US President Donald Trump’s kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has taught me a lesson: that if you think you have a scoop, you file it immediately, not only to get the story out first but to warn the world if it’s about something bad that might be coming.

Shortly after Trump bombed Nigeria on Christmas day, I wrote an article that said his real aim was to send a message to Maduro and that among the options he was entertaining was a SEAL-type operation to capture or kill Maduro.

How did I come to this conclusion? I have no assets in the US intelligence community. I was completely running on instinct, and my instincts told me that the egomaniac Trump wanted to eclipse Obama’s feat in sending in the SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad in 2011, just as he wanted badly to get the Nobel Peace Prize that Obama got.

But it was the holidays and, out of consideration for the folks that run my stories, who deserved a New Year’s break to be with their families, I sat on it after I finished it on December 27 and only sent it to Foreign Policy in Focus on January 2, eight hours before the Caracas operation that kidnapped Maduro, in violation of all the norms of civilised conduct among states.

But though out-scooped by Trump, I still think that there are elements in the unfiled article that could be useful in helping us anticipate what could unfold in the days and weeks ahead. So here’s the scoop that wasn’t.

Trump strikes Nigeria but real target is Venezuela
The Trump regime’s air strikes on Islamic State targets in Nigeria on Christmas Day may have had symbolic significance but no strategic value. There will likely be no impact on the efforts of the militant group called Lakurawa, allied to ISIS, to establish a base in Sokoto state.

Many have been puzzled by the attacks that involved the use of Tomahawk missiles, especially given the relatively minuscule space given to Africa in the recently released National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025. That brief section focuses on transforming the US relationship with Africa from one based on aid to trade, though it does say, “we must remain wary of resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa while avoiding any long-term American presence or commitments.”

It is likely that the attacks were carried out for reasons unrelated to Africa. One is to appease Trump’s Christian evangelical base. As Joshua Keating, an expert in crisis areas, has noted, “Trump’s sudden interest in Africa’s most populous country was likely motivated less by any particular event there — these are all longstanding issues — than by developments in Washington. Though it doesn’t get a ton of mainstream media attention, the plight of Christians in Nigeria has been a galvanising issue for evangelical Christians in the US in recent years.”

On his internet platform Truth Social, Trump has cited figures from the international Christian rights NGO Open Doors, claiming that of the 4476 Christians killed for their faith globally in 2024, 3100 were in Nigeria.

In her recent book on the key groups that make up the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, Furious Minds, Laura Field says that non-establishment Christian groups have an outsized influence in the Trump administration.

With the Republicans struggling in the lead-up to the mid-term elections in 2026, these groups’ muscle on the ground can determine whether the Republicans will continue to control the House of Representatives.

The main target: Venezuela
However, the main goal of the strikes, in my view, had to do mainly with developments thousands of kilometres away. It was to signal to the government of Nicolás Maduro that it will face not just attacks on Venezuelan boats at sea but also air attacks on ground targets. This interpretation would be consistent with NSS 2025.

NSS 2025 is an iconoclastic document. It literally dumps the 80-year-old strategy of liberal containment that guided the United States from the post-Second World War years through the Cold War years to the post-Cold War years, which was to meet challenges to global capital wherever and whenever the US state saw its interests threatened or challenged.

Next to its overthrowing the 80-year-old American “Grand Strategy,” the most significant departure in NSS 2025 is its break with the key assumption of US security policy since the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2008), including the first Trump administration (2017-2021): that Washington must focus its resources on containing China, which was defined as the principal US strategic competitor.

Replacing China and the Asia Pacific as the main US concern in the Western Hemisphere, the document comes out with a reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine, but one fortified with what it calls the “Trump corollary.”

It states that Washington “will deny non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our hemisphere.” There is no more stark expression of the rude replacement of the liberal containment doctrine by a “spheres of influence” approach.

Meantime, the debate goes on in Trump administration on whether a ground invasion of Venezuela is the best way to implement the Western-Hemisphere-first strategy. Air strikes are one thing, boots on the ground are another, and one opposed by much of the MAGA base that is tired of the “forever wars”.

The “Molotov Cocktail” throwers in that base have made known their opposition or disquiet regarding a Venezuelan adventure.

Laura Loomer, an influential firebrand, has challenged Trump’s rationale for the attacks on Venezuelan boats, which is to prevent the opioid fentanyl and other drugs from being shipped to the United States.

“Fentanyl isn’t being manufactured in Venezuela,” she said, urging that the Pentagon target the Mexican drug cartels responsible for most shipments instead. She has also criticised María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize awardee for 2025 and the leader of the opposition in Venezuela, for “actively stoking and promoting violent regime change”.

Steve Bannon, a key official in the first Trump administration, said “neoconservative neoliberals” like Secretary of State Marco Rubio are pushing for a Venezuelan intervention that would derail the administration from its domestic priorities. Marjorie Taylor Greene, the volatile Georgia congresswoman, has posted on X that “People voted in 2024 against foreign intervention and foreign regime change as we have seen far too many times how that’s turned out, it’s not good, and people are so sick of it.”

My fearless forecast
Trump will limit attacks on his perceived adversaries globally to air strikes or naval bombardments to keep them off balance and not risk triggering another forever war with a ground invasion.

Of course, Trump’s people are probably weighing a SEAL-type special op — like then-President Obama’s killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad in 2011 — to murder or capture Maduro, but Maduro is likely to be already very well prepared for such a contingency. He’s not stupid.

Frankly, if you ask me, Washington has dug itself into a hole with its focus on Venezuela, one from which there is no easy exit.

If one gives a broad interpretation to Che Guevara’s dictum that the best way to defeat the United States was to create “two, three many Vietnams,” then Venezuela has the potential for becoming the third phase of the death rattle of the empire, Vietnam being the first and bin Laden’s dragging Washington to eventual defeat in the Middle East the second.

Dr Walden Bello is co-chair of the board of the Bangkok-based research and advocacy institute Focus on the Global South and senior research fellow at the sociology department of the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is also author of Global Battlefields: My close encounters with dictatorship, capital, empire, and love (2025). This article was first published by Foreign Policy in Focus and is republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

On 11 April 2025, AP noted that the two-year-old Civil War in Sudan is regarded by the United Nations as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”, though it is grossly underreported (see Wake up: The Worst Humanitarian Crisis on Earth is in Sudan, by Shirley Martey Hargis and Mike Sexton, Third Way [2024]).

Even Pope Leo XIV failed to mention ‘Sudan’ on Sunday when he denounced the conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and Myanmar (refer Pope Leo calls for peace in Gaza, Myanmar and Ukraine at the end of his inaugural mass, Africa News 18 May 2025).

Al Jazeera’s The Stream (20 May) posed this social media post: “Trying to raise awareness about Sudan is like talking into a void. Nobody seems to care about the starving children or the innocent people being brutally executed by the RSF on a daily basis”.

The young man, Elbashir Idris, political analyst, speaking from Cardiff, claimed: “There’s an international conspiracy done by the global order that seems to be working together against the Sudanese people”.

What Sudan means to me, and that the conflict should mean to New Zealand

I have not been to Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, or Myanmar; though I have been close to Gaza; Port Said (and other places in Egypt, during the week in September 1978 when Pope Jean-Paul I mysteriously died). And I enjoyed two days in Khartoum and Omdurman the following week.

Sudan represents a special memory to me. It’s an assertive place. Khartoum, on the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, was the site of one of the most spectacular defeats of the British Empire, in 1884/85. I still remember the epic 1966 movie Khartoum, starring Charlton Heston and Lawrence Olivier.

That 1880s’ stoush – reminiscent of the 2021 defeat of the United States by the Taliban – could have been New Zealand’s first involvement in a foreign imperial war. The conservative government in New Zealand – headed by Harry Atkinson – refused the request from the United Kingdom for military support; contrast the subsequent adventure into South Africa in 1899 under the Liberal Government of Richard Seddon.

Al Jazeera reported just today (20 May 2025, Sudan time) that the new Battle of Khartoum (2023–2025) has resolved with a victory to the Sudanese Armed Forces over the rebel Rapid Support Forces. (The Wikipedia article is premature, calling the present Battle of Khartoum over on 26 March 2025.) The Sudan Civil War remains far from over, however.

One reason why the west has paid so little attention to this conflict is almost certainly a racism-tainted view; that it’s just a civil war in ‘black Africa’, that the rest of the world can leave well-alone. But this view is not true, because the present Sudan Civil War is an international ‘proxy war’; fuelled by extra-national powers – regional if not global.

Before the Civil War started, there was a successful military coup, in October 2021. Sudanese politics have always been convoluted, as is true in reality for most countries. Sudan had struggled for decades with a humanitarian crisis in its west – Darfur – with attacks on civilian communities by the mysterious Janjaweed which had links to Libya in the time of Muammar Gaddafi. The Janjaweed has now largely morphed into the Rapid Support Forces, and it’s an open contention that they are heavily backed by the United Arab Emirates; that is, the RSF – the force which appears to be mainly responsible for the humanitarian disaster – is an alleged proxy of the UAE. And the RSF have a lot of very sophisticated military kit; armaments which are clearly foreign-sourced and foreign-funded.

Where is the journalism examining the role of the United Arab Emirates in this most brutal of wars; this war happening in front of our eyes but which we do not see? This is an important question for New Zealand, because the UAE is a particularly important commercial ally of New Zealand.

Al Jazeera’s Inside Story (15 April 2025) noted: “In March, the army-led government filed a case in the International Criminal Court against the United Arab Emirates”. Conspiracy or not, there is certainly a massive missing narrative. Is this cognitive void simple racism on the part of The West (and maybe some others)? Or is it part of a wider problem of geopolitical smoke and mirrors? Or are New Zealand and its associates mesmerised, like a possum (or rabbit) in the headlights or an ostrich with its head firmly buried in the sand?

(Chris Hipkins, New Zealand’s Leader of the Opposition, deployed a little casual racism in Parliament yesterday [20 May 2025] – twice in the one speech – referring to “tinpot dictatorships and banana republics“. Is the United Arab Emirates a ‘tinpot dictatorship’? Would he call the President of the Philippines a ‘banana republican’?)

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

In this the ninth episode of A View from Afar for 2023, political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning examine why there is a trend toward military dictatorships in North Africa.

And, in particular, Paul and Selwyn analyse the reasons why countries like Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea have all become part of a challenge to a weakened western-led global order.

In this podcast, Paul and Selwyn examine why events in North Africa are connected to authoritarian multipolarity, a realignment of global power that favours the Russian Federation’s Putin regime.

And, within this context, Paul and Selwyn address the complexities of Russian Federation involvement in the African continent – involvement that includes the notorious Wagner mercenary group; Russian state controlled energy giants like Gazprom that act as envoys of the Kremlin; and how Western powers appear unable to address geopolitical and terrorist-caused instability in the region.

The Questions include:

• How and why have Africa’s dictators found a powerful ally in the Kremlin?
• Who benefits from the Russian-North African alliance and what does this association look like?
• Where does all of this leave terrorist groups, such as ISIS, in the region?
• Why has Africa become a divide between liberal democratic and authoritarian power blocs in the emerging multipolar global constellation?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the ninth episode of A View from Afar for 2023, political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning will examine why there is a trend toward military dictatorships in North Africa.

And, in particular, Paul and Selwyn will analyse the reasons why countries like Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea have all become part of a challenge to a weakened western-led global order.

In this podcast, Paul and Selwyn will examine why events in North Africa are connected to authoritarian multipolarity, a realignment of global power that favours the Russian Federation’s Putin regime.

And, within this context, Paul and Selwyn will address the complexities of Russian Federation involvement in the African continent – involvement that includes the notorious Wagner mercenary group; Russian state controlled energy giants like Gazprom that act as envoys of the Kremlin; and how Western powers appear unable to address geopolitical and terrorist-caused instability in the region.

The Questions include:

How and why have Africa’s dictators found a powerful ally in the Kremlin?

Who benefits from the Russian-North African alliance and what does this association look like?

Where does all of this leave terrorist groups, such as ISIS, in the region?

Why has Africa become a divide between liberal democratic and authoritarian power blocs in the emerging multipolar global constellation?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.