Christopher Luxon is finding his foreign policy feet.

Now eight months into the job, New Zealand’s Prime Minister is in Washington DC this week to attend the NATO summit.

It is the third year in a row that Wellington has been invited to the annual gathering of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the West’s premier political and military alliance. This year’s meeting – already carrying special weight by commemorating the 75^th anniversary of NATO’s founding – looks set to be the most substantive summit yet in terms of New Zealand’s involvement.

New plans are being unveiled for NATO’s cooperation with its ‘Indo-Pacific 4’ (or ‘IP4’) partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Four joint projects from the IP4 and NATO will focus on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation and cybersecurity, according to US officials.

This marks new territory for New Zealand – and something of a turnaround.

While it sent two Prime Ministers to NATO, New Zealand’s previous Labour Government had delayed formalising expanded bilateral links with the alliance.

Australia, Japan and South Korea all finalised ‘Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes’ (or ITPPs) with NATO by last year – but New Zealand’s formal ties remained a work in progress.

This may have been driven by a degree of caution on the part of Jacinda Ardern and Chris Hipkins, who attended NATO as New Zealand Prime Ministers in 2022 and 2023 respectively.

Both Ardern and Hipkins were proponents of New Zealand’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The doctrine, developed after the US downgraded ties with New Zealand in the 1980s, has seen New Zealand build strong relations with China.

A major reason for NATO’s invitation to the IP4 to its Madrid summit in 2022 was to support the launch of the alliance’s new long-term blueprint. The Strategic Concept openly called out China for its ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies’ and pinpointed Beijing as a source of ‘systemic challenges’ for the alliance.

After Ardern attended the 2022 NATO gathering, the Chinese Embassy in Wellington issued a statement noting Beijing’s opposition to ‘all kinds of military alliances, bloc politics, or exclusive small groups’.

Two years on, New Zealand has a new centre-right government. Winston Peters, Luxon’s foreign minister, signalled in April that an ITPP was very much still on its way. Peters himself is known for his pro-US views and more hawkish stance towards China.

China’s reaction to the new NATO-IP4 joint projects remains to be seen. But Beijing is unlikely to be mollified by the fact that the plans avoid any direct mention of China, given the trajectory of closer IP4-NATO cooperation.

Stronger ties with NATO may present particular geopolitical risks for Wellington. NATO is solely a political and military alliance; no companion trade deals are on offer. China has been New Zealand’s biggest trading partner since 2017, while access to most North American and European markets remains heavily restricted for New Zealand exporters.

Aware of the sensitivities of NATO’s interest in China, Christopher Luxon has been keen this week to put the focus on Ukraine – the subject of one of the new NATO-IP4 cooperation projects and tying in with this year’s overall summit theme, ‘Ukraine and transatlantic security’.

To that end, New Zealand’s Prime Minister has announced a modest new $NZ16 million package of aid for Kyiv, of which $NZ4 million appears to be for weaponry. The funds come on top of a $NZ26 million package announced in February, of which $NZ6.5 million was allocated for lethal aid.

The arms contributions are significant because under the previous Labour Government, Wellington had become reluctant to send Ukraine additional lethal aid (or money to purchase it) after making a one-off $NZ7.5 million contribution in April 2022.

After this week’s announcement, Luxon wrote on social media: ‘New Zealand understands that while we are distant from Ukraine, what happens there affects us all, and we are prepared to stand with Ukraine for the long haul’.

It was the Prime Minister’s second Ukraine-related post for the week.

By contrast, there was little publicity this week of New Zealand’s participation in a joint briefing published by a large number of NATO and IP4 security agencies, including New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre. The 28-page publication focused on the ‘tradecraft’ used in relation to Australia by ‘APT40’, defined as a ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group’.

Given the advisory’s target and its authors, it seems very unlikely to be a coincidence that the document was released just prior to the NATO summit.

Stepping back, it is worth reflecting how this week’s NATO focus has shifted the spotlight away from the debate over whether Wellington will join AUKUS – the high-level defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Much ink has been spilled over the merits and drawbacks of New Zealand becoming a member of the ostensibly technology-focused ‘Pillar II’ strand of AUKUS.

With time running out for New Zealand to join AUKUS before US elections in November, New Zealand’s Prime Minister may be turning the page.

For Christopher Luxon, AUKUS may not be needed at all.

A deeper partnership with NATO could be more than enough.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

Analysis by Geoffrey Miller – This analysis was first published by Democracy Project.

Don’t put it all at risk.

That’s likely to be the take-home message for New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in his meetings with Li Qiang, the Chinese Premier.

Li’s visit to Wellington this week is the highest-ranking visit by a Chinese official since 2017. The trip down under – Li is also visiting Australia – constitutes something of a charm offensive by Beijing. Pandas are on the agenda for Li’s stop in Adelaide.

China’s advance publicity for the trip has accentuated the positives and downplayed points of disagreement. The Chinese foreign ministry’s official spokesperson reminded journalists of the ‘enormous benefits’ of Wellington’s relationship with Beijing.

A pledge to discuss ‘international and regional issues of mutual interest’ was the only faint hint that thornier issues – such as New Zealand’s contemplation of joining ‘Pillar II’ of the AUKUS pact – might also be discussed behind the scenes.

This ‘good cop’ approach continued after Li touched down in Wellington. In his first comments made after his arrival in New Zealand, released in a written statement, the Chinese Premier was upbeat about the health of the bilateral relationship.

Showering New Zealand with praise – ‘China-New Zealand relations have always stood at the forefront of China’s relations with the developed world’ – Li suggested there could be ‘an even brighter future’ if the momentum between the two countries were maintained.

Coincidentally, a promise of ‘brighter future’ was also the theme of the New Zealand National Party’s 2008 election campaign that ushered in John Key as New Zealand’s Prime Minister. That vote heralded the start of the golden years for trade with China, riding the waves of a pioneering free trade agreement signed by Helen Clark’s Labour-led Government just before Key’s victory.

Xi Jinping visited New Zealand in 2014, resulting in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Meanwhile, China became New Zealand’s biggest trading partner in 2017, the same year that Li Qiang’s predecessor visited the country.

Key was famously bullish on China and has maintained personal relationships with the country’s leaders since he resigned in 2016 and resumed a business career.

But while the 2010s boom brought talk of New Zealand being a ‘rockstar economy’, seven years on, New Zealand is now in recession. And new trade figures for the year ending in March 2024 show that New Zealand’s trade with China has – relatively speaking – hit turbulence.

The numbers show that trade in both directions fell for the first time since the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed. Most troubling for Christopher Luxon will be that New Zealand’s goods exports to China – which are dominated by primary products such as dairy, meat and wood products – fell by almost nine per cent, from $NZ20.07 billion to $NZ18.34 billion.

In the overall trade figures, this fall was somewhat masked by a post-pandemic recovery in the export of services – particularly travel, as Chinese tourists regained the ability to visit New Zealand. Nevertheless, overall exports still fell by around two per cent, from $NZ21.39 to $NZ20.09 billion.

There will be no better opportunity than Li’s visit for Christopher Luxon to talk to about ways to turn this somewhat troubling economic trend around. After all, Luxon focused heavily on economic matters during his election campaign in 2023 – pledging to get New Zealand ‘back on track’.

And while Luxon has also focused on the need for trade diversification – which has included programmes to boost ties with India and the Gulf states – a sudden drop in trade with China during a recessionary climate and rising unemployment is probably not what the New Zealand Prime Minister had in mind.

As would be expected, the Chinese Premier’s visit to Wellington is a carefully-choreographed and economically-focused mission – at least on the surface. For the charm offensive to work, it has to be genuine.

But behind the scenes, New Zealand’s position on Aukus will remain the elephant in the room. The pact was not specifically mentioned in China’s official accounts of foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington in March – but New Zealand counterpart Winston Peters later confirmed that Wang had raised the matter.

And in May, Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand Wang Xiaolong was unusually forthright on Aukus. The Ambassador repeatedly referred to the arrangement as a ‘military alliance’ – a label clearly at odds with Aukus-friendly characterisations of the pact as a technology-sharing partnership.

The Ambassador said Aukus was ‘clearly and unabashedly designed to maintain US hegemony and contain other countries’ development’, adding that ‘joining such an alliance will not make any country more secure or make the Asia-Pacific region more stable’. He closed by noting his hope that any decision by New Zealand on Aukus would be ‘taking fully into account its own long-term fundamental interests’.

This is undoubtedly plain speaking. China would not be happy if New Zealand became involved with Aukus, to put it mildly.

But Li Qiang’s trip to New Zealand is about the big picture.

Its chief purpose is to remind Christopher Luxon of just how important China is to New Zealand, both economically and beyond.

It is a goodwill tour with a subtext.

There is also a lot to lose.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

Timing is everything. And from China’s perspective, this week’s visit by its foreign minister to New Zealand could be coming at just the right moment. The visit by Wang Yi to Wellington will be his first since 2017.

Anniversaries are important to Beijing. It is more than just a happy coincidence that the visit is taking place during the tenth anniversary year of the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and New Zealand.

That agreement, signed during a visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping in November 2014, marked the start of glory days for bilateral trade. New Zealand’s exports to China have roughly doubled in value since Xi’s visit. They now stand at nearly $NZ21 billion annually. Imports are not far behind, but there is still a trade surplus of some $NZ3 billion in New Zealand’s favour.

Indeed, China has been New Zealand’s biggest two-way trading partner since 2017. A consistent flow of agricultural exports to China – especially milk powder and meat – helped to keep New Zealand afloat during the Covid-19 pandemic while both countries’ borders were closed.

However, New Zealand’s exports to China fell last year for the first time (except for covid-affected 2020) since the 2014 pact was signed. Goods exports took a particular tumble, falling $NZ1.7 billion from 2022 levels in the year to December 2023. Only a post-pandemic recovery in services exports, driven by travel, was able to mask a greater fall. But it was not enough to prevent a $NZ500 million drop overall.

The removal of China’s last remaining tariffs on New Zealand dairy products at the start of 2024 may provide some hope for improvement this year.

But forecasts for China’s economy are mixed and a bumpy post-Covid 19 recovery seems likely. After an expansion of 5.2 per cent in 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts China’s economy will grow by only 4.6 per cent this year and 4.1 per cent in 2025.

Given its food-focused exports, New Zealand is particularly vulnerable to sluggish Chinese economic growth. Tourism is also affected: visitor numbers from China for November 2023 were just 52 per cent of those seen during the same month four years earlier, before the pandemic.

A visit by Wang Yi cannot solve these wider macroeconomic problems. But it will put New Zealand’s crucial relationship with China in the spotlight.

There is every chance the trip could set the stage for an anniversary year visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping later in 2024.

However, whether this occurs will be highly dependent on New Zealand’s next steps in relation to Aukus.

It can be taken as read that Wang will have strong words for Winston Peters, his New Zealand counterpart, about Wellington’s apparent enthusiasm to entertain joining ‘Pillar II’ of the new pact.

The tea leaves are still being read after Labour lost power in the October 2023 election and a new three-way, centre-right coalition led by the National Party’s Christopher Luxon took office the following month.

A joint statement issued by Australia and New Zealand after the countries’ foreign and defence ministers met in Melbourne in early February claimed Aukus was making ‘a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.’

Reaction from the Chinese Embassy in Wellington to the text was typically furious. In an apparent reference to another section of the joint statement which expressed ‘grave concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang’, a spokesperson argued that ‘groundless accusations have been made on China’s internal affairs’.

Meanwhile, on Aukus, the Embassy asserted that the pact ran counter to ‘the common interests of regional countries pursuing peace, stability and common security’. The spokesperson asked ‘relevant countries’ to ‘cherish the hard-won environment for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and be prudent with their words and action to maintain peace, stability and development’.

An indirect, yet ultimately harder-hitting rebuke came from the Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand himself, Wang Xiaolong. Lamenting a lack of options after a last-minute cancellation of a flight to Auckland the day after the joint statement was issued, the Ambassador posted on X: ‘Stuck at Wellington airport clueless as to what to do due to the cancellation of my flight to Auckland and the lack of alternatives. Right now, I am really missing the high-speed trains back in China.’

The displeasure could not be clearer.

Earlier, New Zealand’s new government had sought to move swiftly on Aukus, particularly after Labour itself had laid the groundwork for the new Government by issuing a set of three hawkish defence blueprints just months before the election.

In December, Judith Collins, the defence minister, said that a failure to join Aukus in some form was ‘a real opportunity lost by the previous government’. Christopher Luxon then appeared to back her, telling media: ‘we’re interested in exploring Pillar II, particularly in Aukus, and the new technologies and the opportunities that may mean for New Zealand’. Meanwhile, Winston Peters called for greater NZ-US cooperation in the Pacific, saying ‘we will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift’.

However, the Aukus tide may be turning.

Bonnie Jenkins, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, visited New Zealand in early March and told media: ‘we’re still in the process of having discussions about additional partners’, adding ‘that’s not where we’re at right now’.

Speech notes for an address to be given by Jenkins also seemed restrained.

The lack of a concrete Aukus membership offer is not a new argument. In May 2023, New Zealand’s then Labour Prime Minister Chris Hipkins called the idea of joining ‘purely hypothetical’.

However, gradual shifts in language since then – culminating with Luxon’s comments in December – had suggested that a more specific proposal was afoot.

A looming US election was also a logical reason for New Zealand to act on Aukus sooner rather than later.

But perhaps nothing had ever really changed. A new government in Wellington might have been getting ahead of itself.

Alternatively, it could be that a rethink is now going on in Canberra, London and Washington over the merits of asking Wellington – or others – to become involved with Aukus at all.

In New Zealand itself, opposition to the deal also appears to be increasing in intensity. Labour is appearing to back away from its ‘open to conversations’ approach to Aukus that was set by former Prime Minister Chris Hipkins during a visit by Anthony Blinken to New Zealand in July.

In February, Phil Twyford, the party’s associate foreign affairs spokesperson, described Aukus as an ‘offensive warfighting alliance against China’. And David Parker, Labour’s main spokesperson, said ‘we’re not convinced we should be positioning China as a foe’.

The same month, high-profile former Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark co-wrote an opinion piece in the New Zealand Herald newspaper with Don Brash, a former right-wing rival. The strongly-worded article called on Luxon to ‘reassert New Zealand’s independent foreign policy by making it clear that we want no part of Aukus’.

Finally, questions are being asked in Australia about the future of the original purpose of Aukus – to give Canberra nuclear-powered submarines – following a US decision to cut production of ‘Virginia’ class submarines in half from 2025.

Adding to the uncertainty is Donald Trump’s presumptive nominee status in the US presidential election campaign. A survey conducted in August 2023 found 37 per cent of Australians thought Canberra should pull out of the wider Anzus alliance if Trump wins in November. Meanwhile, Trump’s own stance on the Aukus deal remains unknown.

If all is not well with ‘Pillar I’ of Aukus, it is hard to see an expansion to ‘Pillar II’ in the short-term.

For China’s Wang Yi, the potential wavering over Aukus is an opportunity.

The clock is certainly ticking, but no final decisions have been made.

There is still time for Beijing to make its case to Wellington.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

As the 2024 academic year begins in Australia and New Zealand, optimism over the state of foreign language learning at universities is in short supply.

Languages have taken a post-pandemic battering. In 2023 alone, New Zealand’s Victoria University of Wellington decided to shut down its Greek, Latin and Italian programmes, while the University of Otago in Dunedin opted to discontinue German.

In Australia, Sydney’s Macquarie University has proposed cutting five languages altogether – including German, Italian and Russian. Chinese, Croatian, Hindi, Indonesian and Japanese are just some of the other languages that have faced funding scrutiny at institutions across Australia and New Zealand since 2020.

The cuts are coming despite the outbreak of new wars and soaring geopolitical tensions. As Australia and New Zealand both look to spend billions more on military capabilities, it’s equally vital to support foreign language learning.

Languages are an essential component of the diplomatic and intelligence toolkits. A decline in their teaching and learning has repercussions beyond university campuses.

Read more:
Closure of Indonesian language programs in Australian universities will weaken ties between the two countries

No strategy for strategic languages

Disappointingly, scant attention was paid to languages in the recent Australian Universities Accord review of the higher education system.

A rare exception was an observation that promoting Indonesian skills would help Australia to “engage better with our region” – a hint to policymakers about why languages are more than just a “nice to have”.

In New Zealand, unfortunately, the previous Labour government ultimately did not pursue the idea of a national languages strategy. But both Canberra and Wellington should consider conducting dedicated stocktakes of language learning within the wider diplomatic and societal contexts.

Read more:
Fewer U.S. college students are studying a foreign language − and that spells trouble for national security

This would be timely, given the apparent wane in learning strategic languages such as Arabic, Russian and Chinese throughout the English-speaking world, even as geopolitical tensions build. All three are official languages of the United Nations.

Despite wars in Ukraine and Gaza, Russian and Arabic both failed to feature in the top ten most popular languages studied on one of the biggest language learning apps, Duolingo. Portuguese has overtaken Russian in popularity.

A 2021 census by the Modern Language Association showed US university enrolments in Arabic fell by 27.4% compared with 2016 levels. Over the same period, Chinese declined by 14.3% and Russian fell by 13.5%.

In the United Kingdom, enrolments in Chinese studies reduced by 31% between 2012 and 2021, according to figures cited by The Economist.

At Australian and New Zealand institutions, Russian and Arabic are in particularly short supply. No New Zealand university teaches Arabic.

Some languages on the rise

For all the pessimism, some green shoots may be pushing through in 2024. Preliminary enrolment data from the University of New England (UNE) in New South Wales suggest German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish student numbers have increased for the first time since 2021.

Some positives can also be found in a US survey of university language enrolments. Learners of Korean at US universities soared by 38.3% from 2016 to 2021. The increase seems to parallel the rise of Korean popular culture in the West.

For universities, the challenge is to integrate near-limitless online resources with language instruction. The learning experience should be as realistic as possible. But it also needs to meet and embrace the diverse needs of learners.

Read more:
In Russia’s war against Ukraine, one of the battlegrounds is language itself

At UNE, for example, German learners now apply their language skills to create videos and games in German – and design their own grammar worksheets to teach others. The Australian Awards for University Teaching recently recognised the success of this “portfolio assessment” approach.

Grassroots initiatives also offer inspiration. Informal language exchanges are taking advantage of the healthy post-COVID recovery in international student numbers in both Australia and New Zealand.

These gatherings in cafés and pubs, including in Canberra and Wellington, allow participants to practise their chosen languages in an informal setting outside the classroom. The events help learners build confidence and competence.

In a multicultural society, these community events also perform an important social function. They connect local learners with native speakers who are often immigrants or international students.

Read more:
3 barriers that stop students choosing to learn a language in high school

AI is no substitute

Studying a language inevitably involves gaining insight into another culture and history. The cultural and political dimensions should not be seen as entirely separate.

Across the West, Russian was widely taught during the Cold War, while the popularity of Arabic surged after 9/11 and the Iraq War.

But the opposite phenomenon now seems to be happening. Following a further decline in Russian learner numbers, a US survey reported in 2022 that students appeared keen to “distance themselves from anything Russia related”.

Finding solutions to these challenges will not be easy – but they must be found. While AI technology is improving in leaps and bounds, machine translation will never substitute for the crucial human role foreign language learning plays in understanding other worldviews.

In stormy geopolitical times, this ability is more valuable than ever.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Lost in translation: the geopolitical risks of declining foreign language learning in Australia and NZ – https://theconversation.com/lost-in-translation-the-geopolitical-risks-of-declining-foreign-language-learning-in-australia-and-nz-225787

New Zealand is reshaping its foreign policy via the Middle East. A decision to provide intelligence support for future US and UK airstrikes on Yemen is highly symbolic.

The Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, announced the deployment of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) troops to support the US-led military response to the attacks on commercial shipping from Houthis in Yemen that began on November 19.

In announcing the contribution, Luxon played down its uniqueness, saying ‘choosing to support action in the Middle East is not unusual for New Zealand’. This was immediately echoed by his foreign minister, Winston Peters, who argued the ‘support for maritime security in the Middle East is not new’.

A ‘fact sheet’ released by the Government compared the NZDF contribution to other multilateral efforts in the Middle East such as the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) mission that has been ongoing since 1954.

The fact sheet also pointed to New Zealand’s role in the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a mission for which Wellington has provided support in some form since 2008 and continuously since 2013.

The CMF brings together 40 countries in four separate Combined Task Forces (CTF). While all of these overlap to some extent, New Zealand has traditionally focused its contribution of up to 12 personnel on CTF 150, which concentrates more on criminal activities such as piracy, narcotics and smuggling.

To date, New Zealand has not been involved in CTF 153, ‘Red Sea Maritime Security’, a relatively new mission that was established in April 2022. CTF 153 is now serving as the umbrella for ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’, a new naval patrol mission involving over 20 countries announced in December by US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin.

New Zealand’s announcement made no mention of Operation Prosperity Guardian.

Instead, the NZDF contribution appears to be for the much smaller and far more elite coalition that is backing joint US-UK airstrikes on Yemen.

US Central Command (Centcom) listed Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands as support partners for a second round of joint US-UK airstrikes conducted earlier this week.

They are the same countries that participated in the first wave of joint airstrikes, against 60 Houthi targets, on January 11.

New Zealand signed a joint statement in support of that operation, but was not otherwise involved in it.

Following Tuesday’s announcement, New Zealand can now expect to be included on the list of supporting countries for future airstrikes. So far, the aim of these has been to destroy Houthi infrastructure such as missile systems, radar units and other military facilities.

In between the joint missions, the US has also conducted smaller airstrikes against Houthi infrastructure on its own, according to Centcom.

The bombings constitute the sharper, more hawkish end of Washington’s military response to the Houthis.

Luxon suggested on Tuesday that New Zealand’s contribution would be intelligence-related and would support ‘precision targeting’ in any future airstrikes.

To some extent this will be driven simply by New Zealand’s limited capabilities, given that Wellington disbanded the combat wing of its airforce in 2001.

Still, while New Zealand’s efforts will be small and almost certainly desk-bound, they are in a very different league to New Zealand’s long-running peacekeeping efforts in Egypt and Lebanon, or even the largely deterrence-driven naval mission based out of Bahrain.

Put simply, New Zealand will be one of just a handful of countries that are bombing Yemen.

As Richard Harman points out, many countries willing to participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian, such as Singapore, are staying well away from involvement in the airstrikes.

The military involvement represents a huge shift for New Zealand’s independent foreign policy – and is uncharted territory when it comes to the Middle East.

Unlike Australia, New Zealand strongly opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Wellington did deploy troops to the anti-ISIS coalition in February 2015 – with then Prime Minister John Key shouting at opponents in Parliament to ‘get some guts and join the right side’.

But that operation was at the invitation of the Iraqi government – and New Zealand was joining a broad-based international coalition that brought together dozens of countries from the outset.

On Tuesday, Winston Peters forcefully rejected any connection between New Zealand’s new military contribution and the war in Gaza, saying ‘any suggestion our ongoing support for maritime security in the Middle East is connected to recent developments in Israel and the Gaza Strip, is wrong’.

However, the Houthis have clearly linked their attacks with the war in Gaza and have pledged to continue for as long as the war goes on.

There is little doubt that the war between Hamas and Israel is exacerbating conflict throughout the Middle East – with outbreaks of tit-for-tat attacks happening everywhere from Lebanon to Pakistan.

On the Arab street, there has been an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity for the Palestinian cause – matched in equal measure by anger towards Israel.

While the airstrikes on Yemen may help international shipping in the very short term, they will also galvanise support for the Houthis.

Ultimately, the root causes of the instability will need to be addressed if there is to be any sustainable solution.

This includes Yemen’s own disastrous humanitarian situation, following years of civil war, but also the war in Gaza and the lack of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Shortly before the New Zealand military contribution to the Yemen airstrikes was announced, Peters posted on X that ‘New Zealand is deeply concerned at recent comments by members of the Israeli Government that fuel tensions & imperil the two state solution. New Zealand has always supported a two state solution – and has consistently engaged w/Israel & the Palestinians on that basis’.

https://twitter.com/NewZealandMFA/status/1749538284873912591

Peters’ diagnosis of the need for a long-term, two-state political solution is not wrong – and New Zealand’s good reputation in the Middle East and its traditionally independent stance still puts Wellington in a good position to play a small, yet very useful diplomatic role.

But as New Zealand backs the airstrikes against the Houthis, the window of opportunity to take the dialogue and de-escalation pathway may be gradually closing.

It is hard to overstate the significance of New Zealand’s new military deployment to the Middle East.

The troop numbers are small – but the potential ramifications are enormous.

Wellington is drawing a line in the sand.

And it could be the beginning of the end for New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

New Zealand’s international relations are under new management. And Winston Peters, the new foreign minister, is already setting a change agenda.

As expected, this includes a more pro-US positioning when it comes to the Pacific – where Peters will be picking up where he left off. Peters sought to align New Zealand more closely with the United States under his ‘Pacific Reset’ policy that he launched while serving as foreign minister under Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-New Zealand First coalition government from 2017-2020.

Peters is wasting no time in getting back on the foreign affairs horse.

Just three days after being sworn in as a minster, he gave his first speech on foreign policy at the US Business Summit in Auckland last week.

Peters was lavish in his praise for the US in his address, arguing that Washington had been ‘instrumental in the Pacific’s success’. But he noted that ‘there is more to do and not a moment to lose. We will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift.’ Adding that ‘speed and intensity’ would be needed, Peters said ‘the good news is that New Zealand stands ready to play its part.’

The early timing of the speech itself is a sign that New Zealand’s new, yet very familiar foreign affairs minister is unlikely to wait around when it comes to taking major decisions.

It was an important, agenda-setting address.

There were strong hints that New Zealand’s new Government wants to move swiftly when it comes to Wellington’s potential involvement in in ‘Pillar II’ of the AUKUS defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Peters’ disclosed in the Q&A to the speech that he had already talked to Judith Collins, the new defence minister, about New Zealand’s AUKUS stance.

The previous Labour government’s position was that AUKUS remained a hypothetical question while no formal offer existed for New Zealand to join ‘Pillar II’ of the high-level defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

But while playing for time in an election year, the then Prime Minister Chris Hipkins signalled in July that New Zealand was at least ‘open to conversations’ about joining the pact in some form. And Labour’s expedited release of three major defence strategy documents in August, just prior to the election campaign, laid the groundwork for at least formal consideration of involvement in AUKUS.

The reports also paved the way for New Zealand to spend vastly more on its military and to take a more security-focused approach to the Pacific – recommendations that Peters will probably be keen to implement.

Wellington and Washington have been becoming closer since at least November 2010, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited New Zealand’s capital to sign the ‘Wellington Declaration’. The relatively short agreement served to clear the air after decades of chequered bilateral relations stemming from the Fourth Labour Government’s introduction of a nuclear-free policy in the 1980s.

Going nuclear-free (which prevented visits from US warships) saw New Zealand cast out as a US ally. Washington formally suspended its obligations to Wellington under the ANZUS defence treaty in 1986. But nearly 40 years on, US-NZ relations are rapidly deepening, a trend that has been accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Western concerns over China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.

Since February 2022, New Zealand has imposed sanctions on Russia, joined US-led groupings such as Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and sent its Prime Ministers to successive NATO summits. And in May 2022, Jacinda Ardern visited Joe Biden at the White House, where a 3000-word joint statement called for ‘new resolve and closer cooperation’.

Meanwhile, a string of senior US officials have visited New Zealand just this year, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink and the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell (who Joe Biden recently nominated to become his new Deputy Secretary of State).

If New Zealand does join AUKUS, it could spell the effective end of the country’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The ANZUS break-up of the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation had allowed New Zealand to free itself from blocs. Wellington talked to anyone and everyone, building solid, trade-focused relations with China and others in the Global South – while not neglecting Western partners, including the United States.

Peters may think the current geopolitical environment justifies a new approach.

If he does, he should prepare for significant pushback. Helen Clark, who was Prime Minister during Winston Peters’ first term as foreign minister from 2005-8, posted on Friday that New Zealand was now ‘veering towards signing up’ to AUKUS despite bipartisan support over decades for the independent foreign policy stance.

This added to criticism from Clark earlier in the year, including in August, when she argued the new defence blueprint showed New Zealand was ‘abandoning its capacity to think for itself & instead is cutting & pasting from 5 Eyes’ partners’.

It should also be remembered that Winston Peters, while undoubtedly powerful and highly experienced, is only one Government minister. The views of Judith Collins – the defence minister – remain unknown in any detail, while the foreign policy positions of Christopher Luxon seem more centrist than radical.

Moreover, with the US now firmly focused on the war between Hamas and Israel – and its own presidential election year fast approaching – it is far from guaranteed that the hypothetical AUKUS question will turn into a concrete one for New Zealand anytime soon.

Moreover, Peters’ initial ministerial comments on New Zealand’s own position towards the Middle East suggest there is plenty of room for nuance. Calling the death toll in Gaza ‘horrific’, Peters welcomed a short-lived extension to the ceasefire on Friday, but called for all parties to ‘work urgently towards a long-term ceasefire’.

And in a radio interview earlier last week, Peters said ‘the ceasefire is not good enough, we’re going to have find a way forward through this and a peaceful solution – that’s what New Zealand and the Western world has got to put its focus on’.  Peters added ‘internationally we need to be talking to people across the political divide who are making sense on this matter’.

Talking to all sides and playing a small role in facilitating a sustainable political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would very much be in keeping with New Zealand’s independent foreign policy approach – and Winston Peters is already speaking out strongly about the war.

With Christopher Luxon passing up on the opportunity to attend COP28 in Dubai at the weekend, Winston Peters will have the chance to make the Government’s first ministerial trip to the Middle East to begin this dialogue. The Gulf states would be a natural starting point for these discussions.

Meanwhile, on Ukraine – the war that helped to speed up New Zealand’s alignment with the US in 2022 – Peters was open to the idea of New Zealand upgrading its military support to Ukraine by sending Kyiv light armoured vehicles (LAVs). While noting that the decision was not up to him alone, he added ‘if we can help we should be doing the best we can’.

Labour had denied a request from Ukraine to provide the LAVs in 2022 and of late had preferred to make financial contributions to Kyiv’s war effort – the most recent being a $NZ4.7 million package announced by Chris Hipkins in July at the NATO leaders’ summit in Lithuania.

It all adds up to a complex picture.

Winston Peters has no shortage of global issues to address.

And there could be some major changes ahead for New Zealand foreign policy.

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Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

The COP28 countdown is on.

Over 100 world leaders are expected to attend this year’s UN Climate Change Conference in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which starts next Thursday.

Among the VIPs confirmed for the Dubai summit are the UK’s Rishi Sunak and Brazil’s Lula da Silva – along with King Charles and Pope Francis.

On the other hand, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping are both unlikely to join in – and neither is Australia’s Anthony Albanese.

It remains to be seen which camp New Zealand’s new Prime Minister will fall into. Christopher Luxon is only expected to be formally sworn in as PM on Monday, following the conclusion of several weeks of coalition negotiations to form a new government.

But in theory, this would still leave plenty of time for Luxon to fly to the ‘World Climate Action Summit’ opening event for world leaders, which is being held from December 1-2.

Luxon positioned his National Party firmly in the centre during the election campaign, committing New Zealand to meeting its emissions reductions targets and telling sceptics ‘you can’t be a climate denier or a climate minimalist in 2023’.

Beyond the issue of climate change itself, COP28 would be a valuable initial networking and relationship-forming opportunity for New Zealand’s new Prime Minister. And to some extent, the Dubai gathering would be a make-up affair for Luxon, after he missed the APEC summit in San Francisco in mid-November due to the ongoing coalition negotiations.

It is safe to say that the ongoing war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas will be a major topic of sideline conversations at this year’s COP.

While Luxon missed the chance to meet Xi and Biden at APEC, COP28 would be a good chance for Luxon to hear the views of a range of other world leaders – particularly voices from across the Middle East.

Somewhat surprisingly, New Zealand’s former PM Jacinda Ardern never went to a COP summit during her six years in office. The last time a New Zealand PM was represented was in 2015, when John Key attended COP21 in Paris.

Coincidentally, 2015 was also the year that Key visited the Gulf states on a three-country tour of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE that sought to jumpstart New Zealand’s bid to strike a free trade deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The bloc’s membership also includes Bahrain, Oman and Qatar.

In September, New Zealand’s then Labour government began talks with the UAE on a new bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement – or CEPA. The CEPA could be a stepping stone to finalising a wider free trade agreement with the GCC that has been in the works since 2006.

With trade opportunities in the Gulf beckoning and no end in sight to the war in Gaza, the Middle East is likely to be higher up the foreign affairs agenda for New Zealand than might have previously been thought.

On the climate front, COP28’s head appointed by host UAE, Dr Sultan al Jaber, has emphasised ‘inclusivity’ as a key plank of this year’s event. Bringing together a wide range of countries around the table, despite deepening geopolitical polarisation driven by the Gaza and Ukraine wars and tensions in the Indo-Pacific, may be the summit’s most impressive achievement.

Israel pledged in July to send a 1000-strong delegation to Dubai, led by both its Prime Minister and President. The size will now be greatly reduced – but, remarkably, Israel is still coming and will still have a pavilion at COP28. While the war has strained relations between the UAE and Israel that were normalised under the Abraham Accords in 2020, diplomatic ties remain in place.

Speaking shortly prior to the outbreak of the war that began on October 7, the UAE’s Ambassador to New Zealand, His Excellency Mr. Rashed Matar Alqemzi, told me in an interview that ‘we are bringing the world together’ and emphasised the welcome being extended by COP28 to women, religious organisations, youth and indigenous peoples.

In New Zealand’s case, this includes Māori, whose role at Expo 2020 in Dubai was ‘greatly valued’ according to Alqemzi. New Zealand’s Iwi Chairs Forum, a coalition of Māori tribal leaders, was given the task of leading a ‘Festival of Indigenous and Tribal Ideas’ during the Expo. Two years on, COP28 will be held on the same Expo 2020 site on Dubai’s southern fringe.

The aim for ‘full inclusivity’ is more controversial, however, when it refers to the involvement of oil companies and their executives at the summit – including Dr Sultan Al Jaber himself, who also heads the UAE’s state-owned oil company, ADNOC.

Since he was given the role in January, Al Jaber’s appointment has frequently been criticised by climate campaigners, with one likening it to putting a tobacco company in charge of the World Health Organization.

The counter-argument – as put by Al Jaber himself in a speech to oil company executives in October – is that fossil fuel producers are ‘central to the solution’ and need to stop ‘blocking progress’.

While these words are unlikely to convince campaigners who see greenwashing, there is some cause for optimism ahead of COP28.

A recent agenda for the summit released by Al Jaber called for a ‘responsible phase-down of unabated fossil fuels’ – a reference to the burning of oil, gas and coal without the use of carbon capture technology.

The call to ‘phase-down’ the use of at least some fossil fuels altogether represents a small, yet significant shift from earlier this year, when Al Jaber was called out by former UN climate head Christiana Figueres for speaking merely of ‘phasing out fossil fuel emissions’.

On the other hand, ‘phase-down’ is weaker than the total ‘phase-out’ language used by a recent UN report and agreed upon by the EU as its negotiating position for COP28.

The debate over phasing-down vs. phasing-out is unlikely to go away any time soon.

The need for speed has to be balanced with fairness – especially for the world’s poorest.

In his agenda, Al Jaber called for global emissions reductions of 22 gigatons – almost half the current level – by 2030, but also for a ‘just energy transition’ that ensures energy supplies remain affordable and reliable to all.

Threading this needle will not be easy.

Some parallels might be drawn with New Zealand’s own attempts to reduce agricultural emissions, which make up half of the country’s greenhouse gases – mainly due to the methane produced by livestock.

After originally pledging to bring farming into the country’s Emissions Trading Scheme, Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-led Government agreed in 2019 to work with industry groups on an alternative pricing model and technologies to reduce agricultural emissions.

A deal was announced at the end of 2022, but it collapsed this year with key industry players and Christopher Luxon’s National Party withdrawing their support. Now in Government, National is delaying the introduction of a pricing system until 2030 – well beyond Sultan Al Jaber’s deadline for action.

At the global level, agriculture is a small contributor when it comes to emissions.

By far the lion’s share comes from the burning of fossil fuels – oil, gas and coal.

While the Gulf may be looking to a future beyond oil – and focusing on education, services and technology – the fact remains that there are plenty of players with a lot to lose and everything to gain from delaying the decarbonisation process.

New Zealand’s chequered experience with a joint government-industry effort to reduce agricultural emissions may offer a salutary lesson.

Keeping everyone at the table is harder than it looks.

Still, it is worth keeping the bigger picture in mind.

Al Jaber’s drive for inclusiveness is very much in keeping with the UAE’s current overall foreign policy stance.

Despite pressure from Western capitals, Abu Dhabi has steadfastly maintained relations with Moscow since Russia invaded Ukraine – and the UAE has resisted the temptation to cut its newly forged diplomatic ties with Israel, despite overwhelming backing on the ‘Arab street’ for the Palestinian cause.

Meanwhile, with COP28 just around the corner, Ambassador Alqemzi says his message for the summit’s critics is ‘let’s see what the UAE will do – and then we can talk again’.

It is a pivotal time for the Middle East.

Christopher Luxon could learn a great deal in Dubai.

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Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. Disclosure: Geoffrey attended the recent Global Media Congress in the UAE as a guest of the organisers, the Emirates News Agency.

New Zealand’s new Government will need to hit the ground running on foreign affairs.

Determining New Zealand’s full response to the war in Gaza and the fallout in the wider Middle East will be the first major test for whoever takes the foreign minister’s role.

New Zealand has been run by a Labour caretaker administration since elections were held on October 14.  But the final results are now in – and once coalition negotiations are out of the way, a new right-leaning government will take office.

During the transition period, caretaker Labour Prime Minister Chris Hipkins and outgoing foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta have respected the convention of saying as little as possible while waiting for their successors.

When Labour has spoken out on foreign affairs, it has been after consultation with the National Party leader and soon-to-be Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon.

Luxon has characterised the new war in the Middle East as ‘sad and tragic on both sides’ – a phrasing that reflects New Zealand’s overall balanced position towards the conflict so far.

One possible exception to the low-key approach was New Zealand’s decision to cast a vote in favour of a resolution in the UN General Assembly that called for a ‘humanitarian truce’ in Gaza.

Many of New Zealand’s closest Pacific and Western partners either abstained on the resolution (e.g. Australia, Canada and the UK) or opposed it altogether (such as the United States, Tonga and Fiji).

It seems likely that New Zealand’s own vote in favour was decided by a narrow margin.

Carolyn Schwalger, New Zealand’s ambassador to the UN, said New Zealand’s support came despite Wellington being ‘deeply disappointed’ by the resolution’s failure to directly condemn Hamas.

Luxon later largely echoed Schwalger in a media interview, stressing the need to ‘prioritise the protection of civilians’, but condemning Hamas and emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself.

Still, New Zealand’s vote in favour suggests there is still life to the country’s ‘independent foreign policy’, even as Wellington creeps closer to Washington at a broader level.

It will now be up to the new Government to decide what happens next.

To command a majority in Parliament, Christopher Luxon’s National Party will need a deal with two other parties. These are the Act Party, led by David Seymour, and Winston Peters’ New Zealand First.

Of the two smaller parties, New Zealand First is likely to play a particularly crucial role in determining the shape of New Zealand’s international relations.

Winston Peters has served as foreign minister twice before – but only under Labour-led governments. He held the role under Helen Clark from 2005-2008 and again under Jacinda Ardern from 2017-2020.

Peters is said to want the foreign minister’s job again – which would come as little surprise.

Of course, the rumours could still prove to be incorrect.

Now aged 78, Peters may not want the burden of travel himself.

Other options include Judith Collins, a former National leader, and Gerry Brownlee.

However, Brownlee is a likely candidate for Speaker. For her part, Collins easily has the experience for foreign affairs, having been in Parliament since 2002.

If Collins is not chosen, the defence portfolio would be a worthy alternative option, especially as New Zealand looks to make some major decisions on military spending.

Surprisingly, no woman has ever served as New Zealand’s defence minister. A role model for Collins could be Ursula von der Leyen, a centre-right politician who served as Germany’s first-ever female defence minister from 2013-19 and went on to become a high-profile president of the European Commission.

Yet another option could be for Peters to claim the foreign minister job for his New Zealand First deputy, Shane Jones, who served as a roving ‘Ambassador for Pacific Economic Development’ in the foreign ministry from 2014-2017.

The position was somewhat controversially created for Jones by the then National-led government after Jones quit as a Labour MP, before he later reemerged as a key figure in New Zealand First.

Even if it passes up on the foreign affairs portfolio, New Zealand First is likely to be influential and outspoken on international relations issues.

An ‘agree to disagree’ clause in New Zealand First’s coalition agreement with Labour in 2017 prevented New Zealand First from being muzzled under usual collective Cabinet responsibility provisions.

Peters’ past speeches provide some clues as to how he might respond to current developments.

During his first term as foreign minister, Peters observed at the UN shortly after Israel’s 32-day war with Hezbollah in 2006 that conflicts in the Middle East had largely been left to fester, resulting in ‘an unstable environment where extremism, injustice and despair flourish’.

Peters told the UN General Assembly that peacekeeping efforts – such as the strengthening of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) following the 2006 war – were only a stopgap solution and would be ‘doomed to failure unless the underlying political and security issues are addressed’.

More recently, as tensions between the US and Iran mounted, Peters observed in a speech to the Otago Foreign Policy School in 2019 that it was in New Zealand’s interest to stop ‘flashpoints escalating’ and commended Washington for avoiding ‘retaliatory strikes’. The speech built on an earlier statement in which Peters called for ‘caution, restraint and commonsense’ from all involved.

A 2023 election campaign speech by Peters that was dedicated to foreign affairs provides some wider insights into New Zealand First’s foreign affairs and defence priorities.

These include picking up on New Zealand First’s efforts from 2017-2020 to boost New Zealand’s foreign aid and defence budgets. At the time, Peters secured an additional $NZ714m in funding for foreign aid – largely targeted at the Pacific as part of his ‘Pacific Reset’ policy. Meanwhile, military spending was boosted by around $NZ4 billion over the same three-year period.

Peters also gained funding for 50 more diplomats – a feat he seems keen to build on.

Contrasting New Zealand with two other small states – Singapore and Ireland – Peters argued New Zealand needed ‘highly active diplomacy’ which in his view had been ‘shockingly not pursed with vigour’ since 2020.

This was probably partly a jibe at the outgoing foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta, who came under pressure during her tenure for a perceived reluctance to travel frequently.

Peters’ contrast with Singapore and Ireland also surfaced in a campaign interview, with some eviscerating criticism: ‘Ireland has two-and-a-half-times more diplomats offshore, so does Singapore – maybe they know something about exporting and trade that we should be practising, rather than this eternal idiotic statement that New Zealand is ‘punching above its weight’’.

As foreign minister, Peter oversaw the opening of new diplomatic posts in Cairo (2007), Dublin (2018), Stockholm (2008 and 2018 – the latter a reopening). But not all of these were his idea.

On the substance, Ireland already has around 100 diplomatic missions globally – twice the number maintained by New Zealand – and is currently expanding its diplomatic footprint even further under an initiative dubbed ‘Global Ireland 2025’.

It remains to be seen whether Peters will be in a position to replicate the ‘Global Ireland 2025’ plan in New Zealand – and what exactly he would seek to achieve with more diplomatic resources.

Opening up more missions in the Middle East would help to give New Zealand the eyes and ears it needs to understand and respond more effectively to events in the region. As the current war shows, these frequently have a global impact.

Another focus might be to boost diplomats’ access to foreign language training, which has been dealt a blow by recent cuts to languages by New Zealand universities.

Nevertheless, stepping up engagement in the Pacific is probably going to be the bigger long-term priority for New Zealand First.

In a 2006 speech, Winston Peters remarked that the Pacific’s ‘strategic significance presents opportunity and challenge’ and the threats included ‘chequebook diplomacy’ – probably an early veiled barb at China.

Fast-forward to 2023, and the New Zealand First leader seems keen to pick up on the ‘Pacific Reset’ policy he launched in March 2018.

In his September campaign speech, Peters recapitulated how as foreign minister he had sought to work more closely with Pacific countries themselves, as well as boosting engagement with the US and Japan – on top of the foreign aid and defence budget boosts.

But Peters warned he was ‘seriously concerned that the momentum we started has fallen by the wayside since 2020’.

After a successful election campaign, the New Zealand First leader is now in a position to change that.

Christopher Luxon needs Winston Peters to form a government.

And a shakeup of New Zealand’s international relations seems likely.

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Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

The weekend’s surprise and brutal attack on Israel by Hamas fighters has the potential to reshape the Middle East – and will only further increase global geopolitical instability. As of Sunday night NZT, the initial 24 hours of the assault by Hamas on Israel had already taken at least 250 Israeli lives – easily making it the bloodiest day for Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In addition, dozens of Israelis have been kidnapped and taken back to Gaza to be used as bargaining chips. While there will be a range of motivations for why Hamas chose to act in the way it did now, the symbolic timing of Hamas’ assault – almost 50 years to the day after Yom Kippur – is unlikely to be a coincidence.

In recent years, Western countries such as New Zealand have largely taken their eye off the region to focus on the war in Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific. A staple of New Zealand’s world news diet in decades past, of late the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has only rarely made the headlines. When it has, New Zealand has preferred not to become involved to any real extent beyond expressing sympathy with the victims. For example, when conflict broke out over Gaza in 2021, Jacinda Ardern cut an image that resembled more that of an observer or commentator, rather than of a participant in international affairs.

The new Hamas assault is a reminder of the continued power of the Middle East to shock and surprise. While it is too early to tell how the conflict will exactly unfold, one of the most concerning aspects will be the extent to which other nation-states become involved – particularly Iran, a close supporter of Hamas. The risk is that the war could spiral out of control and become a wider conflict with an even greater global impact, in an echo (or, potentially, an even more dangerous version) of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Determining New Zealand’s response to the new war in the Middle East will be one of the new New Zealand government’s first challenges – and as shown by the fierce reaction to the initial lack of direct condemnation of the Hamas assault by Nanaia Mahuta, it will not be an easy path to navigate. A sustainable and durable two-state solution is the only long-term answer to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But with Israel now defending itself against a vicious and horrific attack by Hamas, and planning a new ground invasion of Gaza, this will not be on the table in the near future.

However, New Zealand should resist the temptation to lose hope or to see the war as simply someone else’s problem. As a small democracy far from the epicentre of the conflict, New Zealand could eventually play a role in peacemaking efforts – if it wanted to. We should not forget that as horrific as the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was, the Camp David Accords came just five years later in 1978. These led to Egypt signing a peace treaty with Israel, a settlement that has endured. The darkest moment can sometimes come before the dawn. There will absolutely be a need for de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy in the days, weeks, months and years ahead – and countries will be sorely needed to lead and support these efforts.

For now, these ambitions may seem like a pipe dream. But as the war in Ukraine has shown, even distant wars can have an outsized impact, even half a world away. Crude oil prices have already risen sharply this year – and combined with a strengthening US dollar, these have caused New Zealand petrol prices to head back up to levels last seen in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pain caused by rising inflation and the cost-of-living crisis – the number one issue of the election campaign – may not be over yet.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. To subscriber, please visit the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz).