SPECIAL REPORT: By Michelle Fahy

The Australian counter-drone weapons system seen at a weapons demonstration in Israel recently is actually just one of a few that were sold by the Canberra-based company Electro Optic Systems (EOS) and sent through its wholly-owned US subsidiary to Israel, Declassified Australia can reveal.

It was the ABC who broke the news of the EOS weapons system being provided for the demonstration trial. In response, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese continued to insist, as he has since the war in Gaza began, that Australia does not sell weapons to Israel.

However the weapon displayed wasn’t just provided on loan for the demonstration – the weapon has been “sold” to the Israelis. Declassified Australia can reveal that EOS, by its own admission, sold more than one of its R400 weapons systems to the Israelis prior to the demonstration.

• READ MORE: Other Declassified Australia reports

An EOS company presentation, titled “2024 Full Year Results”, describes a “potential new customer” for the R400 weapon in the “Middle East” (page 36). The presentation, prepared for EOS shareholders and lodged with the Australian Stock Exchange, is dated 25 February 2025.

EOS describes this potential new customer for its R400 as a “Preliminary” stage opportunity, valued at less-than-A$100 million, and states that more than one weapon was sold:

“Sample products sold, demo held, discussions underway.” [Emphasis added]

The company also points out a sense of urgency with the potential sale:

“Potential to accelerate due to operational requirements.”

In another section of the report (page 16), EOS reports a single entry in the “Preliminary” stage of a potential sale of R400 weapons, with the “Bid being prepared or submitted”.

EOS states (page 36) the “estimated opportunity size” of the sale is up to “$100 million”. At a unit price per system of A$1.55 million that potential contract is enough to purchase 60 of the R400 counter-drone system.

Under the heading “Notable Demonstrations” (page 15), EOS refers to “Counter Drone evaluation testing with New Customer”, held in January 2025, with an accompanying photograph of its R400 counter-drone cannon with five senior Israeli defence leaders posing beside it at the testing site.

EOS itself has revealed that the new customer is clearly Israel.

EOS states it had “supported a local prime [a major local weapons company] to demonstrate counter-drone capabilities in a high profile local demonstration”. EOS states that its R400 weapon system had “performed extremely well, earning high praise from the organisers.”

The location of the demonstration of the Australian weapon is verified as being in Israel’s southern Negev Desert by a 5 February press release about the weapon testing, released by Israel’s Ministry of Defence.  [Note: Since publication of this article, the Press Release has been taken down from the Israeli Defense Ministry website, but is still available here, for now.]

An Israel Defense Force photograph included with the press release, is the same photo of the R400 weapon and Israeli officials, as published in the EOS document. Israel’s Ministry of Defence also posted this video of the final demonstration event, with a firing of the EOS R400 weapons system appearing at 01:06.

In the photograph standing behind the Australian company’s weapon are four senior Israeli defence officials, together with an Israeli defence industry CEO.

Countering drone attacks
EOS’ powerful R400 remote weapons system has a 2km range and is renowned for its lethality and precision in targeting. Using a sophisticated gimbal, its accuracy is maintained even when the system is mounted and used atop a moving vehicle. The weapon can be seen in use on a moving vehicle here in this video clip.

The EOS R400 is not solely a counter-drone weapons system. It can be configured to fire weapons ranging from machine guns, to 30mm cannons, automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missiles and 70mm rockets, meaning it can be used against multiple types of targets in addition to drones — including people, buildings, armoured vehicles, and tanks.

The R400 Slinger variation is marketed by EOS as a system designed solely to counter modern drone threats with a single, lethal shot.

The Australian company’s customer in Israel is noted in the EOS company document as being an Israeli “local prime” arms manufacturer. Both Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems participated in the demonstration trials, each demonstrating a Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) that incorporated a 30mm cannon.

EOS sees a big future for the R400 and its suite of remote weapons systems. The EOS 2024 Financial Report was lodged with ASX on 25 February 2025. In the “Market Overview”section, it discusses weapons contracts signed in 2024, and notes (page 8) that:

“[EOS] Defence Systems is in active discussions and contract negotiations for the provision of RWS [Remote Weapons Systems] and related components with other potential customers.”

“Assuming the evaluation of these systems progresses positively, EOS would hope to move to sell larger, commercial quantities to these customers.” 

Australia obliged to act on defence transfers
In October 2024, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory reported on the implementation of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) findings that Israel may be committing “genocide”.

As reported by Kellie Tranter in Declassified Australia in November, the Australian government’s international legal responsibilities extend to investigating and regulating individuals and corporate entities who act in and from Australia to support the legally proscribed conduct of the Israeli State.

The Commission stated:

“Thus, the Commission recommends that any State engaged in such transfer or trade to Israel shall cease its transfer or trade until the State is satisfied that the goods and technology subject to the transfer or trade are not contributing to maintaining the unlawful occupation or to the commission of war crimes or genocide and thereafter throughout any period when the State is not so satisfied.” [Emphasis added]

The UN Commission makes clear what trade it refers to:

“On the issue of arms and military transfer and trade relating to Israel’s military capability, States have a duty to conduct a due diligence review of all transfer and trade agreements with Israel, including but not limited to equipment, weapons, munitions, parts, components, dual use items and technology, to determine whether the goods or technology subject to the transfer or trade contribute to maintaining the unlawful occupation or are used to commit violations of international law.” [Emphasis added]

If the government becomes aware of an impending military transfer of weapons or technology defined above, to Israel – as the stated intentions of EOS reported here make clear – it is obliged to investigate and if necessary intervene to halt the transfer:

“This includes both preexisting agreements and future transfers to Israel. States are obliged to demonstrate that any transfer or trade relating to military capability is not being used by Israel to maintain the unlawful occupation or commit violations of international law.” [Emphasis added]

Words are not enough
The Australian government and the Defence Department have continued their obfuscation of Australia’s weapons trade with Israel, as Declassified Australia has been reporting repeatedly.

ABC television has reported how the government continues to insist no weapons or ammunition had been supplied “directly to Israel” since its latest genocidal war on Gaza began. The addition of the word “directly” is a notable change to the government’s wording, since this EOS news emerged.

In response to the ABC report, Prime Minister Albanese said: “We do not sell arms to Israel . . .  We looked into this matter and the company has confirmed with the Department of Defence that the particular system was not exported from Australia. Australia does not export arms to Israel.”

Declassified Australia has previously reported on the Albanese Government’s repeated and misleading use of the phrase “to Israel”. Arms companies are known for exporting their weaponry, or parts and components thereof, via third party countries in an attempt to cover their tracks.

A defence industry source told the ABC the Australian-made components of the EOS R400 remote weapons system were assembled at the company’s wholly-owned US subsidiary in Alabama USA, before being shipped to Israel without an Australian export approval.

Military exports, including ammunition, munitions, parts and components, do not need to travel ‘directly’ to Israel to be prohibited under the Arms Trade Treaty.

Governments are required to find out where their weapons will, or may, end up and then make responsible decisions that comply with the treaty. A government must consider and assess the potential ‘end users’ of its military exports.

A UN expert panel has issued repeated demands that States and companies cease all arms transfers to Israel or risk complicity in international crimes, possibly including genocide. It stated:

“An end to transfers must include indirect transfers through intermediary countries that could ultimately be used by Israeli forces, particularly in the ongoing attacks on Gaza.…” [Emphasis added.]

Greens’ defence spokesperson, Senator David Shoebridge, has said, “What we might be seeing here is the impact of what’s called AUKUS Pillar 2, the removal of any controls for the passage of weapons between Australia and the United States, and then Australia permitting the United States to send Australian weapons anywhere”.

Not the first time
EOS has a history of supplying its remote weapons systems to military regimes accused of extensive war crimes.

During the catastrophic Yemen war which started in 2014, despite significant evidence of war crimes, EOS sold its weapons systems to both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. EOS enjoyed the full support of the Turnbull coalition government and its defence industry minister Christopher Pyne.

In early 2019, ABC TV reported, Saudi Arabia awarded Australian weapons manufacturer EOS a contract to supply it with 500 of its R400 Remote Weapons Systems.

The company has also benefited from the government-industry ‘revolving door’. Former chief of army, Peter Leahy, was on the EOS board from 2009 until late 2022, encompassing the period of the Yemen war. He served as the company’s chair from mid-2021 until his departure.

The two longest-serving current members of the EOS board are former chief of air force, Geoff Brown (joined 2016) and former Labor senator for the ACT, Kate Lundy (joined 2018).

The release of a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in 2023 raised serious concerns about EOS and its Saudi Arabian arms deals.

HRW’s report revealed that hundreds, possibly thousands, of unarmed migrants and asylum-seekers had been killed at the Yemen-Saudi border in the 15 months between March 2022 and June 2023, allegedly by Saudi officers.

Human Rights Watch says it identified on Google Earth what looks like “a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle” near a Saudi border guard posts north of the Yemeni refugee trail in January 1, 2023.

The vehicle has what appears to be “a heavy machine gun mounted in a turret on its roof”. This description closely matches the military equipment that Australia sold to Saudi Arabia a few years earlier.

Declassified Australia put a number of questions to EOS, the Department of Defence, and the offices of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and the Foreign Minister. None responded to our questions on this matter.

Michelle Fahy is an independent writer and researcher, specialising in the examination of connections between the weapons industry and government, and has written in various independent publications. She is on X @FahyMichelle, and on Substack at UndueInfluence.substack.com. This article has been republished from Declassified Australia with permission.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

Australia is caught in a jam, between an assertive American ally and a bold Chinese trading partner. America is accelerating its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, building up its fighting forces and expanding its military bases.

As Australia tries to navigate a pathway between America’s and Australia’s national interests, sometimes Australia’s national interest seems to submerge out of view.

Admiral David Johnston, the Chief of the Australia’s Defence Force, is steering this ship as China flexes its muscle sending a small warship flotilla south to circumnavigate the continent.

He has admitted that the first the Defence Force heard of a live-fire exercise by the three Chinese Navy ships sailing in the South Pacific east of Australia on February 21, was a phone call from the civilian Airservices Australia.

“The absence of any advance notice to Australian authorities was a concern, notably, that the limited notice provided by the PLA could have unnecessarily increased the risk to aircraft and vessels in the area,” Johnston told Senate Estimates .

Johnston was pressed to clarify how Defence first came to know of the live-fire drill: “Is it the case that Defence was only notified, via Virgin and Airservices Australia, 28 minutes [sic] after the firing window commenced?”

To this, Admiral Johnston replied: “Yes.”

If it happened as stated by the Admiral — that a live-fire exercise by the Chinese ships was undertaken and a warning notice was transmitted from the Chinese ships, all without being detected by Australian defence and surveillance assets — this is a defence failure of considerable significance.

Sources with knowledge of Defence spoken to by Declassified Australia say that this is either a failure of surveillance, or a failure of communication, or even more far-reaching, a failure of US alliance cooperation.

And from the very start the official facts became slippery.

Our latest investigation –

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE: NAVIGATING US-CHINA TENSIONS

We investigate a significant intelligence failure to detect live-firing by Chinese warships near Australia, has exposed Defence weaknesses, and the fact that when it counts, we are all alone.

👉… pic.twitter.com/GxbSxrtXyc

— Declassified Australia (@DeclassifiedAus) March 7, 2025

What did they know and when did they know it
The first information passed on to Defence by Airservices Australia came from the pilot of a Virgin passenger jet passing overhead the flotilla in the Tasman Sea that had picked up the Chinese Navy VHF radio notification of an impending live-fire exercise.

The radio transmission had advised the window for the live-fire drill commenced at 9.30am and would conclude at 3pm.

We know this from testimony given to Senate Estimates by the head of Airservices Australia. He said Airservices was notified at 9.58am by an aviation control tower informed by the Virgin pilot. Two minutes later Airservices issued a “hazard alert” to commercial airlines in the area.

The Headquarters of the Defence Force’s Joint Operations Command (HJOC), at Bungendore 30km east of Canberra, was then notified about the drill by Airservices at 10.08am, 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

When questioned a few days later, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appeared to try to cover for Defence’s apparent failure to detect the live-fire drill or the advisory transmission.

“At around the same time, there were two areas of notification. One was from the New Zealand vessels that were tailing . ..  the [Chinese] vessels in the area by both sea and air,” Albanese stated. “So that occurred and at the same time through the channels that occur when something like this is occurring, Airservices got notified as well.”

But the New Zealand Defence Force had not notified Defence “at the same time”. In fact it was not until 11.01am that an alert was received by Defence from the New Zealand Defence Force — 53 minutes after Defence HQ was told by Airservices and an hour and a half after the drill window had begun.

Defence Minister Richard Marles later in a round-about way admitted on ABC Radio that it wasn’t the New Zealanders who informed Australia first: “Well, to be clear, we weren’t notified by China. I mean, we became aware of this during the course of the day.

“What China did was put out a notification that it was intending to engage in live firing. By that I mean a broadcast that was picked up by airlines or literally planes that were commercial planes that were flying across the Tasman.”

Later the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, told ABC that two live-fire training drills were carried out at sea on February 21 and 22, in accordance with international law and “after repeatedly issuing safety notices in advance”.

Eyes and ears on ‘every move’
It was expected the Chinese-navy flotilla would end its three week voyage around Australia on March 7, after a circumnavigation of the continent. That is not before finally passing at some distance the newly acquired US-UK nuclear submarine base at HMAS Stirling near Perth and the powerful US communications and surveillance base at North West Cape.

Just as Australia spies on China to develop intelligence and targeting for a potential US war, China responds in kind, collecting data on US military and intelligence bases and facilities in Australia, as future targets should hostilities commence.

The presence of the Chinese Navy ships that headed into the northern and eastern seas around Australia attracted the attention of the Defence Department ever since they first set off south through the Mindoro Strait in the Philippines and through the Indonesian archipelago from the South China Sea on February 3.

“We are keeping a close watch on them and we will be making sure that we watch every move,” Marles stated in the week before the live-fire incident.

“Just as they have a right to be in international waters . . .  we have a right to be prudent and to make sure that we are surveilling them, which is what we are doing.”

Around 3500 km to the north, a week into the Chinese ships’ voyage, a spy flight by an RAAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane on February 11, in a disputed area of the South China Sea south of China’s Hainan Island, was warned off by a Chinese J-16 fighter jet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to Australian protests claiming the Australian aircraft “deliberately intruded” into China’s claimed territorial airspace around the Paracel Islands without China’s permission, thereby “infringing on China’s sovereignty and endangering China’s national security”.

Australia criticised the Chinese manoeuvre, defending the Australian flight saying it was “exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace”.

Two days after the incident, the three Chinese ships on their way to Australian waters were taking different routes in beginning their own “right to freedom of navigation” in international waters off the Australian coast. The three ships formed up their mini flotilla in the Coral Sea as they turned south paralleling the Australian eastern coastline outside of territorial waters, and sometimes within Australia’s 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Exclusive Economic Zone.

“Defence always monitors foreign military activity in proximity to Australia. This includes the Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Task Group.” Admiral Johnston told Senate Estimates.

“We have been monitoring the movement of the Task Group through its transit through Southeast Asia and we have observed the Task Group as it has come south through that region.”

The Task Group was made up of a modern stealth guided missile destroyer Zunyi, the frigate Hengyang, and the Weishanhu, a 20,500 tonne supply ship carrying fuel, fresh water, cargo and ammunition. The Hengyang moved eastwards through the Torres Strait, while the Zunyi and Weishanhu passed south near Bougainville and Solomon Islands, meeting in the Coral Sea.

As the Chinese ships moved near northern Australia and through the Coral Sea heading further south, the Defence Department deployed Navy and Air Force assets to watch over the ships. These included various RAN warships including the frigate HMAS Arunta and a RAAF P-8A Poseidon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plane.

With unconfirmed reports a Chinese nuclear submarine may also be accompanying the surface ships, the monitoring may have also included one of the RAN’s Collins-class submarines, with their active range of sonar, radar and radio monitoring – however it is uncertain whether one was able to be made available from the fleet.

“From the point of time the first of the vessels entered into our more immediate region, we have been conducting active surveillance of their activities,” the Defence chief confirmed.

As the Chinese ships moved into the southern Tasman Sea, New Zealand navy ships joined in the monitoring alongside Australia’s Navy and Air Force.

The range of signals intelligence (SIGINT) that theoretically can be intercepted emanating from a naval ship at sea includes encrypted data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, aerial drone data and communications, as well as data of radar, gunnery, and weapon launches.

There are a number of surveillance facilities in Australia that would have been able to be directed at the Chinese ships.

Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD) Shoal Bay Receiving Station outside of Darwin, picks up transmissions and data emanating from radio signals and satellite communications from Australia’s near north region. ASD’s Cocos Islands receiving station in the mid-Indian ocean would have been available too.

The Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) over-the-horizon radar network, spread across northern Australia, is an early warning system that monitors aircraft and ship movements across Australia’s north-western, northern, and north-eastern ocean areas — but its range off the eastern coast is not thought to presently reach further south than the sea off Mackay on the Queensland coast.

Of land-based surveillance facilities, it is the American Pine Gap base that is believed to have the best capability of intercepting the ship’s radio communications in the Tasman Sea.

Enter, Pine Gap and the Americans
The US satellite surveillance base at Pine Gap in Central Australia is a US and Australian jointly-run satellite ground station. It is regarded as the most important such American satellite base outside of the USA.

The role of ASD in supporting the extensive US surveillance mission against China is increasingly valued by Australia’s large Five Eyes alliance partner.

A Top Secret ‘Information Paper’, titled “NSA Intelligence Relationship with Australia”, leaked from the National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden and published by ABC’s Background Briefing, spells out the “close collaboration” between the NSA and ASD, in particular on China:

“Increased emphasis on China will not only help ensure the security of Australia, but also synergize with the U.S. in its renewed emphasis on Asia and the Pacific . . .   Australia’s overall intelligence effort on China, as a target, is already significant and will increase.”

The Pine Gap base, as further revealed in 2023 by Declassified Australia, is being used to collect signals intelligence and other data from the Israeli battlefield of Gaza, and also Ukraine and other global hotspots within view of the US spy satellites.

It’s recently had a significant expansion (reported by this author in The Saturday Paper) which has seen its total of satellite dishes and radomes rapidly increase in just a few years from 35 to 45 to accommodate new heightened-capability surveillance satellites.

Pine Gap base collects an enormous range and quantity of intelligence and data from thermal imaging satellites, photographic reconnaissance satellites, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, as expert researchers Des Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute have detailed.

These SIGINT satellites intercept electronic communications and signals from ground-based sources, such as radio communications, telemetry, radar signals, satellite communications, microwave emissions, mobile phone signals, and geolocation data.

Alliance priorities
The US’s SIGINT satellites have a capability to detect and receive signals from VHF radio transmissions on or near the earth’s surface, but they need to be tasked to do so and appropriately targeted on the source of the transmission.

For the Pine Gap base to intercept VHF radio signals from the Chinese Navy ships, the base would have needed to specifically realign one of those SIGINT satellites to provide coverage of the VHF signals in the Tasman Sea at the time of the Chinese ships’ passage. It is not known publicly if they did this, but they certainly have that capability.

However, it is not only the VHF radio transmission that would have carried information about the live-firing exercise.

Pine Gap would be able to monitor a range of other SIGINT transmissions from the Chinese ships. Details of the planning and preparations for the live-firing exercise would almost certainly have been transmitted over data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, and even in the data of radar and gunnery operations.

But it is here that there is another possibility for the failure.

The Pine Gap base was built and exists to serve the national interests of the United States. The tasking of the surveillance satellites in range of Pine Gap base is generally not set by Australia, but is directed by United States’ agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) together with the US Defense Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Australia has learnt over time that US priorities may not be the same as Australia’s.

Australian defence and intelligence services can request surveillance tasks to be added to the schedule, and would have been expected to have done so in order to target the southern leg of the Chinese Navy ships’ voyage, when the ships were out of the range of the JORN network.

The military demands for satellite time can be excessive in times of heightened global conflict, as is the case now.

Whether the Pine Gap base was devoting sufficient surveillance resources to monitoring the Chinese Navy ships, due to United States’ priorities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, North Korea, and to our north in the South China Sea, is a relevant question.

It can only be answered now by a formal government inquiry into what went on — preferably held in public by a parliamentary committee or separately commissioned inquiry. The sovereign defence of Australia failed in this incident and lessons need to be learned.

Who knew and when did they know
If the Pine Gap base had been monitoring the VHF radio band and heard the Chinese Navy live-fire alert, or had been monitoring other SIGINT transmissions to discover the live-fire drill, the normal procedure would be for the active surveillance team to inform a number of levels of senior officers, a former Defence official familiar with the process told Declassified Australia.

Expected to be included in the information chain are the Australian Deputy-Chief of Facility at the US base, NSA liaison staff at the base, the Australian Signals Directorate head office at the Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra, the Defence Force’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, in Bungendore, and the Chief of the Defence Force. From there the Defence Minister’s office would need to have been informed.

As has been reported in media interviews and in testimony to the Senate Estimates hearings, it has been stated that Defence was not informed of the Chinese ships’ live-firing alert until a full 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

The former Defence official told Declassified Australia it is vital the reason for the failure to detect the live-firing in a timely fashion is ascertained.

Either the Australian Defence Force and US Pine Gap base were not effectively actively monitoring the Chinese flotilla at this time — and the reasons for that need to be examined — or they were, but the information gathered was somewhere stalled and not passed on to correct channels.

If the evidence so far tendered by the Defence chief and the Minister is true, and it was not informed of the drill by any of its intelligence or surveillance assets before that phone call from Airservices Australia, the implications need to be seriously addressed.

A final word
In just a couple of weeks the whole Defence environment for Australia has changed, for the worse.

The US military announces a drawdown in Europe and a new pivot to the Indo-Pacific. China shows Australia it can do tit-for-tat “navigational freedom” voyages close to the Australian coast. US intelligence support is withdrawn from Ukraine during the war. Australia discovers the AUKUS submarines’ arrival looks even more remote. The prime minister confuses the limited cover provided by the ANZUS treaty.

Meanwhile, the US militarisation of Australia’s north continues at pace. At the same time a senior Pentagon official pressures Australia to massively increase defence spending. And now, the country’s defence intelligence system has experienced an unexplained major failure.

Australia, it seems, is adrift in a sea of unpredictable global events and changing alliance priorities.

Peter Cronau is an award-winning, investigative journalist, writer, and film-maker. His documentary, The Base: Pine Gap’s Role in US Warfighting, was broadcast on Australian ABC Radio National and featured on ABC News. He produced and directed the documentary film Drawing the Line, revealing details of Australian spying in East Timor, on ABC TV’s premier investigative programme Four Corners. He won the Gold Walkley Award in 2007 for a report he produced on an outbreak of political violence in East Timor. This article was first published by Declassified Australia and is republished here with the author’s permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Barely a day passes without a story in the British or Australian media that ramps up fear about the rulers in Beijing, reports the investigative website Declassified Australia.

According to an analysis by co-editors Antony Loewenstein and Peter Cronau, the Australian and British media are ramping up public fear, aiding a major military build-up — and perhaps conflict — by the United States and its allies.

The article is a warning to New Zealand and Pacific media too.

Citing a recent article in the Telegraph newspaper in Britain headlined, “A war-winning missile will knock China out of Taiwan – fast”, says the introduction.

“Written by David Axe, who contributes regularly to the outlet, he detailed a war game last year that was organised by the US think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

“It examined a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and concluded that the US Navy would be nearly entirely obliterated. However, Axe wrote, the US Air Force ‘could almost single-handedly destroy the Chinese invasion force’.

“‘How? With the use of a Lockheed Martin-made Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM).

“‘It’s a stealthy and highly accurate cruise missile that can range hundreds of miles from its launching warplane,’ Axe explained.

“‘There are long-range versions of the JASSM and a specialised anti-ship version, too — and the USAF [US Air Force] and its sister services are buying thousands of the missiles for billions of dollars.’

“Missing from this analysis was the fact that Lockheed Martin is a major sponsor of the CSIS. The editors of The Telegraph either didn’t know or care about this crucial detail.

“One week after this story, Axe wrote another one for the paper, titled, ‘The US Navy should build a robot armada to fight the battle of Taiwan.’

“‘The US Navy is shrinking,’ the story begins. ‘The Chinese navy is growing. The implications, for a free and prosperous Pacific region, are enormous.’”

Branding the situation as “propaganda by think tank”, the authors argue that some sections of the news media are framing a massive military build-up by the US and its allies as necessary in the face of Chinese aggression.

“These repetitive media reports condition the public and so allow, or force, the political class to up the ante on China,” Loewenstein and Cronau write.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz