

A very basic summary of the difference between the Swedish and the Goliath approaches is that Sweden focussed on its people whereas the prevalent strategy focused too much on the virus; the world by-and-large pursued a strategy of covid exceptionalism. (One consequence of covid exceptionalism was that a death clinically ascribed to Covid19 became a more noteworthy death than most other deaths.) Sweden focussed on having people with good levels of immunity, whereas in 2021 much of the rest of the world went down the unhelpful path of obsessing over the various mutant variants of the novel coronavirus.

Giesecke clearly had a better understanding the history of human coronaviruses than most other epidemiologists; these are viruses for which specific immunity is short-lived, from which we top-up immunity naturally through living our daily lives in a normal manner, and for which vaccine-conferred immunity would also be short-lived.

Sweden understood the science better; indeed, the interview tells us that there was a substantial scientific contest of interpretations of the evidence in Sweden, a good sign that actual science was taking place. Not only did a number of Sweden’s scientists prove to be among the better predictors of the future, people such as Johan Giesecke were also much more prepared to offer humility to their own people and to the world if they had got it wrong.

I am still waiting for our authorities – including the scientists – to do a proper retrospective comparison of New Zealand (and other countries, as in my table above) and Sweden. I am still waiting for a little gracious humility from our authorities in Aotearoa New Zealand. Humility is an important characteristic of civilised behaviour.

In the middle of the interview, Jim Mora noted: “Our readers are quite fascinated with Sweden; I think the world is”. When and why did that fascination stop? Or is it just that Goliath’s information mediators stopped being fascinated when the ‘contest’ moved in David’s favour?

————-

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Unprecedented levels of disinformation will only get worse this election in Aotearoa New Zealand, but systems set up to deal with it during the pandemic have all been shut down, Disinformation Project researcher Dr Sanjana Hattotuwa has warned.

He says the levels of vitriol and conspiratorial discourse this past week or two are worse than anything he has seen during the past two years of the pandemic — including during the Parliament protest — but he is not aware of any public work to counteract it.

“There is no policy, there’s no framework, there’s no real regulatory mechanism, there’s no best practice, and there’s no legal oversight,” Dr Hattotuwa told RNZ News.

He says urgent action should be taken, and could include legislation, community-based initiatives, or a stronger focus on the recommendations of the 15 March 2019 mosque attacks inquiry.

Highest levels of disinformation, conspiratorialism seen yet
Dr Hattotuwa said details of the project’s analysis of violence and content from the past week — centred on the visit by British activist Posie Parker — were so confronting he could not share it.

“I don’t want to alarm listeners, but I think that the Disinformation Project — with evidence and in a sober reflection and analysis of what we are looking at — the honest assessment is not something that I can quite share, because the BSA (Broadcasting Standards Authority) guidelines won’t allow it.

“The fear is very much … particularly speaking as a Sri Lankan who has come from and studied for doctoral research offline consequences of online harm, that I’m seeing now in Aotearoa New Zealand what I studied and I thought I had left behind back in Sri Lanka.”

The new levels of vitriol were unlike anything seen since the project’s daily study began in 2021, and included a rise in targeting of politicians specifically by far-right and neo-Nazi groups, he said.

But — as the SIS noted in its latest report this week — the lines were becoming increasingly blurred between those more ideologically motivated groups, and the newer ones using disinformation and targeting authorities and government.

“You know, distinction without a difference,” he said. “The Disinformation Project is not in the business of looking at the far right and neo-Nazis — that’s a specialised domain that we don’t consider ourselves to be experts in — what we do is to look at disinformation.

“Now to find that you have neo-Nazis, the far-right, anti-semitic signatures — content, presentations and engagement — that colours that discourse is profoundly worrying because you would want to have a really clear distinction.

No Telegram ‘guardrail’
“There is no guardrail on Telegram against any of this, it’s one click away. And so there’s a whole range of worries and concerns we have … because we can’t easily delineate anymore between what would have earlier been very easy categorisation.”

Green Party co-leader Marama Davidson said she had been subjected to increasing levels of abuse in recent weeks with a particular far-right flavour.

“The online stuff is particularly worrying but no matter who it’s directed towards we’ve got to remember that can also branch out into actual violence if we don’t keep a handle on it,” she said.

“Strong community connection in real life is what holds off the far-right extremism that we’ve seen around the world … we also want the election to be run where every politician takes responsibility for a humane election dialogue that focuses on the issues, that doesn’t drum up extra hate towards any other politician or any other candidate.”

Limited protection as election nears
Dr Hattotuwa said it was particularly worrying considering the lack of tools in New Zealand to deal with disinformation and conspiratorialism.

“Every institutional mechanism and framework that was established during the pandemic to deal with disinformation has now been dissolved. There is nothing that I know in the public domain of what the government is doing with regards to disinformation,” Dr Hattotuwa said.

“The government is on the backfoot in an election year — I can understand in terms of realpolitik, but there is no investment.”

He believed the problem would only get worse as the election neared.

“The anger, the antagonism is driven by a distrust in government that is going to be instrumentalised to ever greater degrees in the future, around public consultative processing, referenda and electoral moments.

“The worry and the fear is, as has been noted by the Green Party, that the election campaigning is not going to be like anything that the country has ever experienced … that there will be offline consequences because of the online instigation and incitement.

“It’s really going to give pause to, I hope, the way that parties consider their campaign. Because the worry is — in a high trust society in New Zealand — you kind of have the expectation that you can go out and meet the constituency … I know that many others are thinking that this is now not something that you can take for granted.”

Possible countermeasures
Dr Hattotuwa said countermeasures could include legislation, security-sector reform, community-based action, or a stronger focus on implementing the recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques.

“There are a lot of recommendations in the RCOI that, you know, are being just cosmetically dealt with. And there are a lot of things that are not even on the government’s radar. So there’s a whole spectrum of issues there that I think really call for meaningful conversations and investment where it’s needed.”

National’s campaign chair Chris Bishop said the party did not have any specific campaign preparations under way in relation to disinformation, but would be willing to work with the government on measures to counteract it.

“If the goverment thinks we should be taking them then we’d be happy to sit down and have a conversation about it,” he said.

“Obviously we condemn violent rhetoric and very sadly MPs and candidates in the past few years have been subject to more of that including threats made to their physical wellbeing and we condemn that and we want to try to avoid that as much as possible.”

Labour’s campaign chair Megan Woods did not respond to requests for comment.

Ardern’s rhetoric not translating to policy
Former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern spoke during her valedictory farewell speech in Parliament on Wednesday about the loss of the ability to “engage in good robust debates and land on our respective positions relatively respectfully”.

“While there were a myriad of reasons, one was because so much of the information swirling around was false. I could physically see how entrenched it was for some people.”

Ardern is set to take up an unpaid role at the Christchurch Call, which was set up after the terror attacks and has a focus on targeting online proliferation of dis- and mis-information and the spread of hateful rhetoric.

Dr Hattotuwa said Ardern had led the world in her own rhetoric around the problem, but real action now needed to be taken.

“Let me be very clear, PM Ardern was a global leader in articulating the harm that disinformation has on democracy — at NATO, at Harvard, and then at the UN last year. There has been no translation into policy around that which she articulated publicly, so I think that needs to occur.

“I mean, when people say that they’re going to go and vent their frustration it might mean with a placard, it might mean with a gun.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Unprecedented levels of disinformation will only get worse this election, but systems set up to deal with it during the pandemic have all been shut down, Disinformation Project researcher Sanjana Hattotuwa has warned.https://t.co/LUVAbALjGD

— RNZ (@radionz) April 8, 2023

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Jacinda Ardern will largely be remembered in Aotearoa New Zealand as the prime minister whose pandemic-era policies saved thousands of Kiwi lives, according to former prime minister Helen Clark.

And she will also be considered an example of how to govern in the age of social media and endless crises, political experts say, while also achieving more than her critics might give her credit for.

Ardern was set to deliver her valedictory speech later today, having stepped down as prime minister earlier this year after just over five years in the job.

“I think that while I’m happy for Jacinda that she’s going to get a life and design what she wants to do and when she wants to do it, you can’t help feeling sad about her going,” Clark, herself a former Labour prime minister, told RNZ Morning Report ahead of Ardern’s speech.

“Leaders like Jacinda don’t come along too often and we’ve lost one.”

Ardern has played down suggestions online vitriol played a part in her decision to stand aside — but acknowledged on Tuesday she hoped her departure would “take a bit of heat out” of the conversation.

Clark said she “fundamentally” believed the hatred got to Ardern, powered by “populism and division” generated by former US President Donald Trump and his supporters.

‘Conspiracies took hold’
“Conspiracies took hold and suddenly you know, as the pandemic wore on here, I think the sort of relentless barrage from America — not, not just through Trump himself and the reporting of him, but through the social media networks — we have the anti-science people, the people who completely distrusted public authority, the QAnon conspiracies and hey, it played out on our Parliament’s front lawn and it still plays out and it’s very, very vitriolic and divisive.

“So I think that that spillover impact was really quite, well, not just unpleasant — it was horrible.”

Researchers have found Ardern was a lightning rod for online hate.

The perpetrator of the 2019 mosque shootings used the internet to connect with and learn from other extremists, which led to Ardern setting up the Christchurch Call movement to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

Her post-parliamentary career will include continuing that work, as New Zealand’s Special Envoy for the Christchurch Call, reporting to her replacement, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins.

“The mosque murders was just the most horrible thing to have happen on anyone’s watch, and she rose to the occasion, and I think the international reputation was very much associated with initially the empathy that she showed at that time,” said Clark.

But “one of New Zealand’s darkest days”, as Ardern put it at the time, was not the only near-unparalleled crisis she had to deal with in her time as prime minister.

“The White Island tragedy was another that needed, you know, very empathetic and careful handling. But then comes covid, and there’s no doubt that thousands of people are alive today because of the steps taken, particularly in 2020.

‘Would we have survived?’
“You know, I mean, I’m obviously in the older age group now which is more vulnerable. My father is 101 now and has survived the pandemic. But would we have survived it if it had been allowed to rip through our community, like it was allowed to rip through others?

“I think that there’d be so many New Zealanders not alive today had those steps not been taken.”

Data shows New Zealand has actually experienced negative excess mortality over the past few years — the elimination strategy so successful, fewer Kiwis have died than would have if there was no pandemic.

Former Director-General of Health Dr Ashley Bloomfield said that was “unique, virtually unique around the world”.

Despite that, it was New Zealand’s aggressive approach towards covid-19 in 2020 and 2021 that arguably drove much of the polarisation and online vitriol.

“There’s no doubt that those measures did save lives. They also drove people into frenzied levels of opposition and fear and isolation,” said Clark. “They felt polarised, they felt locked out.”

But she said Ardern bore “very little” responsibility for that.

Political scientist Dr Bronwyn Hayward of the University of Canterbury said Ardern’s Christchurch Call to eliminate extremist content will have a long-lasting impact on not just New Zealand, but the world.

“There’s been a lot made about the fact that she resigned under pressure from the trolls, which is completely missing the point that what she’s saying is that in this era where we’ve got particularly Russian, but also other countries’ bots that are attacking liberal leaders,” Dr Hayward told Morning Report, saying Ardern was the first global leader to “really understand” how what happens online can spill over into the real world.

“She understands that democracies are now under attack, and the front line is your social media, where we’ve got a propaganda war coming internationally.

“So she’s taken a very systemic approach to thinking about how to tackle that, so that in local communities it feels like you’re reeling from Islamophobia, to racism to transphobia, but actually, when we look internationally at what’s happening, naive and quite disaffected groups have been constantly fed this material and she’s taken a systemic approach to it.”

Clark said one of the biggest differences in the world between Ardern’s time as prime minister and her own, was that she did not have to deal with social media.

“I didn’t have a Twitter account, didn’t know what it was really. We had texts, that was about it. We used to have pagers, for heaven’s sake.”

Ardern’s domestic legacy
One of the first things Hipkins did when he took over as prime minister was the “policy bonfire” — but critics have long said the Ardern-led government has had trouble delivering on its promises.

Interviewer Guyon Espiner reminded Clark that her government had brought in long-lasting changes like Working for Families, the NZ Super Fund and Kiwibank — asking her what Ardern could point to.

Clark defended Ardern, saying the coalition arrangement with NZ First in Ardern’s first term slowed any reform agenda she might have had, and then there was covid-19.

“Looking back, there needs to be more recognition that the pandemic blindsided governments, communities, publics around the world. It wasn’t easy.”

Dr Hayward pointed to the ban on new oil and gas exploration and child poverty monitoring, “which before that was ruled as impossible or too difficult”.

Dr Lara Greaves, a political scientist at the University of Auckland, said it was “incredibly hard to really evaluate” Ardern’s legacy outside of covid-19.

“Ultimately … she is the covid-19 prime minister.”

The future
Clark said Ardern would be emotional during her valedictory speech.

“You have very close relationships with colleagues, you have relationships with others of a different kind — with the opposition, with the media, with the public — and you’re walking away, you’re closing the door on it.

“But you know that a new chapter will open, and that life post-politics can be very rewarding. I’ve certainly found it so. I have no doubt that Jacinda will get back into her stride with doing things that she feels are worthwhile for the the general public and worthwhile for her.”

After losing the 2008 election, Clark rose the ranks at the United Nations. She said while that was an option for Ardern, there is plenty of time for the 42-year-old to do other things first.

“I was, you know, 58 when I left being prime minister. And Jacinda’s leaving in her early 40s and she has a young child, so who knows? She may want Neve to grow up with a good old Kiwi upbringing.

“And she may want her, you know, involvement internationally to be more, you know, forays out from New Zealand. That’s for her to decide. I mean, the world’s her oyster, if she chooses to follow that.”

Dr Greaves also pointed to Ardern’s relative youth.

“It seems like she’s going for a period of sort of recovery and reflection and figuring out what to do next. But of course, she’s got another 20 years in her career, at least — the world’s her oyster.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

As Jacinda Ardern gets ready to deliver her valedictory speech in the Parliament today, former prime minister Helen Clark says she will largely be remembered as the prime minister whose pandemic-era policies saved thousands of Kiwis’ lives. https://t.co/LhKPSZulpW

— RNZ (@radionz) April 5, 2023

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

A pandemic can end in three ways. Either the death rates attributed to the pandemic disease cease, or at least drop back to pre-pandemic levels. Or normality is re-established, with the pandemic disease still present, but displacing other causes of death. Or a ‘new normal’ is established, with higher ongoing rates of death normalised.

So, to some extent, a pandemic’s duration is a state-of-mind; meaning that the post-pandemic period is when that ’emergency’ mindset has departed. To a large extent, that happens when the most burdensome public health restrictions become untenable; in New Zealand’s case, that was when the substantive closure of the international border finished. Deaths, covid or otherwise, may still be a problem, but they cease to be newsworthy!

For most of the world, the post-pandemic period started around February 2022. East Asia was the principal exception. Table 1 below shows mortality in the first year of the new normal.

Table 1: Back to Normal?
total deaths:	2018/19*	2022/23**	increase
Macau	2199	3596	63.53%
Hong Kong	47056	62056	31.88%
Singapore	21323	26829	25.82%
Taiwan	170483	212665	24.74%
Thailand	484272	603662	24.65%
Iceland	2180	2702	23.94%
South Korea	291529	357298	22.56%
Chile	107408	130970	21.94%
Colombia	236488	285944	20.91%
Ireland	30051	35650	18.63%
Brazil	1325677	1569617	18.40%
Japan	1360950	1607011	18.08%
Northern Ireland	14998	17504	16.71%
Australia	161466	188155	16.53%
Scotland	55633	64807	16.49%
Malaysia	171015	199069	16.40%
Finland	53458	62112	16.19%
New Zealand	33310	38682	16.13%
Netherlands	148356	171826	15.82%
Germany	925309	1069924	15.63%
England & Wales	515610	592677	14.95%
Norway	39819	45650	14.64%
Austria	80544	92325	14.63%
Canada	279510	319140	14.18%
Uruguay	34655	39512	14.02%
United States	2812658	3193088	13.53%
Greece	122940	139406	13.39%
Mexico	726738	819268	12.73%
Portugal	111815	124757	11.57%
Spain	415025	458846	10.56%
Switzerland	66396	73311	10.41%
Italy	641280	705564	10.02%
Israel	45488	49996	9.91%
Denmark	53578	58826	9.80%
Peru	157650	172825	9.63%
France	591364	647762	9.54%
Czechia	110671	120448	8.83%
Slovenia	20603	22307	8.27%
Belgium	107810	116284	7.86%
Slovakia	54017	58196	7.74%
Poland	405241	435401	7.44%
Sweden	88633	94436	6.55%
South Africa	527630	561992	6.51%
Egypt	570015	605500	6.23%
Croatia	52144	55093	5.66%
Albania	21717	22900	5.45%
Hungary	131229	135090	2.94%
Kazakhstan	131089	134709	2.76%
Bulgaria	109175	112080	2.66%
Serbia	101699	104390	2.65%
Romania	263338	270222	2.61%
Moldova	37314	36554	-2.04%
*	year ended April 2019
**	latest available 12-month period

Table 1 shows a number of countries’ most recent annual death tallies compared with the year ended April 2019, the best baseline period available. May 2018 to April 2019 was chosen because it represents the first full year after the silent influenza pandemic of November 2016 to April 2018. While not a media event, that largely invisible 2017 pandemic was a substantial mortality event, at least in the ‘global north’. A pandemic does not require an authentication from WHO to be an actual pandemic. A pandemic is simply a globally widespread experience of a disruptive contagious disease.

Broadly, Table 1 shows the countries which followed ‘elimination strategies’ near the top for post-pandemic mortality. Not only did countries in the east of the eastern hemisphere (including Aotearoa New Zealand) pursue the most stringent anti-covid policies (and practiced them for the longest time periods), some  prematurely claimed to have eliminated (though not eradicated) the disease. For some in East Asia, the 2003 experience of SARS was uppermost in health officials’ minds.

Table 1 also shows that some of the countries worst-hit by the pandemic (especially those in the Southeast European ‘Balkans’) have returned to death tallies comparable with base-year numbers. If South Africa and Egypt are a suitable guide, that return to health normality applies to Africa as well.

The only West European countries with post-pandemic deaths under nine percent more than pre-pandemic deaths are Sweden and Belgium, both countries with high covid death tallies in the first wave of the pandemic, but well below European mortality averages in the second year of the pandemic. Sweden’s 6.55% increase actually overstates its situation by about two percentage points, because, more than in most other countries, deaths there were particularly and unusually low from May 2018 until the start of the pandemic. Also, Australia’s 16.53% is an overstatement, probably by at least two percentage points; this is because tardy Australia’s most recent annual deaths’ data includes the months of December 2021 and January 2022, both high mortality months compared to the following December and January.

New Zealand’s most recent death data uses December 2022 and January 2023, not December 2021 and January 2022. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand’s Table 1 increased mortality experience is understated by a percentage point, because March and April 2019 (included in the pre-pandemic baseline year) had somewhat higher deaths than those same months in 2018. If we had used a baseline year from March 2018 to February 2019, then New Zealand would have had a mortality increase of 17.40%, not 16.13%.

Re East Asia, the numbers for Macau and Hong Kong give a hint of the recent reality in China. For that region we should note also that the South Korea increase in Table 1 (22.56%) is a substantial understatement of reality, because South Korea has not reported ‘total deaths’ after July 2022, and we know that Korea has had many covid cases since then.

We also note that post-pandemic death tallies are high for Japan, Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, and Finland. These are all countries which, for their regions, were known for their more restrictive public health policies. Finland was widely acclaimed for being the most restrictive of the Nordic countries during the pandemic years. (We also note that Finland had many more deaths than Norway both pre-pandemic and post-pandemic, despite having about the same population as Norway; it suggests that many more young Finns are working abroad than young Norwegians. Likewise, we see that New Zealand has more deaths than Ireland, despite both countries having essentially the same population.)

Germany, which has had a particularly worrying recent run of deaths, in Table 1 is not out of step with its western neighbours; although we should note that southern Western Europe has generally had a post-pandemic more normal than northern Western Europe (Sweden excepted).

The critical question, looking to 2023 and 2024, is whether, for the countries towards the top of Table 1, the pandemic has triggered a new normal with persistently higher mortality than in the 2010s’ decade. Or have these countries simply experienced a delayed pandemic mortality experience which will soon subside? If the latter, then we should expect a substantial mortality drop in East Asia and West Europe in the year to April 2024.

Demography and the challenges of predicting the pandemic’s influence on 2020s’ mortality

Demography is a complex subject. Pandemic death rates per capita were high in Eastern Europe because those countries have lost many of their young people to emigration. Increases in death tallies, however, were never so high in those countries. The demography of Europe is particularly complex because many of their older people were born either side of, or during, World War Two; a war with substantial demographic consequences which have not yet fully played out.

The Scandinavian countries in particular had diverse experiences in that war. Sweden was neutral, Norway and Denmark were occupied, while Finland was successively friend and foe to the allied powers. So the change in the number of older people may differ in Sweden compared to the others. Nevertheless, Sweden still compares well with the other neutral countries: Switzerland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. (Though noting that Spain had its own especially large demographic trauma in 1936 to 1939.)

Another problem in unravelling the demographics of Europe is the substantial international migration between present and former European Union countries, and immigration from former (or present) empire countries. So many people these days die in different countries from which they were born. We know little about the different pandemic and post-pandemic death experiences of immigrants compared to people born in the country of their death.

In most countries deaths in 2022/23 would have been higher compared to 2018/19. The main determinant of death rates is the numbers of people in the oldest age cohorts. About half of all deaths in most countries are of people in their eighties. So the biggest increases, for reasons other than the pandemic, would be due to the rate of increase or decrease of a country’s population of octogenarians. Some countries will have significantly fewer octogenarians after the pandemic, because the pandemic itself took so many.

The second most important reason for changing death tallies is the underlying health of the people. Pandemics take more people in countries which already have substantial populations – especially populations in the 65 to 74 age group – with compromised pre-pandemic health or compromised general immunity. In pandemic years, the main reason for more death is worse underlying health. In other years changes in health status may either accentuate or offset changes in the numbers of people over eighty. While there are health-compromised people of all ages, compromised health – high morbidity or low general immunity – is more likely to have prematurely fatal consequences for people aged 65 to 74.

To summarise the two previous paragraphs, I would argue that the two main predictors of a country’s normal death tally are the numbers of octogenarians in the population, and the numbers of people in the population aged 65 to 74 with compromised health or general immunity. (In addition, some developing countries still have unacceptably high levels of infant mortality.)

The two key aspects of the health status of living populations are morbidity and immunity. The countries which fare best in a novel virus pandemic (or from wave pandemics of pathogens which induce only-short-lived specific immunity) are those with low morbidity and high general immunity. With respect to the present post-pandemic period, the covid coronavirus increased both the morbidity and the immunity of populations. Where these two increases balance out, then a new normal appears which looks substantially like the old normal.

Before the twentieth century, people living rurally were more likely to experience longevity. That changed in the twentieth century, when people living in metropolises gained super-high-immunity levels from living in close proximity to each other (improving immunity); and urbanised populations experienced reduced morbidity as a result of access to a wider range of foods, from more timely access to healthcare services, less exposure to conditions such as malaria, and safer supplies of drinking water.

Big cities still reduce life outcomes for people immigrating from rural areas; for people not yet adapted to city levels of exposure to pathogens, and often having to settle for inferior housing and employment experiences. When governments tamper with the finely-tuned immunity equilibria in our big cities, the potential for deadly unintended consequences has always been there. Such tampering may include the required overuse of facemasks, and the creation of fear around the use of public transport.

The post-pandemic experience of East Asia is not a particularly good advertisement for disruptive public health practices. Sweden was conspicuous by taking the opposite policy tack from that taken in East Asia, minimising disruptions from normal social interaction. Sweden’s different approach was not a result of its greater wisdom or greater laisse-faire liberality; rather it was a result of a mistaken assumption that, by mid-March 2020, many more people had already been infected by the new coronavirus (making it too late for restrictive policies) than actually had been infected.

The interregnum between the two recent respiratory pandemics

Finally, it is worthwhile to suggest reasons why deaths in much of the developed world were especially low from May 2018 to February 2020; a phenomenon particularly marked in Sweden. This was most likely because of the 2017 influenza pandemic – the invisible pandemic (invisible even to demographers, then more attentive to issues other than heightened seasonal mortality). This world disease event left populations more immune, and (because that pandemic took so many) it meant that the post-influenza 2018 population was more healthy and had more immunity than the pre-pandemic 2016 population.

It is normal for post-pandemic death rates to be low for a couple of years. Indeed, it was true around 1919 and 1920, after the great influenza pandemic of 1918. Will it prove to be so this time, from 2023 to say 2025? We should be watching aggregate mortality – in our own countries and other countries – with as great interest as we watch the inflation, unemployment and economic growth data.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Well, no one saw that coming. For those in New Zealand relieved that Christmas was over because it means politics resumes, this week held the promise of a cabinet reshuffle, the possible unveiling of some meaty new policy and — if we were really lucky — the announcement of the date of this year’s general election.

We got the last of these (it will be on October 14). What we also got, however, was the announcement that in three weeks’ time one of the most popular — and powerful — prime ministers in recent New Zealand history will be stepping down.

It isn’t difficult to divine why Jacinda Ardern has reached her decision. As she herself put it:

I believe that leading a country is the most privileged job anyone could ever have but also one of the more challenging. You cannot and should not do it unless you have a full tank plus a bit in reserve for those unexpected challenges.

She has had more than her fair share of such challenges: a domestic terror attack in Christchurch, a major natural disaster at Whakaari-White Island, a global pandemic and, most recently, a cost-of-living crisis.

On top of that, of course, she has had to chart a way through the usual slate of policy issues that have bedevilled governments for decades in this country, including the cost of housing, child poverty, inequality and the climate crisis.

Clearly, the Ardern tank is empty.

But it isn’t just about the policy. Along with other women politicians, Ardern faces a constant barrage of online and in-person abuse — from anti-vaxxers, misogynists and sundry others who simply don’t like her.

As others with direct experience of this have written, the deterioration in civic discourse in New Zealand has been profound and disturbing, especially since the violent occupation of the parliamentary precinct in early 2022.

🔴 #BREAKING: New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern will not seek re-election and has revealed the date she will stand down https://t.co/UET5ZoszD1 #Newshub pic.twitter.com/fPAROdI5l2

— Newshub (@NewshubNZ) January 19, 2023

Ardern has spent the past two years right on the frontline of this sort of toxicity. This has taken a toll — on her, on her family, on those close to her — and has played a part in her decision.

A tale of two legacies
In time, however, what people will remember most about Ardern’s term in office is the manner of her response to serious crises. She has faced more than any other New Zealand prime minister in recent history and, in the main, has responded with calmness, dignity and clarity.

There are always competing points of view on these matters, of course. But her refusal to engage in the rhetoric of abuse or disparagement (her recent reference in Parliament to an opposition MP as an “arrogant prick” aside), which has become the stock-in-trade of too many elected representatives, has marked her out in a world in which abuse has become normalised in politics.

Critics may deride this as “mere performance”. But politics is — above all else — a matter of controlling the narrative. And for a long time Ardern and her team were very good at this.

That said, there is plenty she hasn’t achieved. She came to power promising transformation, but inequality and poverty remain weeping sores on the body politic.

Her Labour government has not been able to alleviate the chronic shortage of public housing that has existed for many years, and workforces in public health, education and construction face challenges no future government will relish.

No obvious successor
Attention now turns to Labour’s leadership and the party’s caucus vote this Sunday. A majority of 60 percent plus one more vote is required to secure the position, and Labour will be hoping this is what happens.

If not, the party’s constitution requires it to establish an electoral college comprising the caucus (which gets 40 percent of the total vote), the wider party membership (40 percent) and affiliate members (20 percent). This would be time-consuming, potentially divisive and a distraction.

Look for a clear-cut decision to be announced on Sunday.

The other big surprise has been Finance Minister and Ardern’s deputy Grant Robertson ruling himself out of the contest. Many people assumed he was the logical successor, but his decision opens the field wide.

Even including Ardern’s inner circle of David Parker, Chris Hipkins and Megan Woods, the bench is not that deep, and none of the candidates has anything like Ardern’s wattage. The shoes needing filling are on the large side of big.

Australian PM Anthony Albanese said she has “shown the world how to lead with intellect and strength”. https://t.co/Mkg8u82vxL

— Stuff (@NZStuff) January 19, 2023

Mixed news for National
Unsurprisingly, Ardern’s announcement has dominated the news cycle in New Zealand, leaving no room for consideration of another important event this week — the National Party’s first caucus of the year.

One might imagine that on hearing news of Ardern’s resignation there might have been jubilation in some sections of the party. Labour’s polling has been falling for some time now, while support for centre-right parties National and ACT has been climbing.

Ardern is still significantly more popular than National’s leader, Christopher Luxon, and he will likely be quietly pleased he won’t have to face Ardern on the campaign trail. She was good at that stuff; he is still learning.

National will be thinking, too, that some of the support for Labour that is tied to Ardern herself — including the support Labour received in 2020 from people who habitually vote for National — can now be peeled off and brought home.

Wider National heads will counsel caution, however. As the covid years have rolled by, Ardern has become an increasingly polarising figure.

By stepping aside now she gives her party plenty of time to instal a new leadership group that can draw a line under the past three years and focus on the future.

It is far too soon to tell, of course, if the country will buy a new narrative in which Ardern is not the key character. But she is giving Labour every chance of having a decent crack at it.

Leaving on her own terms
Are there broader lessons in all of this for international audiences? Depressingly, perhaps the key one concerns the price paid by elected representatives in these times of polarisation and the normalisation of abuse.

Around the world, women politicians in particular have borne the brunt of the toxicity and there are many who will see in Ardern’s departure a silencing of a woman’s voice.

On the upside, perhaps there are also things to be learned about the exercise of political leadership. Ardern has chosen the time and manner of her leaving — she has not lost the position because of internal ructions or because of an election loss.

Her reputation will be burnished as a result, and if anything it will generate even more political capital for her — although whether or not she chooses to distribute that currency on the international stage remains unclear. But you rather suspect she might at some point.

For now, though, she will be looking forward to walking her child to school and finally being able to marry her long-term partner. After a tumultuous and more-than-testing time in office, that may yet be reward enough.

Dr Richard Shaw is professor of politics, Massey University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz