A Constitutional Reform Bill dedicated to New Caledonia was rejected on Thursday by the French National Assembly (Lower House) without debate, by a gathering of opposition parties by a score of 190 to 107.

The rejection came in the form of the endorsement of a preliminary Bill filed by a left wing opposition, Emmanuel Tjibaou, on behalf of the GDR group (Gauche démocrate et républicaine).

The “prior rejection motion” means that if the rejection motion is adopted, then it closes the current sitting on the matter and the Bill would then have to come back to the other House of Parliament, the Senate, following the “shuttle” rule.

Tjibaou, who is an indigenous Kanak pro-independence leader, is one of the two MPs representing New Caledonia in the Assembly.

The text was originally tabled for a vote to be held on 1 April 2026, but this was later delayed by one day, following an announcement by Speaker Yaël Braun-Pivet.

However, on Thursday, during a sitting that only debated motives from the government and its Minister for Overseas Naïma Moutchou, the rapporteur Philippe Gosselin and representatives from all parties present, it quickly became clear that most of the opposition parties were going to support the rejection motion, and vote against the text without further debate.

The sitting only lasted 01 hour 40 minutes.

Tjibaou, speaking in support of his rejection motion, stressed that the Constitutional Bill, in his view, was “not consensual”, because his party, the FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) was opposed to the text and that the Bill “did not seek to reach a compromise” between all stakeholders.

Tjibaou said this was in contradiction to the previous Matignon-Oudinot (1988) and Nouméa Accord (1998), which initiated a decolonisation process for New Caledonia.

The present Constitutional Bill derives from talks held in July 2025 and January 2026 between New Caledonia political stakeholders and the French government. This was on two occasions — in the small city of Bougival in July 2025 and later in January 2026 in Paris, at the French Presidential palace of Élysée, and the French ministry of Overseas territories in Rue Oudinot.

Hence the name of Bougival-Élysée-Oudinot (BEO) for a text and an expanded project.

The project also envisions the creation of a “State of New Caledonia”, with a correlated “New Caledonia Nationality” available to people who are already French citizens.

Other participating parties pro-France and pro-independence (two pro-independence members of FLNKS) have since split to create their own “UNI” (Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance).

They have maintained their commitment to the BEO process, including their legislative adaptation (in the form of a Constitutional Amendment and an “organic Law”, which would de facto become New Caledonia’s constitution).

Tjibaou: ‘a logic of assimilation’
But the BEO text, in August 2025, was unequivocally opposed by the FLNKS, one of the main components of the pro-independence movement.

The FLNKS later explained it saw these, as well as a planned process of transfer of more powers from Paris to Nouméa, was, in their view, just a “lure” of independence.

Tjibaou said on Thursday the text was at best “symbolic”.

“To us, this amounts to a perennial status within France… It’s a logic of assimilation… It cannot be compared to a decolonisation in accordance with the UN resolutions and the international law”, he told MPs.

He called on local elections to be held sooner than later, currently no later than 28 June 2026.

Tjibaou said it was ironic that “a pro-independence” should tell the Minister that “when our Kanak country is damaged, it is also France that is damaged”… Because “when you make decisions that are leading us to chaos, you are also jeopardising France’s place in the Pacific”, he said at the tribune.

Moutchou: ‘There is no other agreement’
Moutchou, in her reply, said the rejection of the Bill would have repercussions on New Caledonians’ everyday life.

She stressed what New Caledonians needed, after the riots of May 2024 and a severe economic downfall since, was “visibility”, especially on the part of economic stakeholders who needed stability in order to restore confidence and investment.

“There is no other agreement. The Bougival process was approved by 5 of the 6 political parties of New Caledonia.

“Some are mentioning the absence of FLNKS. I’ve always maintained the principles of transparency, dialogue information for all. And the door was never closed”, she said.

“And the politics of the empty chair cannot dictate the future of a territory.

“So what do we do? How much longer do we have to wait… To be responsible, we move on with those who are here… Consensus does not mean unanimity, consensus is not perfection, it’s a point of equilibrium”, she replied to Tjibaou.

“And while we have this text that is not perfect, but opens a way, those who say, ‘we will wait and see later’ risk bringing us back to a confrontational situation”.

“I don’t know what more we should do. After the 2024 riots, you asked us to find a political agreement. We did this and we made big concessions, we, the non-independentists. We did this for the good of New Caledonia.

“Then you said we had to meet again to further clarify… On Kanak identity and the self-determination process. So now we are back with two political agreements.”

“And now you are sending us back home without a debate… You know, New Caledonia may be far from Paris, but tonight, many are watching this debate on TV and they’re thinking ‘What will happen to us?”

“Many have lost their home, their work, but even worse, they have lost hope to live in peace in New Caledonia”.

“What I am asking (MPs) today is just to have the common decency to debate on this (Bill)… These agreements are being supported by the majority of New Caledonia’s political class (including the moderate pro-independence parties within the Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance), but also by the economic and business sector.”

“I’m asking for a vote on these accords and I’m asking to organise a consultation of New Caledonia’s people, because at the end of the day, we are the only legitimate ones to decide on our future.”

What now?
Following the rejection vote on Thursday, French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said all parties that had signed the Bougival-Elysée-Oudinot Accord would meet “next week”, because this is what was agreed in case of a deadlock.

Commenting on future options, Metzdorf told French media in Paris that “all options are now on the table”.

After the National Assembly’s rejection, another possibility was to bring the text back to the Upper House (the Senate).

Another option (that was almost implemented a few months ago, but later abandoned) would be to bring back a process of “consultation” directly in New Caledonia in the form of a de facto referendum for or against the Bougival process.

But the sensitive issue of who is eligible to vote at local elections remains for the looming provincial elections (which would now have to be held no later than 28 June 2026).

Pro-France parties are still determined to have those restrictions changed to allow the “frozen” electoral roll to be more open, if not fully “unfrozen”.

This could be the subject of separate negotiations between New Caledonia’s opposing parties in the coming days.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

New Caledonia’s pro-and-anti-independence parties have committed to an “historic” deal over the future political status of the French Pacific territory, which is set to become — for the first time — a “state” within the French realm.

The 13-page agreement yesterday, officially entitled “Agreement Project of the Future of New Caledonia”, is the result of a solid 10 days of difficult negotiations between both pro and anti-independence parties.

They have stayed under closed doors at a hotel in the small city of Bougival, in the outskirts of Paris.

The talks were convened by French President Emmanuel Macron after an earlier series of talks held between February and May 2025 failed to yield an agreement.

After opening the talks on July 2, Macron handed over them to his Minister for Overseas, Manuel Valls, to oversee. Valls managed to bring together all parties around the same table earlier this year.

In his opening speech earlier this month, Macron insisted on the need to restore New Caledonia’s economy, which was brought to its knees following destructive and deadly riots that erupted in May 2024.

He said France was ready to study any solution, including an “associated state” for New Caledonia.

During the following days, all political players exchanged views under the seal of strict confidentiality.

While the pro-independence movement, and its Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), remained adamant they would settle for no less than “full sovereignty”, the pro-France parties were mostly arguing that three referendums — held between 2018 and 2021 — had already concluded that most New Caledonians wanted New Caledonia to remain part of France.

Those results, they said, dictated that the democratic result of the three consultations be respected.

With this confrontational context, which resulted in an increasingly radicalised background in New Caledonia, that eventually led to the 2024 riots, the Bougival summit was dubbed the “last chance summit”.

In the early hours of Saturday, just before 7 am (Paris time, 5 pm NZ time), after a sleepless night, the secrecy surrounding the Bougival talks finally ended with an announcement from Valls.

He wrote in a release that all partners taking part in the talks had signed and “committed to present and defend the agreement’s text on New Caledonia’s future.”

Valls said this was a “major commitment resulting from a long work of negotiations during which New Caledonia’s partners made the choice of courage and responsibility”.

The released document, signed by almost 20 politicians, details what the deal would imply for New Caledonia’s future.

In its preamble, the fresh deal underlines that New Caledonia was “once again betting on trust, dialogue and peace”, through “a new political organisation, a more widely shared sovereignty and an economic and social refoundation” for a “reinvented common destiny.”

New Caledonia’s population will be called to approve the agreement in February 2026.

If approved, the text would be the centrepiece of a “special organic law” voted by the local Congress.

It would later have to be endorsed by the French Parliament and enshrined in an article of the French Constitution.

What does the agreement contain?
One of the most notable developments in terms of future status for New Caledonia is the notion of a “State of New Caledonia”, under a regime that would maintain it as part of France, but with a dual citizenship — France/New Caledonia.

Another formulation used for the change of status is the often-used “sui generis”, which in legal Latin, describes a unique evolution, comparable to no other.

This would be formalised through a fundamental law to be endorsed by New Caledonia’s Congress by a required majority of three-fifths.

The number of MPs in the Congress would be 56.

The text also envisages a gradual transfer of key powers currently held by France (such as international relations), but would not include portfolios such as defence, currency or justice.

In diplomacy, New Caledonia would be empowered to conduct its own affairs, but “in respect of France’s international commitments and vital interests”.

On defence matters, even though this would remain under France’s powers, it is envisaged that New Caledonia would be “strongly” associated, consulted and kept informed, regarding strategy, goals and actions led by France in the Pacific region.

On police and public order matters, New Caledonia would be entitled to create its own provincial and traditional security forces, in addition to national French law enforcement agencies.

New Caledonia’s sensitive electoral roll
The sensitive issue of New Caledonia’s electoral roll and conditions of eligibility to vote at local elections (including for the three Provincial Assemblies) is also mentioned in the agreement.

It was this very issue that was perceived as the main trigger for the May 2024 riots, the pro-independence movement feared at the time that changing the conditions to vote would gradually place the indigenous Kanak community in a position of minority.

It is now agreed that the electoral roll would be partly opened to those people of New Caledonia who were born after 1998.

The roll was frozen in 2007 and restricted to people born before 1998, which is the date the previous major autonomy agreement of Nouméa was signed.

Under the new proposed conditions to access New Caledonia’s “citizenship”, those entitled would include people who already can vote at local elections, but also their children or any person who has resided in New Caledonia for an uninterrupted ten years or who has been married or lived in a civil de facto partnership with a qualified citizen for at least five years.

Provincial elections once again postponed
One of the first deadlines on the electoral calendar, the provincial elections, was to take place no later than 30 November 2025.

It will be moved once again — for the third time — to May-June 2026.

A significant part of the political deal is also dedicated to New Caledonia’s economic “refoundation”, with a high priority for the young generations, who have felt left out of the system and disenfranchised for too long.

One of the main goals was to bring New Caledonia’s public debts to a level of sustainability.

In 2024, following the riots, France granted, in the form of loans, over 1 billion euros (NZ $1.9 billion) for New Caledonia’s key institutions to remain afloat.

But some components of the political chessboard criticised the measure, saying this was placing the French territory in a state of excessive and long-term debt.

Nickel is regarded as the backbone of New Caledonia’s economy.

A nickel “strategic plan” would aim at re-starting New Caledonia nickel’s processing plants, especially in the Northern province, but at the same time facilitating the export of raw nickel.

There was also a will to ensure that all mining sites (many of which have been blocked and its installations damaged since the May 2024 riots) became accessible again.

Meanwhile, France would push the European Union to include New Caledonia’s nickel in its list of strategic resources.

New Caledonia’s nickel industry’s woes are also caused by its lack of competitiveness on the world market — especially compared to Indonesia’s recent rise in prominence in nickel production — because of the high cost of energy.

Swift reactions, mostly positive

The announcement yesterday was followed by quick reactions from all sides of New Caledonia’s political spectrum and also from mainland France’s political leaders.

French Prime Minister François Bayrou expressed “pride” to see an agreement “on par with history”, emerge.

“Bravo also to the work and patience of Manuel Valls” and “the decisive implication of Emmanuel Macron,” he wrote on X-Twitter.

From the ranks of New Caledonia’s political players, pro-France Nicolas Metzdorf said he perceived as one of the deal’s main benefits the fact that “we will at last be able to project ourselves in the future, in economic, social and societal reconstruction without any deadline.”

Metzdorf admitted that reaching an agreement required concessions and compromise from both sides.

“But the fact that we are no longer faced with referendums and to reinforce the powers of our provinces, this was our mandate”, he told public broadcaster NC La 1ère.

“We’ve had to accept this change from New Caledonia citizenship to New Caledonian nationality, which remains to be defined by New Caledonia’s Congress. We have also created a completely new status as part of the French Republic, a sui generis State”, he noted.

He said the innovative status kept New Caledonia within France, without going as far as an “associated state” mooted earlier.

“At least, what we have arrived at is that New Caledonians remain French”, pro-France Le Rassemblement-LR prominent leader Virginie Ruffenach commented.

“And those who want to contribute to New Caledonia’s development will be able to do so through a minimum stay of residence, the right to vote and to become citizens and later New Caledonia nationals”

“I’m aware that some could be wary of the concessions we made, but let’s face it: New Caledonia nationality does not make New Caledonia an independent State . . . It does not take away anything from us, neither of us belonging to the French Republic nor our French nationality,” Southern Province pro-France President Sonia Backès wrote on social media.

In a joint release, the two main pro-France parties, Les Loyalistes and Rassemblement-LR, said the deal was no less than “historic” and “perennial” for New Caledonia as a whole, to “offer New Caledonia a future of peace, stability and prosperity” while at the same time considering France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

From the pro-independence side, one of the negotiators, Victor Tutugoro of UNI-UPM (Progressist Union in Melanesia) said what mattered was that “all of us have placed our bets on intelligence, beyond our respective beliefs, our positions, our postures”.

“We put all of these aside for the good of the country.”

“Of course, by definition, a compromise cannot satisfy anyone 100 percent. But it’s a balanced compromise for everyone,” he said.

“And it allows us to look ahead, to build New Caledonia together, a citizenship and this common destiny everyone’s been talking about for many years.”

Before politicians fly back to New Caledonia to present the deal to their respective bases, President Macron received all delegation members last evening to congratulate them on their achievements.

During the Presidential meeting at the Elysée Palace, FLNKS chief negotiator Emmanuel Tjibaou (whose father Jean-Marie Tjibaou also struck a historic agreement and shook hands with pro-France leader Jacques Lafleur, in 1988), stressed the agreement was one step along the path and it allows to envisage new perspectives for the Kanak people.

A sign of the changing times, but in a striking parallel — 37 years after his father’s historic handshake with Lafleur, Emmanuel Tjibaou (whose father was shot dead in 1989 by a radical pro-independence partisan who felt the independence cause had been betrayed — did not shake hands, but instead fist pumped with pro-France’s Metzdorf.

In a brief message on social networks, the French Head of State hailed the conclusive talks, which he labelled “A State of New Caledonia within the (French) Republic,” a win for a “bet on trust.”

“Now is the time for respect, for stability and for the sum of good wills to build a shared future.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

French President Emmanuel Macron has sent a formal invitation to “all New Caledonia stakeholders” for talks in Paris on the French Pacific territory’s political and economic future to be held on July 2.

The confirmation came on Thursday in the form of a letter sent individually to an undisclosed list of recipients and June 24.

The talks follow a series of roundtables fostered earlier this year by French Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls.

But the latest talks, held in New Caledonia under a so-called “conclave” format, stalled on  May 8.

This was mainly because several main components of the pro-France (anti-independence) parties said the draft agreement proposed by Valls was tantamount to a form of independence, which they reject.

The project implied that New Caledonia’s future political status vis-à-vis France could be an associated independence “within France” with a transfer of key powers (justice, defence, law and order, foreign affairs, currency ), a dual New Caledonia-France citizenship and an international standing.

Instead, the pro-France Rassemblement-LR and Loyalistes suggested another project of “internal federalism” which would give more powers (including on tax matters) to each of the three provinces, a notion often criticised as a de facto partition of New Caledonia.

Local elections issue
In May 2024, on the sensitive issue of eligibility at local elections, deadly riots broke out in New Caledonia, resulting in 14 deaths and more than 2 billion euros (NZ$3.8 billion) in damage.

In his letter, Macron writes that although Valls “managed to restore dialogue…this did not allow reaching an agreement on (New Caledonia’s) institutional future”.

“This is why I decided to host, under my presidency, a summit dedicated to New Caledonia and associating the whole of the territory’s stakeholders”.

Macron also wrote that “beyond institutional topics, I wish that our exchanges can also touch on (New Caledonia’s) economic and societal issues”.

Macron made earlier announcements, including on 10 June 2025, on the margins of the recent UNOC Oceans Summit in Nice (France), when he dedicated a significant part of his speech to Pacific leaders attending a “Pacific-France” summit to the situation in New Caledonia.

“Our exchanges will last as long as it takes so that the heavy topics . . . can be dealt with with all the seriousness they deserve”.

Macron also points out that after New Caledonia’s “crisis” broke out on 13 May 2024, “the tension was too high to allow for a dialogue between all the components of New Caledonia’s society”.

A new deal?
The main political objective of the talks remains to find a comprehensive agreement between all local political stakeholders, in order to arrive at a new agreement that would define the French Pacific territory’s political future and status.

This would then allow to replace the 27-year-old Nouméa Accord, signed in 1998.

That pact put a heavy focus on the notions of “living together” and “common destiny” for New Caledonia’s indigenous Kanaks and all of the other components of its ethnically and culturally diverse society.

It also envisaged an economic “rebalancing” between the Northern and Islands provinces and the more affluent Southern province, where the capital Nouméa is located.

The Nouméa Accord also contained provisions to hold three referendums on self-determination.

The three polls took place in 2018, 2020 and 2021, all of those resulting in a majority of people rejecting independence.

But the last referendum, in December 2021, was largely boycotted by the pro-independence movement.

‘Examine the situation’
According to the Nouméa Accord, after the referendums, political stakeholders were to “examine the situation thus created”, Macron recalled.

But despite several attempts, including under previous governments, to promote political talks, the situation has remained deadlocked and increasingly polarised between the pro-independence and the pro-France camps.

A few days after the May 2024 riots, Macron made a trip to New Caledonia, calling for the situation to be appeased so that talks could resume.

In his June 10 speech to Pacific leaders, Macron also mentioned a “new project” and in relation to the past referendums process, pledged “not to make the same mistakes again”.

He said he believed the referendum, as an instrument, was not necessarily adapted to Melanesian and Kanak cultures.

In practice, the Paris “summit” would also involve French minister for Overseas Manuel Valls.

The list of invited participants would include all parties, pro-independence and pro-France, represented at New Caledonia’s Congress (the local parliament).

But it would also include a number of economic stakeholders, as well as a delegation of Mayors of New Caledonia, as well as representatives of the civil society and NGOs.

Talks could also come in several formats, with the political side being treated separately.

The pro-independence platform FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) has to decide at the weekend whether it will take part in the Paris talks.

Will Christian Téin take part?
During a whirlwind visit to New Caledonia in June 2024, Macron met Christian Téin, the leader of a pro-independence CCAT (Field Action Coordination Cell), created by Union Calédonienne (UC).

Téin was arrested and jailed in mainland France.

In August 2024, while in custody in the Mulhouse prison (northeastern France), he was elected in absentia as president of a UC-dominated FLNKS.

Even though he still faces charges for allegedly being one of the masterminds of the May 2024 riots, Téin was released from jail on June 12 on condition that he does not travel to New Caledonia and reports regularly to French judges.

On the pro-France side, Téin’s release triggered mixed angry reactions.

Other pro-France hard-line components said the Kanak leader’s participation in the Paris talks was simply “unthinkable”.

Pro-independence Tjibaou said Téin’s release was “a sign of appeasement”, but that his participation was probably subject to “conditions”.

“But I’m not the one who makes the invitations,” he told public broadcaster NC la 1ère on 15 June 2025.

FLNKS spokesman Dominique Fochi said in a release Téin’s participation in the talks was earlier declared a prerequisite.

“Now our FLNKS president has been released. He’s the FLNKS boss and we are awaiting his instructions,” Fochi said.

At former roundtables earlier this year, the FLNKS delegation was headed by Union Calédonienne (UC, the main and dominating component of the FLNKS) president Emmanuel Tjibaou.

‘Concluding the decolonisation process’, says Valls
In a press conference on Tuesday in Paris, Valls elaborated some more on the upcoming Paris talks.

“Obviously there will be a sequence of political negotiations which I will lead with all of New Caledonia’s players, that is all groups represented at the Congress. But there will also be an economic and social sequence with economic, social and societal players who will be invited”, Valls said.

During question time at the French National Assembly in Paris on 3 June 2025, Valls said he remained confident that it was “still possible” to reach an agreement and to “reconcile” the “contradictory aspirations” of the pro-independence and pro-France camps.

During the same sitting, pro-France New Caledonia MP Nicolas Metzdorf decried what he termed “France’s lack of ambition” and his camp’s feeling of being “let down”.

The other MP for New Caledonia’s, pro-independence Emmanuel Tjibaou, also took the floor to call on France to “close the colonial chapter” and that France has to “take its part in the conclusion of the emancipation process” of New Caledonia.

“With the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, and the political forces, we will make offers, while concluding the decolonisation process, the self-determination process, while respecting New Caledonians’ words and at the same time not forgetting history, and the past that have led to the disaster of the 1980s and the catastrophe of May 2024,” he said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A leaked “working paper” on New Caledonia’s future political status is causing concern on the local stage and has prompted a “clarification” from the French government’s Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls.

Details of the document, which was supposed to remain confidential, have been widely circulated online over the past few days.

Valls said earlier the confidentiality of the document was supposed to ensure expected results of ongoing talks would not be jeopardised.

However, following the leak, Valls said in a release on Friday that, for the time being, it was nothing more than a “working paper”.

The document results from earlier rounds of talks when Valls was in Nouméa during his previous trips in February and March 2025.

Valls is due to return to New Caledonia on April 29 for another round of talks and possibly “negotiations” and more political talks are ongoing behind closed doors.

He has denied that it can be regarded as a “unilateral proposal” from Paris.

The latest roundtable session was on Friday, April 11, held remotely via a video conference between Valls in Paris and all political stakeholders (both pro-France and pro-independence parties) in Nouméa.

All tendencies across the political spectrum have reaffirmed their strong and sometimes “non-negotiable” respective stances.

Parties opposed to independence, who regard New Caledonia as being part of France, have consistently maintained that the results of the latest three referendums on self-determination — held in 2018, 2020 and 2021 — should be respected. They reject the notion of independence.

The last referendum in December 2021 was, however, largely boycotted by the pro-independence movement and indigenous Kanak voters.

On the pro-independence side, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS, dominated by the Union Calédonienne) is announcing a “convention” on April 26 — just three days before Valls’s return — to decide on whether it should now fully engage in negotiations proper.

In a news conference last week, the FLNKS was critical of the French-suggested approach, saying it would only commit if they “see the benefits” and that the document was “patronising”.

Two other pro-independence parties — the PALIKA (Kanak Liberation Party) and the UPM (Union Progressiste en Mélanésie) — have distanced themselves from the FLNKS, which they see as too radical under Union Calédonienne’s influence and dominance) and hold a more moderate view.

PALIKA held a general meeting late last week to reaffirm that, while they too were regarding the path to sovereignty as their paramount goal, they were already committed to participating in future “negotiations” since “all topics have been taken into account” (in the working document).

They are favour an “independence association” pathway.

Carefully chosen words
In his release on Friday, Valls said the main pillars of future negotiations were articulated around the themes of:

• “democracy and the rule of law”, a “decolonisation process”, the right to self-determination, a future “fundamental law” that would seal New Caledonia’s future status (and would then, if locally approved, be ratified by French Parliament and later included in the French Constitution);
• the powers of New Caledonia’s three provinces (including on tax and revenue collection matters); and
• a future New Caledonia citizenship (and its conditions of eligibility) with the associated definition of who meets the requirements to vote at local elections.

Citizenship
On acquiring New Caledonia citizenship, a consensus seems to emerge on the minimum time of residence: it would be “10 to 15” years with other criteria such as an “exam” to ascertain the candidate’s knowledge and respect of cultural “values and specificities”.

Every person born in New Caledonia, children and spouses of qualified citizens, would also automatically qualify for New Caledonia’s citizenship.

Power-sharing
On power-sharing, the draft also touches on the “sovereign” powers (international relations, defence, law and order, justice, currency) which would remain within the French realm, but in a stronger association for New Caledonia.

All other powers, regarded as “non-sovereign”, would remain under direct control of New Caledonia as they have already been transferred, gradually, to New Caledonia, over the past 27 years, under the Nouméa Accord.

New Caledonia would also be consulted on all negotiations related to the Pacific islands region and would get representation at European Union level.

Local diplomats would also be trained under France’s Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Under the Nouméa Accord, the training process was already initiated more than 10 years ago with New Caledonian representatives appointed and hosted at French embassies in the region — Fiji, New Zealand, Australia.

A local “strategic committee” would also be set up on defence matters.

However, despite long-time FLNKS demands, this would not allow for a seat at the United Nations.

In terms of currency, the present French Pacific Francs (CFP, XPF) would be abolished for a new currency that would remain pegged to the Euro, provided France’s other two Pacific territories (French Polynesia, Wallis-and-Futuna — which are also using the CFP) agree.

Reinforced provincial powers
A new proposal, in terms of reinforced provincial powers, would be to grant each of New Caledonia’s three provinces (North, South and Loyalty Islands) the capacity — currently held by New Caledonia’s government — to generate and collect its own taxes.

Each province would then re-distribute their collected tax revenues to the central government and municipalities.

This is also reported to be a sensitive point during the talks, since about 80 percent of New Caledonia’s wealth is located in the Southern Province, which also generates more than 90 percent of all of New Caledonia’s tax revenues.

This is perceived as a concession to pro-France parties, which are calling for an “internal federation” model for New Caledonia, a prospect strongly opposed by pro-independence parties who are denouncing what they liken to some kind of “partition” for the French Pacific dependency.

In the currently discussed project, the representation at the Congress (Parliament) of New Caledonia would be revised among the three provinces to better reflect their respective weight according to demographic changes.

The representation would be re-assessed and possibly modified after each population census.

Under the proposed text, New Caledonia’s government would remain based on the notion of “collegiality”.

Future referendum — no more just ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence
The current working paper, on the right to self-determination, suggests that any future referendum on self-determination no longer has a specified deadline, but should take place after a “stabilisation and reconstruction” phase.

It would no longer ask the binary question of “yes” or “no” to independence and full sovereignty, but rather seek the approval of a “comprehensive project”.

To activate a referendum, the approval of at least three fifths of New Caledonia’s 54-seat Congress would be needed.

The Congress’s current makeup, almost equally split in two between pro-France and pro-independence parties, this 3/5th threshold could only be found if there is a consensual vote beyond party lines.

Some of the FLNKS’s earlier demands, like having its president Christian Téin (elected in absentia in August 2024 ) part of the talks, now seem to have been dropped.

Téin was arrested in June 2024 for alleged involvement in the May 2024 insurrectional riots that caused 14 dead (including two French gendarmes), hundreds of injured, thousands of jobless and the destruction of several hundred businesses for a total estimated damage of 2.2 billion euros (NZ$4.3 billion).

Four days after his arrest, Téin was transferred from New Caledonia to mainland France.

Although he is still remanded in custody pending his trial (for alleged involvement in organised criminal-related acts), his case was recently transferred from the jurisdiction of judges in Nouméa to mainland France magistrates.

Union Calédonienne president and pro-independence front man Emmanuel Tjibaou told public broadcaster NC la 1ère yesterday he was in regular contact with Téin from his jail in Mulhouse (northeastern France).

Another recent development that could also be perceived as a concession to the FLNKS is that last week, France announced the replacement of French High commissioner Louis Le Franc, France’s representative and man in charge in Nouméa during last year’s riots.

‘We are facing a decisive moment’, says Valls
Valls said he remained hopeful that despite “all positions remaining at present still far from each other . . . evolutions are still possible”.

“I reaffirm the (French) State’s full commitment to pursue this approach, in the spirit of the Matignon and Nouméa Accords (signed respectively in 1988 and 1998) to build together a united, appeased and prosperous New Caledonia,” Valls concluded.

“We are facing a decisive moment for the future of New Caledonia, which is confronted with a particularly grave economic and social situation. Civil peace remains fragile.”

The much sought-after agreement, which has been at the centre of political talks since they resumed in early 2025 after a three-year hiatus, is supposed to replace the Nouméa Accord from 1998.

The 1998 pact, which outlines the notion of gradual transfer of sovereign powers from France to new Caledonia, but also the notion of “common destiny”, stipulates that after three referendums on self-determination resulting in a majority of “no”, then the political partners are to meet and “discuss the situation thus created”.

Determination, anxiety and hope
On all sides of the political landscape, ahead of any outcome for the crucial talks, the current atmosphere is a mix of determination, anxiety and hope, with a touch of disillusionment.

The pro-independence movement’s Emmanuel Tjibaou has to manage a sometimes radical base.

He told NC la 1ère that the main objective remained “the path to sovereignty”.

Within the pro-France camp, there is also defiance towards Vall’s approach and expected results.

Among their ranks, one lingering angst, founded or not, is to see an agreement being concluded that would not respond to their expectations of New Caledonia remaining part of France.

This worst-case scenario, in their view, would bring back sad memories of Algeria’s pre-independence process decades ago.

On 4 June 1958, in the midst of its war against Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), French President General De Gaulle, while on a visit to Algiers, shouted a resounding “Je vous ai compris!” (“I have understood you”) to a crowd of cheering pro-France and French Algerians who were convinced at the time that their voice had been heard in favour of French Algeria.

On 19 March 1962, after years of a bloody war, the Evian Accords were signed, paving the way for Algeria’s independence on July 3.

“I had to take precautions, I had to proceed progressively and this is how we made it”, De Gaulle explained to the French daily Le Monde in 1966.

In the meantime, in an atmosphere of fear and violence, an estimated 700,000 French citizens from Algeria were “repatriated” by boat to mainland France.

As an alternative posed to French nationals at the time, FLN’s slogan was “la valise ou le cercueil” (“the suitcase or the coffin”).

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

New Caledonia’s largest pro-independence party, the Union Calédonienne (UC), has unveiled the main outcome of its congress last weekend, including its plans for the French Pacific territory’s political future.

Speaking at a news conference on Thursday in Nouméa, the party’s newly-elected executive bureau, now headed by Emmanuel Tjibaou, debriefed the media about the main resolutions made during its congress.

One of the motions was specifically concerning a timeframe for New Caledonia’s road to independence.

Tjibaou said UC now envisaged that one of the milestones on this road to sovereignty would be the signing of a “Kanaky Agreement”, at the latest on 24 September 2025 — a highly symbolic date as this was the day of France’s annexation of New Caledonia in 1853.

‘Kanaky Agreement’ by 24 September 2025?
This, he said, would mark the beginning of a five-year “transition period” from “2025 to 2030” that would be concluded by New Caledonia becoming fully sovereign under a status yet to be defined.

Several wordings have recently been advanced by stakeholders from around the political spectrum.

Depending on the pro-independence and pro-France sympathies, these have varied from “shared sovereignty”, “independence in partnership”, “independence-association” and, more recently, from the also divided pro-France loyalists camp, an “internal federalism” (Le Rassemblement-LR party) or a “territorial federation” (Les Loyalistes).

Charismatic pro-independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Emmanuel’s father who was assassinated in 1989, was known for being an advocate of a relativist approach to the term “independence”, to which he usually preferred to adjunct the pragmatic term “inter-dependence”.

Negotiations between all political parties and the French State are expected to begin in the next few weeks.

The talks (between pro-independence, anti-independence parties and the French State) are scheduled in such a way that all parties manage to reach a comprehensive and inclusive political agreement no later than March 2025.

The talks had completely stalled after the pro-indeoendence riots broke out on 13 May 2024.

Over the past three years, following three referendums (2018, 2020, 2021, the latter being strongly challenged by the pro-independence side) on the question of independence (all yielding a majority in favour of New Caledonia remaining part of France), there had been several attempts to hold inclusive talks in order to discuss New Caledonia’s political future.

But UC and other parties (including pro-France and pro-independence) did not manage to sit at the same table.

Speaking to journalists, Emmanuel Tjibaou confirmed that under its new leadership, UC was now willing to return to the negotiating table.

He said “May 13 has stopped our advances in those exchanges” but “now is the time to build the road to full sovereignty”.

Back to the negotiating table
In the footsteps of those expected negotiations, heavy campaigning will follow to prepare for crucial provincial elections to be held no later than November 2025.

The five years of “transition” (2025-2030), would be used to transfer the remaining “regal” powers from France as well as putting in place “a political, financial and international” framework, accompanied by the French State, Tjibaou elaborated.

And after the transitional period, UC’s president said a new phase of talks could start to put in place what he terms “interdependence conventions on some of the ‘regal’ — main — powers” (defence, law and order, foreign affairs, currency).

Tjibaou said this project could resemble a sort of independence in partnership, a “shared sovereignty”, a concept that was strongly suggested early November 2024 by visiting French Senate President Gérard Larcher.

But Tjibaou said there was a difference in the sense that those discussions on sharing would only take place once all the powers have been transferred from France.

“You can only share sovereignty if you have obtained it first”, he told local media.

One of the other resolutions from its congress held last weekend in the small village of Mia (Canala) was to reiterate its call to liberate Christian Téin, appointed president of the FLNKS (Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front) in absentia late August, even though he is currently imprisoned in Mulhouse (north-east of France) pending his trial.

Allegations over May riots
He is alleged to have been involved in the organisation of the demonstrations that degenerated into the May 13 riots, arson, looting and a deadly toll of 13 people, several hundred injured and material damage estimated at some 2.2 billion euros (NZ$3.9 billion).

Tjibaou also said that within a currently divided pro-independence movement, he hoped that a reunification process and “clarification” would be possible with other components of FLNKS, namely the Progressist Union in Melanesia (UPM) and the Kanak Liberation Party (PALIKA).

Since August 2024, both UPM and PALIKA have de facto withdrawn with FLNKS’s political bureau, saying they no longer recognised themselves in the way the movement had radicalised.

In 1988, after half a decade of a quasi civil war, Jean-Marie Tjibaou signed the Matignon-Oudinot agreements with New Caledonia’s pro-France and anti-independence leader Jacques Lafleur.

The third signatory was the French State.

One year later, in 1989, Tjibaou was shot dead by a hard-line pro-independence militant.

His son Emmanuel was aged 13 at the time.

‘Common destiny’
In 1998, a new agreement, the Nouméa Accord, was signed, with a focus on increased autonomy, the notions of “common destiny” and a local “citizenship” and a gradual transfer of powers from France.

After the three referendums held between 2018 and 2021, the Nouméa Accord prescribed that if there had been three referendums rejecting independence, then political stakeholders should “meet to examine the situation thus generated”.

On Thursday, Union Calédonienne also stressed that the Nouméa Accord remained the founding document of all future political discussions.

“We are sticking to the Nouméa Accord because it is this document that brings us to the elements of accession to sovereignty”.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The election of Emmanuel Tjibaou as the new president of New Caledonia’s main pro-independence party, the Union Calédonienne (UC), has triggered a whole range of political reactions — mostly favourable, some more cautious.

Within the pro-independence camp, the two main moderate parties UPM (Progressist Union in Melanesia) and PALIKA (Kanak Liberation Party), have reacted favourably, although they have recently distanced themselves from UC.

UPM leader Victor Tutugoro hailed Tjibaou’s election while pointing out that it was “not easy” . . . “given the difficult circumstances”.

“It’s courageous of him to take this responsibility,” he told public broadcaster NC la 1ère.

“He is a man of dialogue, a pragmatic man.”

PALIKA leader Jean-Pierre Djaïwé reacted similarly, saying Tjibaou “is well aware that the present situation is very difficult”.

Both PALIKA and UPM hoped the new UC leadership could have the potential to pave the way for a reconciliation between all members of the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), which has been experiencing profound differences for the past few years.

‘Real generational change’
On the pro-France (and therefore anti-independence) side, which is also divided, the moderate Calédonie Ensemble’s Philippe Michel saw in this new leadership a “real generational change” and noted that Tjibaou’s “appeasing” style could build new bridges between opposing sides of New Caledonia’s political spectrum.

“We’ll have to leave him some time to put his mark on UC’s operating mode,” Michel said.

“We all have to find our way back towards an agreement.”

Over the past two years, attempts from France to have all parties reach an agreement that could potentially produce a document to succeed the 1998 Nouméa autonomy Accord have failed, partly because of UC’s refusal to attend discussions involving all parties around the same table.

Pro-France Rassemblement-LR President Alcide Ponga said it was a big responsibility Tjibaou had on his shoulders in the coming months.

“Because we have these negotiations coming on how to exit the Nouméa Accord.

“I think it’s good that everyone comes back to the table — this is something New Caledonians are expecting.”

‘Wait and see’
Gil Brial, vice-president of a more radical pro-France Les Loyalistes, had a “wait and see” approach.

“We’re waiting now to see what motions UC has endorsed,” he said.

“Because if it’s returning to negotiations with only one goal, of accessing independence, despite three referendums which rejected independence, it won’t make things any simpler.”

Brial said he was well aware that UC’s newly-elected political bureau now included about half of “moderate” members, and the rest remained more radical.

“We want to see which of these trends will take the lead, who will act as negotiators and for what goal.”

UC has yet to publish the exact content of the motions adopted by its militants following its weekend congress.

Les Loyalistes leader and Southern province President Sonia Backès also reacted to Tjibaou’s election, saying this was “expected”.

Writing on social media, she expressed the hope that under its new leadership, UC would now “constructively return to the negotiating table”.

She said her party’s approach was “wait and see, without any naivety”.

Tjibaou’s first post-election comments
Tjibaou told journalists: “Now we have to pull up our sleeves and also shed some light on what has transpired since the 13 May (insurrection riots).”

He also placed a high priority on the upcoming political talks on New Caledonia’s institutional and political future.

“We still need to map out a framework and scope — what negotiations, what framework, what contents for this new agreement everyone is calling for.

“What we’ll be looking for is an agreement towards full emancipation and sovereignty. Based on this, we’ll have to build.”

He elaborated on Monday by defining UC’s pro-independence intentions as “a basket of negotiations”.

He, like his predecessor Daniel Goa, also placed a strong emphasis on the need for UC to take stock of past shortcomings (especially in relation to the younger generations) in order to “transform and move forward”.

CCAT ‘an important tool’
Asked about his perception of the role a UC-created “field action coordinating cell” (CCAT) has played in the May riots, Tjibaou said this remained “an important tool, especially to mobilise our militants on the ground”.

“But [CCAT] objectives have to be well-defined at all times.

“There is no political motion from UC that condones violence as a means to reach our goals.

“If abuses have been committed, justice will take its course.”

At its latest congress in August 2024 (which both UPM and PALIKA decided not to attend), the FLNKS appointed CCAT leader Christian Téin as its new president.

Téin is in jail in Mulhouse in the north-east of France, following his arrest in June and pending his trial.

In the newly-elected UC political bureau, the UC’s congress, which was held in the small village of Mia (near Canala, East Coast of the main island of Grande Terre) has maintained Téin as the party’s “commissar-general”.

Tjibaou only candidate
Tjibaou was the only candidate for the president’s position.

His election on Sunday comes as UC’s former leader, Daniel Goa, 71, announced last week that he did not intend to seek another mandate, partly for health reasons, after leading the party for the past 12 years.

Goa told militants this was a “heavy burden” his successor would now have to carry.

He also said there was a need to work on political awareness and training for the younger generations.

He said the heavy involvement of the youth in the recent riots, not necessarily within the UC’s political framework, was partly caused by “all these years during which we did not train (UC) political commissioners” on the ground.

He told local media at the weekend this has been “completely neglected”, saying this was his mea culpa.

After the riots started, there was a perception that calls for calm coming from UC and other political parties were no longer heeded and that, somehow, the whole insurrection had got out of control.

The 48-year-old Tjibaou was also elected earlier this year as one of New Caledonia’s two representatives to the French National Assembly (Lower House in the French Parkiament).

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The voters in the second round of France’s national elections last weekend staved off an expected shift to the far-right. But the result in the Pacific territory Kanaky New Caledonia was also in many ways historic.

Of the two assembly representatives decided, a position fell on either side of the deep polarisation evident in the territory — one for loyalists, one for supporters of independence. But it is the independence side that will take the most from the result.

Turnout in the vote was remarkable, not only because of the violence in New Caledonia over recent months, which has curbed movement and public transport across the territory, but also because national elections have been seen particularly by independence parties as less relevant locally.

Not this time.

The two rounds of the elections saw voters arrive in droves, with 60 percent and 71 percent turnout respectively, compared to typically low levels of 35-40 percent in New Caledonia. Images showed long queues with many young people.

Voting was generally peaceful, although a blockade prevented voting in one Kanak commune during the first round.

After winning the first round, a hardline loyalist and independence candidate faced off in each constituency. The second round therefore presented a binary choice, effectively becoming a barometer of views around independence.

Sobering results for loyalists
While clearly not a referendum, it was the first chance to measure sentiment in this manner since the boycotted referendum in 2021, which had followed two independence votes narrowly favouring staying with France.

The resulting impasse about the future of the territory had erupted into violent protests in May this year, when President Emmanuel Macron sought unilaterally to broaden voter eligibility to the detriment of indigenous representation. Only Macron then called snap national elections.

These are sobering results for loyalists.

So the contest, as it unfolded in New Caledonia, represented high stakes for both sides.

In the event, loyalist Nicolas Metzdorf won 52.4 percent in the first constituency (Noumea and islands) over the independence candidate’s 47.6 percent. Independence candidate Emmanuel Tjibaou won 57.4 percent to the loyalist’s 42.6 percent in the second (Northern Province and outer suburbs of Noumea).

The results, a surprise even to independence leaders, were significant.

It is notable that in these national elections, all citizens are eligible to vote. Only local assembly elections apply the controversial voter eligibility provisions which provoked the current violence, provisions that advantage longstanding residents and thus indigenous independence supporters.

Independence parties’ success
Yet without the benefit of this restriction, independence parties won, securing a majority 53 percent (83,123 votes) to the loyalists’ 47 percent (72,897) of valid votes cast across the territory. They had won 43 percent and 47 percent in the two non-boycotted referendums.

Even in the constituency won by the loyalist, the independence candidate, daughter-in-law of early independence fighter Nidoïsh Naisseline, won 47 percent of the vote.

These are sobering results for loyalists.

Independence party candidate Emmanuel Tjibaou, 48, carried particular symbolism. The son of the assassinated founding father of the independence movement Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Emmanuel had eschewed politics to this point, instead taking on cultural roles including as head of the Kanak cultural development agency.

He is a galvanising figure for independence supporters.

Emmanuel Tjibaou is now the first independence assembly representative in 38 years. He won notwithstanding France redesigning the two constituencies in 1988 specifically to prevent an independence representative win by including part of mainly loyalist Noumea in each.

A loyalist stronghold has been broken.

Further strain on both sides
While both a loyalist and independence parliamentarian will now sit in Paris and represent their different perspectives, the result will further strain the two sides.

Pro-independence supporters will be energised by the strong performance and this will increase expectations, especially among the young. The responsibility on elders is heavy. Tjibaou described the vote as  “a call for help, a cry of hope”. He has urged a return to the path of dialogue.

At the same time, loyalists will be concerned by independence party success. Insecurity and fear, already sharpened by recent violence, may intensify. While he referred to the need for dialogue, Nicolas Metzdorf is known for his tough uncompromising line.

Paradoxically the ongoing violence means an increased reliance on France for the reconstruction that will be a vital underpinning for talks. Estimates for rebuilding have  exceeded 2 billion euros (NZ$3.6 billion), with more than 800 businesses, countless schools and houses attacked, many destroyed.

Yet France itself is reeling after the snap elections returned no clear winner. Three blocs are vying for power, and are divided within their own ranks over how government should be formed. While French presidents have had to “cohabit” with an assembly majority of the opposite persuasion three times before, never has a president faced no clear majority.

It will take time, perhaps months, for a workable solution to emerge, during which New Caledonia is hardly likely to take precedence.

As New Caledonia’s neighbours prepare to meet for the annual Pacific Islands Forum summit next month, all will be hoping that the main parties can soon overcome their deep differences and find a peaceful local way forward.

Denise Fisher is a visiting fellow at ANU’s Centre for European Studies. She was an Australian diplomat for 30 years, serving in Australian diplomatic missions as a political and economic policy analyst in many capitals. The Australian Consul-General in Noumea, New Caledonia (2001-2004), she is the author of France in the South Pacific: Power and Politics (2013).

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz