Australia is caught in a jam, between an assertive American ally and a bold Chinese trading partner. America is accelerating its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, building up its fighting forces and expanding its military bases.

As Australia tries to navigate a pathway between America’s and Australia’s national interests, sometimes Australia’s national interest seems to submerge out of view.

Admiral David Johnston, the Chief of the Australia’s Defence Force, is steering this ship as China flexes its muscle sending a small warship flotilla south to circumnavigate the continent.

He has admitted that the first the Defence Force heard of a live-fire exercise by the three Chinese Navy ships sailing in the South Pacific east of Australia on February 21, was a phone call from the civilian Airservices Australia.

“The absence of any advance notice to Australian authorities was a concern, notably, that the limited notice provided by the PLA could have unnecessarily increased the risk to aircraft and vessels in the area,” Johnston told Senate Estimates .

Johnston was pressed to clarify how Defence first came to know of the live-fire drill: “Is it the case that Defence was only notified, via Virgin and Airservices Australia, 28 minutes [sic] after the firing window commenced?”

To this, Admiral Johnston replied: “Yes.”

If it happened as stated by the Admiral — that a live-fire exercise by the Chinese ships was undertaken and a warning notice was transmitted from the Chinese ships, all without being detected by Australian defence and surveillance assets — this is a defence failure of considerable significance.

Sources with knowledge of Defence spoken to by Declassified Australia say that this is either a failure of surveillance, or a failure of communication, or even more far-reaching, a failure of US alliance cooperation.

And from the very start the official facts became slippery.

Our latest investigation –

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE: NAVIGATING US-CHINA TENSIONS

We investigate a significant intelligence failure to detect live-firing by Chinese warships near Australia, has exposed Defence weaknesses, and the fact that when it counts, we are all alone.

👉… pic.twitter.com/GxbSxrtXyc

— Declassified Australia (@DeclassifiedAus) March 7, 2025

What did they know and when did they know it
The first information passed on to Defence by Airservices Australia came from the pilot of a Virgin passenger jet passing overhead the flotilla in the Tasman Sea that had picked up the Chinese Navy VHF radio notification of an impending live-fire exercise.

The radio transmission had advised the window for the live-fire drill commenced at 9.30am and would conclude at 3pm.

We know this from testimony given to Senate Estimates by the head of Airservices Australia. He said Airservices was notified at 9.58am by an aviation control tower informed by the Virgin pilot. Two minutes later Airservices issued a “hazard alert” to commercial airlines in the area.

The Headquarters of the Defence Force’s Joint Operations Command (HJOC), at Bungendore 30km east of Canberra, was then notified about the drill by Airservices at 10.08am, 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

When questioned a few days later, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appeared to try to cover for Defence’s apparent failure to detect the live-fire drill or the advisory transmission.

“At around the same time, there were two areas of notification. One was from the New Zealand vessels that were tailing . ..  the [Chinese] vessels in the area by both sea and air,” Albanese stated. “So that occurred and at the same time through the channels that occur when something like this is occurring, Airservices got notified as well.”

But the New Zealand Defence Force had not notified Defence “at the same time”. In fact it was not until 11.01am that an alert was received by Defence from the New Zealand Defence Force — 53 minutes after Defence HQ was told by Airservices and an hour and a half after the drill window had begun.

Defence Minister Richard Marles later in a round-about way admitted on ABC Radio that it wasn’t the New Zealanders who informed Australia first: “Well, to be clear, we weren’t notified by China. I mean, we became aware of this during the course of the day.

“What China did was put out a notification that it was intending to engage in live firing. By that I mean a broadcast that was picked up by airlines or literally planes that were commercial planes that were flying across the Tasman.”

Later the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, told ABC that two live-fire training drills were carried out at sea on February 21 and 22, in accordance with international law and “after repeatedly issuing safety notices in advance”.

Eyes and ears on ‘every move’
It was expected the Chinese-navy flotilla would end its three week voyage around Australia on March 7, after a circumnavigation of the continent. That is not before finally passing at some distance the newly acquired US-UK nuclear submarine base at HMAS Stirling near Perth and the powerful US communications and surveillance base at North West Cape.

Just as Australia spies on China to develop intelligence and targeting for a potential US war, China responds in kind, collecting data on US military and intelligence bases and facilities in Australia, as future targets should hostilities commence.

The presence of the Chinese Navy ships that headed into the northern and eastern seas around Australia attracted the attention of the Defence Department ever since they first set off south through the Mindoro Strait in the Philippines and through the Indonesian archipelago from the South China Sea on February 3.

“We are keeping a close watch on them and we will be making sure that we watch every move,” Marles stated in the week before the live-fire incident.

“Just as they have a right to be in international waters . . .  we have a right to be prudent and to make sure that we are surveilling them, which is what we are doing.”

Around 3500 km to the north, a week into the Chinese ships’ voyage, a spy flight by an RAAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane on February 11, in a disputed area of the South China Sea south of China’s Hainan Island, was warned off by a Chinese J-16 fighter jet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to Australian protests claiming the Australian aircraft “deliberately intruded” into China’s claimed territorial airspace around the Paracel Islands without China’s permission, thereby “infringing on China’s sovereignty and endangering China’s national security”.

Australia criticised the Chinese manoeuvre, defending the Australian flight saying it was “exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace”.

Two days after the incident, the three Chinese ships on their way to Australian waters were taking different routes in beginning their own “right to freedom of navigation” in international waters off the Australian coast. The three ships formed up their mini flotilla in the Coral Sea as they turned south paralleling the Australian eastern coastline outside of territorial waters, and sometimes within Australia’s 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Exclusive Economic Zone.

“Defence always monitors foreign military activity in proximity to Australia. This includes the Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Task Group.” Admiral Johnston told Senate Estimates.

“We have been monitoring the movement of the Task Group through its transit through Southeast Asia and we have observed the Task Group as it has come south through that region.”

The Task Group was made up of a modern stealth guided missile destroyer Zunyi, the frigate Hengyang, and the Weishanhu, a 20,500 tonne supply ship carrying fuel, fresh water, cargo and ammunition. The Hengyang moved eastwards through the Torres Strait, while the Zunyi and Weishanhu passed south near Bougainville and Solomon Islands, meeting in the Coral Sea.

As the Chinese ships moved near northern Australia and through the Coral Sea heading further south, the Defence Department deployed Navy and Air Force assets to watch over the ships. These included various RAN warships including the frigate HMAS Arunta and a RAAF P-8A Poseidon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plane.

With unconfirmed reports a Chinese nuclear submarine may also be accompanying the surface ships, the monitoring may have also included one of the RAN’s Collins-class submarines, with their active range of sonar, radar and radio monitoring – however it is uncertain whether one was able to be made available from the fleet.

“From the point of time the first of the vessels entered into our more immediate region, we have been conducting active surveillance of their activities,” the Defence chief confirmed.

As the Chinese ships moved into the southern Tasman Sea, New Zealand navy ships joined in the monitoring alongside Australia’s Navy and Air Force.

The range of signals intelligence (SIGINT) that theoretically can be intercepted emanating from a naval ship at sea includes encrypted data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, aerial drone data and communications, as well as data of radar, gunnery, and weapon launches.

There are a number of surveillance facilities in Australia that would have been able to be directed at the Chinese ships.

Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD) Shoal Bay Receiving Station outside of Darwin, picks up transmissions and data emanating from radio signals and satellite communications from Australia’s near north region. ASD’s Cocos Islands receiving station in the mid-Indian ocean would have been available too.

The Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) over-the-horizon radar network, spread across northern Australia, is an early warning system that monitors aircraft and ship movements across Australia’s north-western, northern, and north-eastern ocean areas — but its range off the eastern coast is not thought to presently reach further south than the sea off Mackay on the Queensland coast.

Of land-based surveillance facilities, it is the American Pine Gap base that is believed to have the best capability of intercepting the ship’s radio communications in the Tasman Sea.

Enter, Pine Gap and the Americans
The US satellite surveillance base at Pine Gap in Central Australia is a US and Australian jointly-run satellite ground station. It is regarded as the most important such American satellite base outside of the USA.

The role of ASD in supporting the extensive US surveillance mission against China is increasingly valued by Australia’s large Five Eyes alliance partner.

A Top Secret ‘Information Paper’, titled “NSA Intelligence Relationship with Australia”, leaked from the National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden and published by ABC’s Background Briefing, spells out the “close collaboration” between the NSA and ASD, in particular on China:

“Increased emphasis on China will not only help ensure the security of Australia, but also synergize with the U.S. in its renewed emphasis on Asia and the Pacific . . .   Australia’s overall intelligence effort on China, as a target, is already significant and will increase.”

The Pine Gap base, as further revealed in 2023 by Declassified Australia, is being used to collect signals intelligence and other data from the Israeli battlefield of Gaza, and also Ukraine and other global hotspots within view of the US spy satellites.

It’s recently had a significant expansion (reported by this author in The Saturday Paper) which has seen its total of satellite dishes and radomes rapidly increase in just a few years from 35 to 45 to accommodate new heightened-capability surveillance satellites.

Pine Gap base collects an enormous range and quantity of intelligence and data from thermal imaging satellites, photographic reconnaissance satellites, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, as expert researchers Des Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute have detailed.

These SIGINT satellites intercept electronic communications and signals from ground-based sources, such as radio communications, telemetry, radar signals, satellite communications, microwave emissions, mobile phone signals, and geolocation data.

Alliance priorities
The US’s SIGINT satellites have a capability to detect and receive signals from VHF radio transmissions on or near the earth’s surface, but they need to be tasked to do so and appropriately targeted on the source of the transmission.

For the Pine Gap base to intercept VHF radio signals from the Chinese Navy ships, the base would have needed to specifically realign one of those SIGINT satellites to provide coverage of the VHF signals in the Tasman Sea at the time of the Chinese ships’ passage. It is not known publicly if they did this, but they certainly have that capability.

However, it is not only the VHF radio transmission that would have carried information about the live-firing exercise.

Pine Gap would be able to monitor a range of other SIGINT transmissions from the Chinese ships. Details of the planning and preparations for the live-firing exercise would almost certainly have been transmitted over data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, and even in the data of radar and gunnery operations.

But it is here that there is another possibility for the failure.

The Pine Gap base was built and exists to serve the national interests of the United States. The tasking of the surveillance satellites in range of Pine Gap base is generally not set by Australia, but is directed by United States’ agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) together with the US Defense Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Australia has learnt over time that US priorities may not be the same as Australia’s.

Australian defence and intelligence services can request surveillance tasks to be added to the schedule, and would have been expected to have done so in order to target the southern leg of the Chinese Navy ships’ voyage, when the ships were out of the range of the JORN network.

The military demands for satellite time can be excessive in times of heightened global conflict, as is the case now.

Whether the Pine Gap base was devoting sufficient surveillance resources to monitoring the Chinese Navy ships, due to United States’ priorities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, North Korea, and to our north in the South China Sea, is a relevant question.

It can only be answered now by a formal government inquiry into what went on — preferably held in public by a parliamentary committee or separately commissioned inquiry. The sovereign defence of Australia failed in this incident and lessons need to be learned.

Who knew and when did they know
If the Pine Gap base had been monitoring the VHF radio band and heard the Chinese Navy live-fire alert, or had been monitoring other SIGINT transmissions to discover the live-fire drill, the normal procedure would be for the active surveillance team to inform a number of levels of senior officers, a former Defence official familiar with the process told Declassified Australia.

Expected to be included in the information chain are the Australian Deputy-Chief of Facility at the US base, NSA liaison staff at the base, the Australian Signals Directorate head office at the Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra, the Defence Force’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, in Bungendore, and the Chief of the Defence Force. From there the Defence Minister’s office would need to have been informed.

As has been reported in media interviews and in testimony to the Senate Estimates hearings, it has been stated that Defence was not informed of the Chinese ships’ live-firing alert until a full 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

The former Defence official told Declassified Australia it is vital the reason for the failure to detect the live-firing in a timely fashion is ascertained.

Either the Australian Defence Force and US Pine Gap base were not effectively actively monitoring the Chinese flotilla at this time — and the reasons for that need to be examined — or they were, but the information gathered was somewhere stalled and not passed on to correct channels.

If the evidence so far tendered by the Defence chief and the Minister is true, and it was not informed of the drill by any of its intelligence or surveillance assets before that phone call from Airservices Australia, the implications need to be seriously addressed.

A final word
In just a couple of weeks the whole Defence environment for Australia has changed, for the worse.

The US military announces a drawdown in Europe and a new pivot to the Indo-Pacific. China shows Australia it can do tit-for-tat “navigational freedom” voyages close to the Australian coast. US intelligence support is withdrawn from Ukraine during the war. Australia discovers the AUKUS submarines’ arrival looks even more remote. The prime minister confuses the limited cover provided by the ANZUS treaty.

Meanwhile, the US militarisation of Australia’s north continues at pace. At the same time a senior Pentagon official pressures Australia to massively increase defence spending. And now, the country’s defence intelligence system has experienced an unexplained major failure.

Australia, it seems, is adrift in a sea of unpredictable global events and changing alliance priorities.

Peter Cronau is an award-winning, investigative journalist, writer, and film-maker. His documentary, The Base: Pine Gap’s Role in US Warfighting, was broadcast on Australian ABC Radio National and featured on ABC News. He produced and directed the documentary film Drawing the Line, revealing details of Australian spying in East Timor, on ABC TV’s premier investigative programme Four Corners. He won the Gold Walkley Award in 2007 for a report he produced on an outbreak of political violence in East Timor. This article was first published by Declassified Australia and is republished here with the author’s permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

On the eve of the US Pacific Islands Summit in Washington, a key ally in the region called off a scheduled negotiating session for a treaty Washington views as an essential hedge against China in the region.

The Marshall Islands and the United States negotiators were scheduled for the third round of talks this weekend to renew some expiring provisions of a Compact of Free Association when leaders in Majuro called it off, saying the lack of response from Washington on the country’s US nuclear weapons testing legacy meant there was no reason to meet.

Marshall Islands leaders have repeatedly said the continuing legacy of health, environmental and economic problems from 67 US nuclear tests from 1946-1958 must be satisfactorily addressed before they will agree to a new economic package with the US.

Washington sees the Compact treaties with the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau, which stretch across an ocean area larger than the continental US, as key to countering the expansion of China in the region.

“The unique security relationships established by the Compacts of Free Association have magnified the US power projection in the Indo-Pacific region, structured US defense planning and force posture, and contributed to essential defense capabilities,” said a new study released September 20 in Washington, DC by the United States Institute of Peace, “China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific.”

China’s naval expansion is increasing the value of the US relationship with the freely associated states (FAS).

China’s blue water ambitions
China’s naval expansion is increasing the value of the US relationship with the freely associated states (FAS).

“The value of the buffer created by US strategic denial over FAS territorial seas is poised to increase as China seeks to make good on its blue water navy ambitions and to deepen its security relationships with Pacific nations,” said the report whose primary authors were Admiral (Ret.) Philip Davidson, Brigadier-General (Ret.) and David Stilwell, former US Congressman from Guam Dr Robert Underwood.

“As Washington seeks to limit the scope of Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific in concert with regional partners, the US-FAS relationship functions as a key vehicle for reinforcing regional norms and democratic values.”

US and Marshall Islands negotiators have both said they hope for a speedy conclusion to the talks as the existing 20-year funding package expires on September 30, 2023. But the nuclear test legacy is the line in the sand for the Marshall Islands.

“The entire Compact Negotiation Committee agreed — don’t go,” said Parliament Speaker Kenneth Kedi, who represents Rongelap Atoll, which was contaminated with nuclear test fallout by the 1954 Bravo hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll and other weapons tests.

“It is not prudent to spend over $100,000 for our delegation to travel to Washington with no written response to our proposal. We are negotiating in good faith. We submitted our proposal in writing.” But he said on Friday, “there has been no answer or counter proposal from the US.”

US and Marshall Islands officials had been aiming to sign a “memorandum of understanding” at the summit as an indication of progress in the discussions, but that now appears off the table.

US Pacific summit
Marshall Islands President David Kabua, who is currently in the US following a speech to the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday last week, is scheduled to participate in the White House-sponsored US Pacific Islands Summit on September 28-29.

Kabua, while affirming in his speech at the UN that the Marshall Islands has a “strong partnership” with the US, added: “It is vital that the legacy and contemporary challenges of nuclear testing be better addressed” (during negotiations on the Compact of Free Association). “The exposure of our people and land has created impacts that have lasted – and will last – for generations.”

The Marshall Islands submitted a proposed nuclear settlement agreement to US negotiators during the second round of talks in July. The US has not responded, Kedi and other negotiating committee members said Friday in Majuro.

In response to questions about the postponement of the planned negotiating session, the State Department released a brief statement through its embassy in Majuro.

“With respect to the Compact Negotiations, which are ongoing, both sides continue to work diligently towards an agreement,” the statement said. “Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, Ambassador Joe Yun, is expected to meet with President Kabua while he is in Washington to continue to advance the discussions.”

While the Marshall Islands decision to cancel its negotiating group’s attendance at a scheduled session in Washington is a blow to the Biden administration’s efforts to fast-track approval of the security and economic agreement for this strategic North Pacific area, island leaders continue to describe themselves as part of the “US family.”

“The cancellation of the talks indicates the seriousness of this issue for the Marshall Islands,” said National Nuclear Commission Chairman Alson Kelen. “This is the best time for us to stand up for our rights.”

‘Fair and just’ nuclear settlement
For decades, the Pacific Island Forum countries that will be represented at this week’s leader’s summit in Washington have stood behind the Marshall Islands in its quest for a fair and just nuclear settlement, said Kelen, who helped negotiators develop their plan submitted recently to the US government for addressing lingering problems of the 67 nuclear tests.

“We live with the problem (from the nuclear tests),” said Kelen, a displaced Bikini Islander. “We know the big picture: bombs tested, people relocated from their islands, people exposed to nuclear fallout, and people studied. We can’t change that. What we can do now is work on the details for this today for the funding needed to mitigate the problems from the nuclear legacy.”

Kedi said he was tired of US attempts to argue over legal issues from the original Compact of Free Association’s nuclear test settlement that was approved 40 years ago before the Marshall Islands was an independent nation.

That agreement, which provided a now-exhausted $150 million nuclear compensation fund, was called “manifestly inadequate” by the country’s Nuclear Claims Tribunal, which over a two-decade period determined the value of claims to be over $3 billion.

“Bottom line, the nuclear issue needs to be addressed,” Kedi said.

“We need to come up with a dignified solution as family members. I’ve made it clear, once these key issues are addressed, we are ready to sign the Compact tomorrow.”

President Kabua is scheduled to participate in the White House-sponsored US Pacific Islands Summit on September 28-29.

Meanwhile, the members of his Compact negotiating team are in Majuro waiting for a response from the US government to their proposal to address the nuclear legacy.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

It has been an interesting couple of weeks for Solomon Islands, with stories of policing, weapons, replica weapons and a security agreement with China dominating the local and regional media.

Let’s start with the issue of arming the police. After the tensions, for a long time Solomon police did not carry arms but this is an exception in our history.

Indeed, the precursor of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) created during the early colonial era was known as the “BSIP Armed Constabulary”.

For as long as I can remember, our police have had access to some form of arms stored in the armoury. Their use traditionally was ceremonial, mostly during parades.

In fact, many of us who used to watch their parades loved to hear the sound made when the police and marine units lifted the guns as they responded to the orders of the parade commander.

The only time the weapons were used in my lifetime was during the Bougainville crisis and during the ethnic tensions.

The Bougainville crisis necessitated the importation by the Solomon Islands government of high-powered guns because of incursions by armed Papua New Guinean soldiers across the border and their use against Solomon Islands citizens at the PNG-Solomon Islands border.

Weapons bought via US broker
I recall that importation as at that time I was a legal adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The weapons were purchased from the US via a broker in Singapore.

Some questions were asked but, given the circumstances, their importation was justifiable.

A diplomatic request was made for their temporary storage in Australia before they were shipped to Honiara. These were government-procured arms and the procurement procedures for their acquisition duly complied with government procurement processes.

I have been advocating for some time the rearmament of the RSIPF and I am also supportive of the RSIPF to be trained by whoever can provide it. Many police officers have been trained in the US, Taiwan, Australia, UK, Singapore, New Zealand and Fiji.

Thus, I have no particular issues with them being trained by Chinese advisers as was the case recently.

However, I do have issues if the RSIPF is going to equip itself with high-powered guns, whether real ones (as supplied by Australia) or fake ones (as supplied by China). These concerns are exacerbated by the current level of secrecy and confusion around the security arrangements.

Firstly, it is questionable whether it is necessary for the RSIPF to be armed with high-powered weapons. Perhaps there are still a number of guns that were taken from the armoury that are still in the hands of former MEF (Malaitan Eagle Force) militants.

Moreover, this information might be known by a key member of the current political coalition who is a former MEF commander. Perhaps the police just want to be prepared.

Memories of the ethnic tensions
However, we also should not forget what happened 22 years ago during the ethnic tensions, when the armoury was compromised by police giving weapons to militants and militants raiding the armoury for weapons — weapons which were then used by Solomon Islanders to intimidate and kill their fellow citizens.

Members of the public are also genuinely concerned about the manner in which the Chinese fake guns were imported into the country — via a logging vessel which is, to say the least, an unusual means of transporting official government goods.

The shifting narratives from the Police Commissioner about this incident have raised more questions than they have answered.

There are also broader questions. Is security created through arming the police? Or should we instead focus on an approach to security whereby the community is recognised as a partner in building and maintaining peace, and build on the long history Solomon Islanders have of brokering conflict among themselves?

While, as I said, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with arming the police, the focus needs to be on using community policing, chiefs, and youth leaders to broker conflicts. It is unfortunate when the ordinary citizens of the country are viewed not as partners in development, but as threat to the hegemony and hold on power by some people.

Last year’s riots and covid-19 have revealed many underlying governance weaknesses. As I have argued earlier, they are symptomatic of a society that has become increasingly less pluralistic, and of political and economic institutions that have become less inclusive.

Then there is the leaked security agreement with China, which has exacerbated existing unease among the public about China. The increasing engagement with China is explained by the Prime Minister as an attempt by the government to diversify its engagement on security.

Chinese naval base unlikely
It is unlikely that China will build a naval base in Solomon Islands. The agreement does not specify that it will and, although it could be construed that way, the reality is that it is not going to happen.

Australia is already building a patrol base in Lofung, in the Shortland Islands which borders Papua New Guinea, and has announced that they will build another one in the eastern Solomon Islands. I would venture to suggest that the capacity of these investments should cater for a naval base if the need ever arises in the future.

What is unprecedented about this security arrangement is that it allows China, with the consent of the Solomon Islands government, to send armed personnel to protect its citizens and assets.

It also prohibits any publicity around these arrangements. It is ironic that a prime minister who invariably extols the virtues of national sovereignty should agree to cede a fundamental sovereign function — the protection of lives and property — to a foreign force.

It is not clear if this is inadvertent, but it would seem that its ramifications have not been thought through.

The security arrangement has also raised concerns in the region. The President of the Federated States of Micronesia has written to Prime Minister Sogavare requesting that he reconsider it.

There is perhaps nothing intrinsically wrong with Solomon Islands signing a security agreement with China. There should, however, be coherence with similar arrangements with other countries, which focus on the capacity of the Solomon Islands Police Force to deal with internal security uprisings, and preferably all assistance should be within a regional framework supported by the Pacific Islands Forum.

Cannot choose neighbours
While a country may choose its friends, it cannot choose its neighbours.

In Solomon Islands today, there is no opportunity for policy debate by the public except on Facebook. The public and constituents do not have the same ease of access to our ministers and prime minister as embassy officials, and mining and logging CEOs.

Such is the current degree of polarisation that any criticism or comment is viewed by the current political coalition as “anti-government”. There does not seem to be any scope for dissenting views, or even constructive ideas from outside the inner circle, to be accommodated.

Unless a more pluralistic society is promoted where people’s views are welcomed, and there are more inclusive political and economic institutions, the government will be forced to depend on regional troops to support it.

At some stage, regional partners must hold Solomon Islands politicians to account for the economic and political situation they have created and the resulting violence such as the rioting last year.

The current focus on arms, without attention to rights and responsibilities, cannot and should not be sustained.

Dr Transform Aqorau is CEO of iTuna Intel and founding director, Pacific Catalyst, and a legal adviser to the Marshall Islands. He is the former CEO of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Office. This article was first published by Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre at The Australian National University and is republished under a Creative Commons licence.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A draft security cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands has been leaked on social media.

The unverified document includes seven articles, which discuss the scope of cooperation between both nations.

Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles has seen the agreement on social media.

She told RNZ Pacific that the document is presented as a draft: “It doesn’t have any dates, nor is it signed.

“There are still questions around its authenticity but if it is authentic, it raises some serious questions and if it’s not authentic then it also provides some interesting insights into the way in which the geopolitical dynamic is playing out domestically in the Solomon Islands,” she said.

Dr Powles said that the draft document includes a request between the Solomon Islands government and China to send armed police personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to the Solomon Islands.

“Now that raises a lot of questions obviously, what is the distinction between police and armed police, and who are the other law enforcement and armed forces that are referred to in the agreement.

‘Maintaining social order’
“It also talks about what kind of tasks that a Chinese contingent would be involved in such as maintaining social order, it’s not clear what that means, it also talks about providing assistance on other tasks and it’s also unclear what those other tasks would be.”

Dr Powles points out that the agreement refers to protecting lives and property, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

In February, a team of Chinese police officers began working in Solomon Islands. This was two months after the Solomons government accepted Beijing’s offer to help restore law and order following anti-government riots in November 2021.

Dr Powles believes that if the draft agreement is authentic, then the deployment was a natural extension of the document.

The document also contains some concerning provisions which allow China to send ships to the Solomon’s “according to its needs”.

“The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.”

She said that such provisions would need to be clarified as it was unclear what “China’s own needs” refer to.

Concerns over ‘strategic interests’
Are those strategic interests for instance? If so, that would raise a number of concerns. Particularly as to what would happen if China’s interests cut across the interests of the Solomon Islands or of its key regional partners such as Australia or Papua New Guinea.

“And it also suggests that logistical support would be provided for ship visits in the Solomon Islands and suggests that perhaps China could seek to establish a logistical supply base in Solomon Islands to support those ship visits.

The document does not specify what types of ships, but Dr Powles said “we could safely assume that they are referring to the People’s Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) ships.”

“In the Pacific, we have seen PLAN ship visits to the region. China has a strong interest in maritime issues and in the Pacific maritime domain. And so that probably is not surprising and there have been long-standing concerns and very public long-standing concerns about the potential for increased ship visits for China increasing its engagement in the Pacific maritime domain and potential implications that may have for a potential base to support those ship visits.”

Dr Powles also drew attention to one particular provision of the agreement, which raised alarm bells with respect to the control of information around security cooperation.

That provision stated that information between the Solomon Islands and China could only be released on mutual agreement by both parties.

“And that suggests that there would be the intent to control public information, to control media briefings, to control what access media has to information about security arrangements between the two countries.

“We can be legitimately concerned about lack of transparency about a degree around this agreement,” she said.

Solomon Islands switched allegiances from Taiwan to China in 2019.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz